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Foreword
We are facing a global crisis. We are totally dependent upon the natural world. It supplies us 
with every oxygen-laden breath we take and every mouthful of food we eat. But we are currently 
damaging it so profoundly that many of its natural systems are now on the verge of breakdown.
Every other animal living on this planet, of course, is similarly dependent. But in one crucial way, 
we are different. We can change not just the numbers, but the very anatomy of the animals and 
plants that live around us. We acquired that ability, doubtless almost unconsciously, some ten 
thousand years ago, when we had ceased wandering and built settlements for ourselves. It was 
then that we started to modify other animals and plants.
At first, doubtless, we did so unintentionally. We collected the kinds of seeds that we wanted 
to eat and took them back to our houses. Some doubtless fell to the ground and sprouted 
the following season. So over generations, we became farmers. We domesticated animals 
in a similar way. We brought back the young of those we had hunted, reared them in our 
settlements and ultimately bred them there. Over many generations, this changed both the 
bodies and ultimately the characters of the animals on which we depend.
We are now so mechanically ingenious that we are able to destroy a rainforest, the most 
species-rich ecosystem that has ever existed, and replace it with plantations of a single species in 
order to feed burgeoning human populations on the other side of the world. No single species 
in the whole history of life has ever been so successful or so dominant.
Now we are plundering every corner of the world, apparently neither knowing or caring what 
the consequences might be. Each nation is doing so within its own territories. Those with lands 
bordering the sea fish not only in their offshore waters but in parts of the ocean so far from land 
that no single nation can claim them. So now we are stripping every part of both the land and 
the sea in order to feed our ever-increasing numbers.
How has the natural world managed to survive this unrelenting ever-increasing onslaught by a 
single species? The answer of course, is that many animals have not been able to do so. When 
Europeans first arrived in southern Africa they found immense herds of antelope and zebra. 
These are now gone and vast cities stand in their stead. In North America, the passenger pigeon 
once flourished in such vast flocks that when they migrated, they darkened the skies from 
horizon to horizon and took days to pass. So they were hunted without restraint. Today, that 
species is extinct. Many others that lived in less dramatic and visible ways simply disappeared 
without the knowledge of most people worldwide and were mourned only by a few naturalists.
Nonetheless, in spite of these assaults, the biodiversity of the world is still immense. And 
therein lies the strength that has enabled much of its wildlife to survive until now. Economists 
understand the wisdom of spreading their investments across a wide range of activities. It 
enables them to withstand disasters that may strike any one particular asset. The same is true 
in the natural world. If conditions change, either climatically or as a consequence of a new 
development in the never-ending competition between species, the ecosystem as a whole is able 
to maintain its vigour.
But consider the following facts. Today, we ourselves, together with the livestock we rear for 
food, constitute 96% of the mass of all mammals on the planet. Only 4% is everything else – 
from elephants to badgers, from moose to monkeys. And 70% of all birds alive at this moment 
are poultry – mostly chickens for us to eat. We are destroying biodiversity, the very characteristic 
that until recently enabled the natural world to flourish so abundantly. If we continue this 
damage, whole ecosystems will collapse. That is now a real risk.
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Putting things right will take collaborative action by every nation on earth. It will require 
international agreements to change our ways. Each ecosystem has its own vulnerabilities and 
requires its own solutions. There has to be a universally shared understanding of how these 
systems work, and how those that have been damaged can be brought back to health.
This comprehensive, detailed and immensely important report is grounded in that 
understanding. It explains how we have come to create these problems and the actions we must 
take to solve them. It then provides a map for navigating a path towards the restoration of our 
planet’s biodiversity.
Economics is a discipline that shapes decisions of the utmost consequence, and so matters 
to us all. The Dasgupta Review at last puts biodiversity at its core and provides the compass 
that we urgently need. In doing so, it shows us how, by bringing economics and ecology 
together, we can help save the natural world at what may be the last minute – and in doing so, 
save ourselves.
David Attenborough
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Preface
The present monograph is an abridged version of The Dasgupta Review on the Economics of 
Biodiversity (the Review) that I prepared at the invitation, in Spring 2019, of the then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer of the UK Government. 
*
Economics, like I imagine other scientific disciplines, normally moves in incremental steps, and 
always without a central guide. Much like practitioners of other disciplines, we economists work 
with models of those features of the world we want to study in detail. That involves keeping all 
else in the far background. Models are thus parables, some say they are caricatures, which is of 
course their point.
Economics is also a quantitative subject. Finance ministers need estimates of tax revenues if they 
are to meet intended government expenditure; environment ministers today cannot but ask how 
much farmers should be paid to set aside land for ‘greening’ the landscape, and whether fossil-
fuel subsidies should be eliminated; health ministers look to convince cabinet colleagues that 
investment in health is good for economic growth; and so on. Which is why economic models 
are almost invariably cast in mathematical terms.
That is also why the models that appear in economics journals can appear esoteric, unreal, 
and even self-indulgent. Many would argue as well that to model human behaviour formally, 
let alone mathematically, is to tarnish the human experience, with all its richness. And yet, 
economists in governments, international organisations, and private corporations find those 
models and their adaptations essential for collecting and analysing data, forecasting economic 
trajectories, evaluating options and designing policy. Perhaps, then, it should be no surprise that 
those same models go on to shape the conception we build of our economic possibilities. In 
turn, our acceptance of the economic possibilities those models say are open to us encourages 
academic economists to refine and develop them further along their tested contours. And that 
in turn further contributes to our beliefs about what is achievable in our economic future. The 
mutual influence is synergistic.1
That has had at least one unintended and costly consequence. Not so long ago, when the 
world was very different from what it is now, the economic questions that needed urgent 
response could be studied most productively by excluding Nature from economic models. At 
the end of the Second World War, absolute poverty was endemic in much of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America; and Europe needed reconstruction. It was natural to focus on the accumulation 
of produced capital (roads, machines, buildings, factories, and ports) and what we today call 
human capital (health and education). To introduce Nature, or natural capital, into economic 
models would have been to add unnecessary luggage to the exercise.2
1 It will be asked who is represented in the collective ‘we’ and ‘our’ that I am using here. It is not everyone in the world, and 
certainly not restricted to those who agree with the claims I am making about the mutual influence of academic economic models 
and a general reading of economic possibilities. The group I have in mind is not fixed by designation but through invitation – for 
example, people who read this Review – to consider why and how we need to break the cycle and revise the conception we hold of 
humanity’s place in the biosphere. 
2 The significance of the years immediately following the Second World War for the economics of biodiversity will become clear 
below. I am referring to the evolution of economic thinking in the West. However, to the best of my knowledge the economic 
models that shaped state policy in the Soviet Union, and the ones developed by prominent academics in Latin America, also did 
not include Nature. The terms Nature, natural capital, the natural environment, the biosphere, and the natural world are used 
interchangeably. 
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Nature entered macroeconomic models of growth and development in the 1970s, but in an 
inessential form.3 The thought was that human ingenuity could overcome Nature’s scarcity over 
time, and ultimately (formally, in the limit) allow humanity to be free of Nature’s constraints. But 
the practice of building economic models on the backs of those that had most recently been 
designed meant that the macroeconomics of growth and development continued to be built 
without Nature’s appearance as an essential entity in our economic lives. Historians of science 
and technology call that feature of the process of selection ‘path dependence’.4 That may be 
why economic and finance ministries and international organisations today graft particular 
features of Nature, such as the global climate, onto their models as and when the need arises, 
but otherwise continue to assume the biosphere to be external to the human economy. In turn, 
the practice continues to influence our conception of economic possibilities for the future. We 
may have increasingly queried the absence of Nature from official conceptions of economic 
possibilities, but the worry has been left for Sundays. On week-days, our thinking has remained 
as usual.5
The Review is both long and technical; in boxes, annexes, and starred chapters, it is even 
mathematical. I knew it would be so even as I began working on it; so I have all along had it in 
mind to write a shortened, non-mathematical monograph based on it. But I never expected the 
resulting monograph to be an easy read; it could not be, because the economics of biodiversity 
is a very hard subject. 
My reader is the concerned citizen. She is someone who has watched television documentaries 
on the state of the biosphere and has read reports in newspapers and magazines on the 
extent to which Earth is being degraded and biodiversity is being lost. What she wants now 
is an explanation for how and why we have come to this pass, and she wants to know how 
to translate that explanation into recommendations. She is curious to know what sustainable 
development should mean; what criteria governments and private companies should use when 
choosing investment projects; what rules private investors such as herself should use to compare 
alternative asset portfolios; what she should insist be the practices of companies producing the 
goods and services she purchases and consumes; whether the social returns on investment in 
family planning and reproductive health to meet the unmet needs of millions of the world’s 
poorest women are so low that the European Union assigns less than 1% of their international 
aid budget to them; and so on. Depending on the context, I call her the ‘social evaluator’, or 
the ‘citizen investor’. She recognises that her perspective as a citizen is different from the one 
she assumes as she goes about her daily life. And she wants to understand why this is so. She 
is perplexed that her economist neighbour insists that markets can eliminate these problems if 
only the government would set appropriate taxes, subsidies, and regulations, but that without 
sustained economic growth all that humanity has achieved will be lost and poverty will be on 
the rise. She feels her neighbour is on a wrong track, but doesn’t know how to argue with 
him. My reader is someone willing to work hard with me to understand how to counter her 
economist neighbour.
Biodiversity is the diversity of life. We will find that the economics of biodiversity is the 
economics of the entire biosphere. So, when developing the subject, we will keep in mind that 
we are embedded in Nature. We show (and the Review confirms formally) that although the 
difference in conception is analytically slight, it has profound implications for what we can 
legitimately expect of the human enterprise. The former viewpoint encourages the thought 
3 See, for example, the special issue in the Review of Economic Studies (1974) on the economics of exhaustible resources.
4 A clear statement is in P. A. David, ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’, American Economic Review, 75(2), 332-337. 
5 Over the years the absence of Nature’s essentiality from macroeconomic models of growth and development has been remarked 
upon by scholars outside the mainstream of economic thinking and practice. But while it is all too easy to criticise existing practices, 
it is a lot harder to develop alternative models of comparable analytical depth and empirical reach to ones that have been honed by 
years of patient work. That may be why the criticisms have not been taken seriously by mainstream economists. 
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that human ingenuity, when it is directed at advancing the common good, can raise global 
output indefinitely without affecting the biosphere so adversely that it is tipped into a state 
far-removed from where it has been since long before human societies began to form; the latter 
is an expression of the thought that because the biosphere is bounded, the global economy 
is bounded.
In the chapters that follow, the natural world is studied in relation to the many other assets we 
hold in our portfolios, such as the vehicles we use for transport, the homes in which we live, 
and the machines and equipment that furnish our offices and factories. But like education and 
health, Nature is more than a mere economic good. Nature nurtures and nourishes us, so we 
will think of assets as durable entities that not only have use value, but may also have intrinsic 
worth. Once we make that extension, the economics of biodiversity becomes a study in portfolio 
management. Which is why I call the concerned citizen the ‘citizen investor’. 
Nature has features that differ subtly from produced capital goods. The financier may be 
moving assets around in his portfolio, but that is only a figure of speech. His portfolio represents 
factories and ports, plantations and agricultural land, and mines and oil fields. Reasonably, he 
takes them to be immobile. In contrast, Nature is in large measure mobile. Insects and birds 
fly, fish swim, the wind blows, rivers flow, the oceans circulate, and even earthworms travel. 
Economists have long realised that Nature’s mobility is one reason the citizen investor will not 
take the market prices of natural capital to represent their social worth even when markets for 
them exist. We study the wedge between the prices we pay for Nature’s goods and services and 
their social values (their social values are called ‘accounting prices’) in terms of what economists 
call ‘externalities’. Over the years, a rich and extensive literature has identified the measures that 
can be deployed (the forces of the law and social norms) for closing that wedge. The presence 
of the wedge is why the citizen investor will insist that companies disclose activities along their 
entire supply chain. Disclosure serves to substitute for imperfect market prices.
But in addition to mobility, Nature has two properties that make the economics of biodiversity 
markedly different from the economics that informs our intuitions about the character of 
produced capital. Many of the processes that shape our natural world are silent and invisible. 
The soils are a seat of a bewildering number of processes with all three attributes. Taken 
together the attributes are the reason it is not possible to trace very many of the harms inflicted 
on Nature (and by extension, on humanity too) to those who are responsible. Just who is 
responsible for a particular harm is often neither observable nor verifiable. No social mechanism 
can meet this problem in its entirety, meaning that no institution can be devised to enforce 
socially responsible conduct.
It would seem then that, ultimately, we each have to serve as judge and jury for our own 
actions. And that cannot happen unless we develop an affection for Nature and its processes. 
As that affection can flourish only if we each develop an appreciation of Nature’s workings, the 
monograph ends with a plea that our education systems should introduce Nature studies from 
the earliest stages of our lives, and revisit them in the years we spend in secondary and tertiary 
education. The conclusion we should draw from this is unmistakable: if we care about our 
common future and the common future of our descendants, we should all in part be naturalists.
My education in what is the substance of the Review began in the late 1970s in conversations 
with Karl-Göran Mäler. He encouraged me to develop my ideas on the links between rural 
poverty and the state of the local environmental resource-base in the world’s poorest countries, 
a subject that was then notably absent from mainstream development economics and remained 
absent until well into the 1990s. I was further encouraged by Lal Jayawardena, Director of 
the World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER), Helsinki, who invited Mäler 
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and me in 1988 to establish a programme at his institute on the environment and emerging 
development issues.6
But it wasn’t until 1991 when, as the newly appointed Director of the Beijer Institute of 
Ecological Economics, Stockholm, Mäler asked me to serve as Chair of the Institute’s Scientific 
Advisory Board, that we were able to pursue the programme jointly with ecologists. The 
Institute’s mandate made it possible, which was unusual at that time, for ecologists and 
economists to conduct a regular series of workshops in ecological economics. In this, Mäler and 
I were aided greatly by the intellectual authority of Kenneth Arrow, Bert Bolin, Paul Ehrlich, and 
Simon Levin. The Institute’s activities have continued with the same exacting standard under Carl 
Folke, who assumed the Directorship when Mäler retired.
As these developments were confined to Continental Europe, it was natural for us to imagine 
regional networks of ecological economists in developing countries. That was made possible 
by a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, Chicago. It enabled Mäler and me in 1999 to 
establish the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics (SANDEE) 
and simultaneously the journal Environment and Development Economics (Cambridge University 
Press). Our idea was to offer not only encouragement, but also financial help and a journal 
based in the West where university teachers of economics in developing countries could publish 
their research findings. We were able soon after to help colleagues in Eastern and Southern 
Africa and in Latin America to establish their own networks.7
Mäler and I received further help. This time from Miguel Virasoro, Director of the Abdus Salam 
International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP), Trieste, who invited us in 2001 to create a 
programme in ecological economics at ICTP. We used the opportunity to invite economists in our 
newly formed networks to the Centre, so that they could prepare their findings for publication 
with help from members of the journal’s editorial board. The Review has been much influenced 
by the rich body of work by colleagues in those networks.
The economics of biodiversity requires attention to local socio-ecological details. I was 
introduced to the idea of social capital and its relevance for ecological economics at the biannual 
retreat that Ismail Serageldin convened for an advisory panel he had constituted in the mid-
1990s at the Sustainable Development Vice Presidency of the World Bank.8 My understanding 
of the subject has been deepened at the annual teaching workshop that SANDEE has organised 
since its inception, from discussions with my fellow lecturers Rabindranath Bhattacharya, Randall 
Bluffstone, Enamul Haque, Karl-Göran Mäler, Pranab Mukhopadhyay, M.N. Murty, Mani Nepal, 
Subhrendu Pattanayak, Priya Shyamsundar, E. Somanathan, and Jeff Vincent, and participants 
from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, too numerous to mention 
individually. On the science of complexity, I have learnt enormously from discussions over a 
period of fifteen years with fellow members of the Scientific Advisory Panel of the Programme on 
Complex Systems at the James S. McDonnell Foundation, St. Louis, and from the Foundation’s 
successive Presidents, John Bruer and Susan Fitzpatrick.
Before beginning work on the Review, I asked Simon Beard, John Bongaarts, Simon Levin, Tom 
Lovejoy, and Peter Raven to prepare essays for me on subjects I knew to be essential but on 
which I was inexpert. The ideas they developed in their papers are reflected in the present work. 
6 The programme’s proceedings were published in P. Dasgupta and K.-G. Mäler, eds., The Environment and Emerging Development 
Issues, Vols. I and II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), and P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Mäler, and A. Vercelli, eds., The Economics of 
Transnational Commons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
7 Resource Accounting Network for Eastern and Southern Africa (RANESA) and the Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy 
in Africa (CEEPA), Pretoria; and Latin American and Caribbean Environmental Economics (LACEEP) and the Tropical Agricultural 
Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE), Costa Rica. SANDEE is based at the International Center for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD), Kathmandu.
8 The Panel’s proceedings were published in P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin, eds. (2000), Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective 
(Washington, DC: World Bank).
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The Review and this monograph have been much influenced also by Scott Barrett and Aisha 
Dasgupta, who assumed the lead in collaborative works that form the basis of some of the 
central ideas here.
During the Review’s preparation, I gained enormously from correspondence and discussions 
with Inger Andersen, Robert Aumann, Scott Barrett, Ian Bateman, Simon Beard, Simon 
Blackburn, Caroline Bledsoe, John Bongaarts, Stephen Carpenter, William Clark, Mary Colwell, 
Diane Coyle, Aisha Dasgupta, Shamik Dasgupta, Zubeida Dasgupta, Paul Ehrlich, Carl Folke, 
Patrick Gerland, Roger Gifford, Lawrence Goulder, Ben Groom, Andy Haines, Geoffrey Heal, 
Cameron Hepburn, Girol Karacaoglu, Phoebe Koundouri, Pushpam Kumar, Tim Lenton, Simon 
Levin, Justin Lin, Tim Littlewood, Jane Lubchenco, Georgina Mace, Robert Macfarlane, Shunsuke 
Managi, Eric Maskin, Henrietta Moore, Tid Morton, Ilan Noy, Gustav Paez, Charles Perrings, 
Stuart Pimm, Peter Raven, Martin Rees, Fiona Reynolds, Marten Scheffer, Ingmar Schumacher, V. 
Kerry Smith, Denise Spinney, Will Steffen, Nicholas Stern, Thomas Sterner, William Sutherland, 
Nicola Tagart, Alistair Ulph, Ruut Veenhoven, Jeff Vincent, Robert Watson, Gavin Wright, 
Anastasios Xepapadeas, Menahem Yaari, and Aart de Zeeuw.
I am especially grateful to HM Treasury for enabling Sandy Sheard to assemble an exceptionally 
gifted team who have helped me think through the economics of biodiversity. Drawn from 
across the public sector and based in HM Treasury, they have provided me with invaluable 
support over the course of the Review, including Mark Anderson, Heather Britton, Abbas 
Chaudri, Dana Cybuch, Rebecca Gray, Haroon Mohamoud, Robert Marks, Emily McKenzie, Diana 
Mortimer, Rebecca Nohl, Felix Nugee, Ant Parham, Victoria Robb, Sandy Sheard, Sehr Syed, 
Thomas Viegas, Ruth Waters, and Lucy Watkinson. They have gathered evidence from a wide 
range of experts from around the world, arranged for me to meet many of them, supported 
my Advisory Panel, prepared a wealth of case studies, edited the Review, and made vital 
contributions to drafting elements of the Review itself. Even more, they queried every intellectual 
move I made; to a professor, there can be no greater reward.
Above all, I am grateful to Carol Dasgupta, on whom I have tested pretty much every idea in the 
Review. Her suggestions on what to emphasise and what is superficial have been invaluable. The 
present monograph reflects the impact of her comments and those of Paul Ehrlich.
The influence of Amiya Dasgupta, Kenneth Arrow, Paul Ehrlich, Peter Raven, John Rawls, and 
Robert Solow on the way I frame economics has become increasingly evident to me. 
Partha Dasgupta 
St John’s College, Cambridge
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Part I  
The State We Are In and Why
1 Managing Our Assets
We are all asset managers. Whether as farmers or fishers, foresters or miners, households or 
businesses, governments or communities, we manage the assets to which we have access, in 
line with our motivations as best as we can. But the best each of us is able to achieve with our 
portfolios may nevertheless result in a massive collective failure to manage the global portfolio 
of all our assets. The analogy of each person in a crowd trying to keep balance on a hanging 
bridge and bringing it crashing down speaks to that possibility. The Review has been prompted 
by a growing body of evidence that in recent decades humanity has been degrading our most 
precious asset, the natural environment, at rates far greater than ever before. Simultaneously, 
the material standard of living of the average person in the world is far higher today than it has 
ever been; indeed, we have never had it so good.9 In the process of getting to where we are, 
though, we have degraded the biosphere to the point where the demands we make of its goods 
and services far exceed its ability to meet them on a sustainable basis. That suggests we have 
been living at both the best and worst of times.
It is a commonplace assertion that economic development should be so directed that it is 
sustainable (Box 1). But the idea of sustainable development cannot be applied unless we have 
an understanding of what a sustainable dependence on Nature requires of us.10 Here we study 
the natural world in relation to the many other assets we hold in our portfolios, such as the 
vehicles we use for transport, the homes in which we live, and the machines and equipment 
that furnish our offices and factories. But like education and health, Nature is more than a mere 
economic good. Nature nurtures and nourishes us, so we will think of assets as durable entities 
that not only have use value, but may also have intrinsic worth. Once we make that extension, 
the economics of biodiversity becomes a study in portfolio management.
To be sure, not every object of Nature has a positive value for us. Pathogens and pests damage 
not only our health and that of our crops and animals, they also destroy pristine forests and 
fisheries, so we try to suppress them when they arise. That their emergence is an immanent 
feature of Nature’s processes does not alter our attitude to them, for we too are an emergent 
feature of those processes. We will confirm that environmental degradation is making their 
appearance in the human economy more frequent. COVID-19 is only the most recent arrival.
Pollution is a by-product and waste product of our activities – they too have negative value. 
Conservation of mass means that the waste we create has to be deposited somewhere. The 
discharge contributes to the degradation of the natural environment. Acid rains damage forests; 
carbon emissions into the atmosphere trap heat; industrial seepage and discharge reduce 
water quality in streams and underground reservoirs; sulphur emissions corrode structures and 
harm human health; and so on. The damage inflicted on each type of asset (buildings, forests, 
the atmosphere, fisheries, human health) should be interpreted as depreciation of that asset. 
Pollution is the reverse of conservation.
9 Recent books noting humanity’s achievements include Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000), Ridley (2010), Lomborg (2013), 
Norberg (2016), and Pinker (2018). Time series of subjective measures of well-being, such as happiness and life satisfaction, 
however, tell a different story (Review, Chapter 11). 
10 We use the terms Nature, natural world, natural environment, biosphere, and natural capital, interchangeably. 
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The Review demonstrates that in order to judge whether the path of economic development 
we choose to follow is sustainable, nations need to adopt a system of economic accounts that 
records an inclusive measure of their wealth. The contemporary practice of using gross domestic 
product (GDP) to judge economic performance is based on a faulty application of economics. 
GDP is a flow (so many market dollars of output per year), in contrast to inclusive wealth, which 
is a stock (the social worth of the economy’s entire portfolio of assets). Relatedly, GDP does 
not include the depreciation of assets, for example the degradation of the natural environment 
(we should remember that ‘G’ in GDP stands for gross output of final goods and services, not 
output net of depreciation of assets). As a measure of economic activity, GDP is indispensable in 
short-run macroeconomic analysis and management, but it is wholly unsuitable for appraising 
investment projects and identifying sustainable development. Nor was GDP intended by the 
economists who fashioned it to be used for those two purposes. An economy could record 
a high rate of growth of GDP by depreciating its assets, but one would not know that from 
national statistics.11 Below we show that in recent decades eroding natural assets has been 
exactly the means the world economy has deployed for enjoying what is routinely celebrated 
as ‘economic growth’, and that sustainable economic growth requires a different measure 
than GDP.
Depending on our circumstances, the portfolios of assets we manage differ widely. More than 
50% of the world’s population today are urban, and the figure is projected to rise to 70% by 
2050. Urban living creates a distance between us and the natural world. Rural communities 
in low income countries are much closer to Nature than urban households in high income 
countries. Daily activities in rural Africa require goods and services extracted from the local 
landscape, in contrast to the daily lives in urban Europe, where people depend equally on, and 
extract more from, Nature but do so at several steps removed, often depending on natural 
resources from distant parts of the world. Many households in villages in Niger, in contrast to 
households in towns in Germany, do not have water on tap to drink, wash, or cook; nor do 
they have access to electricity. And their landscape is degrading through unsustainable use. 
One measure of resource degradation facing rural communities in low income regions is the 
increased time needed for household production. But exit toward a similar landscape is not 
always an option, for neighbouring villages also face increasing resource scarcity and out of 
necessity are not welcoming. Which is how crowding in the shanty towns of sprawling cities has 
become such a familiar sight.
In contrast, degradation of Nature in distant lands has little-to-no bite on the lives of people 
in high income countries; there are alternative sources of supply from other parts of the 
world, at least for now. Pendrill et al. (2019) for example have estimated that about one-sixth 
of the carbon footprint of the average diet in the European Union can be linked directly to 
deforestation in tropical countries.
The Review develops the idea of sustainable development by constructing a grammar for 
understanding our engagements with Nature – what we take from it, how we transform what 
we take from it and return to it, why and how in recent decades we have disrupted Nature’s 
processes to the detriment of our own and our descendants’ lives, and what we can do to 
change direction.
As this is a global Review, we often speak of the demands that humanity makes on Nature. 
But much of the time the Review looks closely at smaller scales and local engagement with 
Nature. Differences in the way communities are able to live tell us that people do not experience 
increasing resource scarcity in the same way. Food, potable water, clothing, a roof over one’s 
head, clean air, a sense of belonging, participating with others in one’s community, and a 
reason for hope are no doubt universal needs, but the emphases people place on the goods 
11 The United Nations’ Human Development Index (UNDP, 1990) suffers from the same weakness. 
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and services Nature supplies differ widely. To farmers in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, it 
could be declining sources of water and increasing variability in rainfall in the foreground of 
global climate change; to indigenous populations in Amazonia it may be eviction not just from 
their home, but from their spiritual home; to inhabitants of shanty towns everywhere the worry 
could be the infections they are subjected to from open sewers; to the suburban household in 
the UK it may be the absence of bees and butterflies in the garden; to residents of mega-cities 
it could be the poisonous air they breathe; to the multi-national company it could be the worry 
about supply chains, as disruptions to the biosphere makes old sources of primary products 
unreliable and investments generally more risky; to governments in many places it may be the 
call by citizens, even children, to stem global climate change; and to people everywhere it would 
be to experience the consequences in myriad different situations to such forms of environmental 
problems as the COVID-19 pandemic. Degradation of Nature is not experienced in the same way 
by everyone.
Box 1
Sustainable Development Goals and the Idea of Sustainable Development
In September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly agreed on an agenda for 
sustainable development in member countries. Nations committed themselves to meeting 
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 (Figure 1). Reasonably, the quantitative 
targets to be met do not distinguish societal ends from the means to achieve them. Thus, in 
the chart below Goals 1-6 should be taken to be ends, whereas Goals 7, 9 and 17 are means 
to ends, and Goal 8 reflects both ends and means. The SDGs involve 169 socio-economic 
targets. To measure progress in meeting those targets, it was proposed to track more than 
240 socio-economic indicators over the coming years (United Nations, 2015).
Figure 1 17 Sustainable Development Goals Adopted by All United Nations Member 
States in 2015
Source: United Nations (2015).
International agreement on the SDGs was a remarkable, even noble, achievement, for the 
Goals unpick features of lives that would enable us to live well. But there is a problem. The 
Part I: The State We Are In and Why
14 The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Abridged Version
Goals are not accompanied by an examination of whether, assuming they are achieved, they 
are sustainable. The Brundtland Commission (1987) defined sustainable development as “... 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”. One should interpret it as a requirement that relative 
to their respective demographics, each generation should leave to its successor at least 
as large a productive base as it had inherited from its predecessor. For if it were to do so, 
economic possibilities facing the successor would be no less than those the generation faced 
when inheriting the productive base from its predecessor. 
The Review shows that an economy’s productive base is an inclusive measure of its wealth 
(here, we sketch the idea in Section 17). The Brundtland Commission’s proposal could 
then be re-worded to say that development is sustainable if inclusive wealth increases. The 
founding text of the discipline of economics was titled ‘The Wealth of Nations’, not ‘The 
GDP of Nations’. The notion of wealth the Review formulates is a lot more comprehensive 
than the one Adam Smith was able to articulate in his day, but his focus on assets was 
exactly right.
2 Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
Biological diversity, or biodiversity for short, means the diversity of life in all its forms. It is not 
uncommon though to regard biodiversity to be the number of species of organisms that inhabit 
Earth. Today there are 8-20 million species of organisms, maybe more, with cells containing a 
distinct nucleus that houses genetic material in the form of chromosomes (such organisms are 
called eukaryotes). Only about 2 million eukaryotes have been recognised and named so far. 
There are in addition unknown and much larger numbers of archaea and bacteria, which do 
not have a cell nucleus (they are called prokaryotes). Our lack of knowledge, including whether 
viruses should be thought of as living organisms, is enormous.12
But biodiversity has further dimensions, including the genes these organisms contain and, as 
we will see presently, the functional characteristics of the ecosystems in which they live. The 
chemical reactions of Earth’s plants, algae and many bacteria sustain life by converting sunlight 
and nutrients into food, useable energy, and the building blocks of life, as well as recycling 
waste. Those photosynthesising organisms are called primary producers. Their activities are 
often both silent and hidden from view, but they enable ecosystems to function and provide 
a multitude of services on which we rely. Which is why the economics of biodiversity is the 
economics of the biosphere.
The biosphere, which is the part of Earth occupied by living organisms, is a regenerative 
entity. Its rhythms such as those responding to the seasons, shape the regeneration patterns 
of the living world. Living systems in turn make use of the non-living, or abiotic, material in 
the biosphere and transform them; water, carbon, and nitrogen cycles are expressions of 
that. Because the ability to regenerate is a characteristic of living systems, regeneration of the 
biosphere is key to the sustainability of the human enterprise.
Movement is a pervasive feature of the biosphere. The wind blows, rivers flow, birds and 
insects fly, the oceans circulate, even continents are known to travel. The Antarctic ice sheet 
is weakened by activity everywhere; phosphorus-rich runoff from farms in north-central US 
contribute to transforming the estuary of the Mississippi River into a dead zone; fertilisers, and 
pesticides pollute the rivers and ground waters of the Indo-Gangetic Plain; emissions of soot 
12 Hubbell (2015), for example, notes that a recent estimate that there are between 40,000 and 53,000 tree species in the tropics 
is based on a very small sample of forest patches. Peter Raven has emphasised to us in correspondence the enormous uncertainty 
in our knowledge of the number of species, let alone tree species in the tropics. Moreover, the distribution of species numbers has 
a thick tail: a very large proportion of species are of small population size. Pimm and Raven (2019) contains a summary of what 
we know. 
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from kitchens in the Indian sub-continent affect the circulation patterns of the monsoons; fish in 
the North Sea eat micro-plastic originating in markets in the Bahamas; and so on.13
Less visible are the changes that take place when a plant dies and is converted into soil by the 
actions of organisms that also live and die. Mostly, these transformative processes are invisible to 
the naked eye. We do not see the bacterial mass residing beneath our feet, without which life as 
we know it would not exist. The activities they are engaged in are undertaken in silence to the 
human ear. These three features of Nature – mobility, invisibility and silence – are of profound 
significance to the economics of biodiversity (Box 2).
Figure 2 Nature’s Properties 
Ecosystems are constituents of the biosphere. They combine the abiotic environment with 
communities of plants, animals, fungi, and microorganisms to form combinations of life forms 
that control the multitude of natural processes shaping the world around us. Ecosystems are 
not defined in a sharp manner from rigid principles. Watersheds, wetlands, coral reefs, and 
mangrove forests are ecosystems, as are agricultural land, inland fisheries, freshwater lakes, 
rainforests, coastal fisheries, estuaries and the oceans.
Ecosystems are not tightly knit entities – they blend into one another. The Okavango River 
comes down from the hills of Angola, waters grasslands in northern Zimbabwe, and as the river 
loses its energy, grass gives way to shrubs and, even as the Okavango sinks into the ground, 
shrubs give way to the pebbly desert of the Kalahari. But there are ecosystems that have strong 
interactions among their own constituents and weak interactions across their boundaries, as in 
the visible breaks between the oases and deserts of Egypt. The boundaries may separate sharp 
differences in material composition, distribution of organisms, soil types, depth of a body of 
water, and so on.
Ecosystems differ in their spatial reach (the Amazon rainforest is an ecosystem, as is the 
collection of micro-organisms occupying the gut of a dolphin swimming in its rivers) and 
rhythmic time (minutes for bacterial colonies, decades for boreal forests). Some ecosystems 
cover regions (the Ganga-Brahmaputra river basin); many are volcanic islands (Micronesia); 
13 A new species of crustacean, discovered deep in the Marina Trench in 2014, has been appropriately named Eurythenes plasticus 
for the contents of its stomach (reported in The New Yorker, 18 May 2020, p. 15). 
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others involve clusters of towns (micro-watersheds in the Ethiopian highlands); yet others are 
confined to a village (village ponds in Barisal, Bangladesh).14
Each of us is an element in many ecosystems. We each contain microbial ecosystems. The 
biosphere is the largest ecosystem of which we are an element – it is our home. Being 
embedded within it, we are entirely dependent on it, not just for survival but for our well-
being too. Nature’s goods and services are the foundations of our economies. They include the 
provisioning services that supply the goods we harvest and extract (food, water, fibres, timber, 
medicines) and cultural services, such as the gardens, parks and coastlines we visit for pleasure, 
even emotional sustenance and recuperation. But Nature’s processes also maintain a genetic 
library, preserve and regenerate soil, control floods, filter pollutants, assimilate waste, pollinate 
crops, maintain the hydrological cycle, regulate climate, and fulfil many other functions besides. 
Without those regulating and maintenance services, life as we know it would not be possible.15
Depreciation is the decline in the quantity or quality of an asset over time. In the case of 
ecosystems, depreciation is the difference between the rate at which it is harvested and its 
regenerative rate. If human extraction of an ecosystem’s provisioning services exceeds its 
regenerative rate, the ecosystem depreciates. Depreciation caused by pollutants is the difference 
between the rate at which pollutants are discharged into the biosphere and the rate at which 
the biosphere is able to degrade them for assimilation in the land and waters. Sustainability of 
our engagement with Nature is thus ultimately about the functions of the biosphere, not just 
the living part of it.
Biodiversity is a characteristic of ecosystems. It enables ecosystems to flourish and supply the 
wide variety of services we have just alluded to. Drawing an analogy with human society, we 
could say biodiversity in an ecosystem resembles the extent to which people trust one another. 
A further analogy would be the diversity of human talents in an economy needed for it to thrive. 
From a financial perspective, just as diversity within a portfolio of financial assets reduces risk 
and uncertainty, so biodiversity increases Nature’s resilience to shocks, and thereby reduces risks 
to the ecosystem services on which we rely. And drawing on an analogy with indivisible objects 
such as automobiles, biodiversity provides ecosystems with spare parts; it enables ecosystems 
to be resilient, to be able to adapt to changing circumstances and to be productive. Reduce 
biodiversity, and the health of ecosystems generally suffers.16
There is, however, a significant caveat to this idea of productivity. Modern agriculture enables 
us to produce food at rates per hectare unthinkable in the past. But it does so at the cost of 
biodiversity. Croplands as far as the eye can see are productive, but they are productive in mono 
crops and do not even house crop genetic diversity, let alone diversity of species and ecosystems. 
Land given over to ranching and animal grazing is productive too, but it is productive in 
terms of sheep and cattle. Plantations of oil palm and soya are also productive, but they are 
poor in biodiversity. The fields we see today replaced ecosystems that were once in varying 
degrees diverse in species – grasslands, wetlands, woodlands, tropical rainforests, swamps. 
Moreover, agricultural practices themselves cause biodiversity to be lost, both on and off site. 
Industrial fertilisers, insecticides and pesticides destroy soil biodiversity and cause even far-away 
estuaries to become dead zones. Tilling and ploughing destroy life in the soils (Box 2).17 The 
underlying idea in modern agriculture is the substitution of one production input (industrial 
14 Levin (1999) is a deep meditation on the processes that shape the evolving spatial characteristics of the biosphere. The author 
explains the significance for life of Nature’s modular structure. 
15 The classification of ecosystem services into provisioning, cultural, and regulating and maintenance services follows the Common 
International Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES), which is an adaptation of the classification constructed by the pioneering 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005 a-d). 
16 The scientific literature on this is huge. The interested reader should consult the Review (Chapter 2), which reports findings on the 
role of biodiversity in ecosystem functions.
17 We are indebted for discussions with organic farmer Tid Morton of Norfolk, UK, on what ploughing does to the soils. 
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fertilisers) for another (soil nutrients). Our demand for food, water, timber, fibre, minerals, and 
the dams that are built to supply water and produce electricity visibly destroy biodiversity. By 
tearing the landscape apart, mining and quarrying are also significant factors in biodiversity 
loss. Substitution of produced capital (roads, buildings ports, machines) for natural capital 
(ecosystems) has not only characterised our investment activities but also shaped our conception 
of economic progress.
Figure 3 Links From Biodiversity to the Economy
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Box 2
The Soils
The soils, called the pedosphere by ecologists, appear far less in public discourses on 
biodiversity than terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Beach, Luzzadder-Beach, and Dunning 
(2019) call the soils, “dark matter biodiversity”. The soils are approximately half air and water, 
45% minerals and 5% organic matter. Of that 5%, only 10% is life, but that 10% contains 
some of the greatest biodiversity in the biosphere. By one estimate, the soils contain nearly 
80% of terrestrial carbon, with an inevitable accompanying estimate that up to 25% of our 
uncertainty in the flux of global carbon is traceable to soil erosion.
Soil organisms include earthworms, nematodes, arthropods, protozoa, fungi and bacteria, 
but by far the most abundant are fungi and bacteria. These organisms form food webs which 
drive soil ecosystem processes, including nutrient cycling, carbon sequestration, nitrogen 
storage and water purification, and are important components of global cycling of matter, 
energy and nutrients. Advances in molecular genetics have revealed the enormous diversity 
of fungi and bacteria associated with plant roots. They play diverse roles, for example, in 
promoting plant growth through enhancing plant nutrition and protecting plants from 
herbivores and pathogens (Orgiazzi et al. 2016). By one set of estimates, more than 25% of 
the Earth’s species live only in the soil or soil litter.
The 2016 Global Soil Biodiversity Atlas was the first attempt to map life in soil at a global 
scale (Figure 4). Biodiversity in soil is highest in tropical rainforests and lowest in deserts. Soil 
has historically been the world’s largest carbon sink. However, recent studies have suggested 
that soil could shift to become a net emitter of carbon, due to climate-change driven 
increases in respiration by organisms that derive their nutrition from plants and animal matter 
(Lugato, Leip, and Jones, 2018).
The soils also supply most of the water needed by plants and for terrestrial biodiversity. Soil 
water makes up 65% of the world’s fresh water, is the source of 90% of global farm output, 
and provides over 99% of our food calories (Pimental and Burgess, 2013). The dynamics in 
the soils start from plants, which shed leaf litter on soil surface and the narrow band of soil 
that is influenced by root secretion and soil microorganisms. The enormous network of fungi 
that connect tiny roots (‘rootlets’) to a wider array of soil nutrients and water help to fix 
nitrogen (a regulating service). Nitrogen is a macronutrient, vital in the food chain.
The soils are also a major reservoir for medicines (a provisioning service). Pepper et al. (2009) 
have reported that over 75% of antibacterial agents and 60% of new cancer drugs approved 
between 1983 and 1994 had their origins in the soils, as did 60% of all newly approved 
drugs between 1989 and 1995.
When threats to soil biodiversity are mapped, areas at high-risk often correspond with 
areas of highest soil biodiversity (Figure 4). A risk index was constructed by combining eight 
factors that place soil health under risk: loss of above-ground diversity; pollution and nutrient 
overloading; over-grazing; intensive agriculture; fire; soil erosion; desertification; and climate 
change (Orgiazzi et al. 2016).
If soil biodiversity were completely lost, the land-based food system would cease to function. 
Wagg et al. (2014) found a strong linear relationship between all measured ecosystem 
functions and indicators of soil biodiversity. Reductions in soil biodiversity contribute to 
several environmental problems, such as an excessive nutrient load (i.e. eutrophication) of 
freshwater bodies, reduced above-ground biodiversity and global warming. Declines in soil 
biodiversity cause declines in performance of essential processes.
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Figure 4 Soil Biodiversity Index
Source: Orgiazzi et al. (2016).
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2005a-d) found that 15 of the 24 ecosystem 
services that were assessed were in decline. The recent global assessment by the 
Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2019) reported a 
decline in 14 of 18 categories of Nature’s goods and services since 1970. Both global reviews 
found our extraction and harvest of provisioning services has increased, while the supply of 
regulating and maintenance services has declined. A corresponding decline in cultural services 
has also been recorded by the assessments. 
There is thus a tension between our demand for provisioning services on the one hand and our 
need for regulating, maintenance, and cultural services on the other. The distinction between 
drawing on Nature and depending on Nature is all-important here. Tensions between the two 
became manifest in recent centuries, but at the global scale it did so only gradually. As we 
confirm below, it has become acute since the middle of the 20th century. The biosphere’s 
regulating and maintenance services are the underpinnings of human societies, which is why 
increases in the material standard of living will come to naught if those underpinnings are 
broken irreparably.
3 Nature’s Complexities
Ecosystems are self-regulating, but only within bounds. The biosphere provides regulating and 
maintenance services as joint products and ecosystem processes are complementary to one 
another. Disturb a process sufficiently and the other processes are affected, adversely. Lovejoy 
and Nobre (2018), for example, have observed that the Amazon rainforest generates half of its 
rainfall by recycling moisture 5 to 6 times as air masses move from the Atlantic across the basin 
to the West. The authors have estimated that at 20-30% further deforestation, central, southern 
and eastern Amazon would experience diminished rainfall and lengthier dry seasons, and that 
this would tip the rainforest into savannah vegetation. That shift can be expected to affect wind 
patterns, altering farming conditions as far away as central USA.
Such a chain of events, resulting in an ecosystem tipping over from one broad mode of 
behaviour into another very different mode, can start with fragmentation. Studies have found 
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that habitat fragmentation reduces biodiversity by impairing important ecosystem functions 
and altering nutrient cycles. Striking examples arise when river systems are fragmented with 
dams: fragmentation destroys the life cycles of fish species (Box 3). In a long-standing research 
programme in the Amazon rainforest, Laurance et al. (2002), Laurance et al. (2011) and Lovejoy 
and Hannah (2019) have observed that fragmentation caused by networks of roads affect forest 
microclimates, tree mortality, carbon storage, and fauna. The intensity of what the authors call 
‘edge effects’ is influenced by such factors as the ages of an ecosystem’s edges (or boundaries) 
and the number of nearby edges. One way to read this is to say that the productivity of an 
ecosystem is greater than the sum of the productivities of its broken parts. Mathematicians say 
ecosystem processes are non-linear.
Fragmentation exposes species to harsh environmental conditions, including fires, diseases, and 
invasive species. That amounts to a reduction in an ecosystem’s ability to withstand disturbances 
without breaking down – it becomes less resilient. Decline in resilience would accompany a loss 
in biodiversity, so there is mutual causation at work. Paleo-biologists have found fragmentation 
of natural habitats to be a good early-warning sign of biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse. 
Chance events that would previously have been absorbed by the ecosystem that has lost its 
resilience can trigger a sudden, dramatic change and loss of its integrity.18
Shallow bodies of water such as garden ponds offer a good illustration of synergies among 
Nature’s processes. A major reason ponds tip from a crystalline state to a eutrophic state is the 
inflow of phosphorus from fertilisers applied to lawns. If the rate of inflow is small enough, 
ponds remain crystalline, but not otherwise. Freshwater lakes suffer from a similar fate when 
phosphorus seeps into them from farms. Accumulation of small pressures (regular runoff into a 
lake) can tip a lake into a eutrophic state.19
The time involved in such dramatic shifts (they are called ‘regime shifts’ by ecologists) differs 
enormously, depending on the character (e.g. size) of the ecosystem. It could take decades 
for a rainforest to tip over into a savannah, whereas grasslands have been known to tip into 
shrub in years; and garden ponds have been known to tip into a eutrophic state in a matter 
of hours (Figure 5). Reversing direction is costly because an ecosystem’s history is imprinted 
in its current state: ecosystems have memory.20 One can help to bring an ecosystem back to a 
state near to where it had previously been, but only at a cost. The phenomenon is known as 
‘hysteresis’. Examples abound: eutrophic ponds can only be brought back to a crystalline state 
at a cost; a rainforest that has become savannah cannot be brought back – the move is to all 
intents and purposes irreversible. Thus, restoration is costlier than conservation, other things 
equal.21 The institutions, physical infrastructure, and social practices we have fashioned since 
establishing agriculture some 11,000 years ago also display hysteresis. They have been shaped 
under broadly speaking stable biospheric conditions. Abrupt changes to settled conditions 
are costly because the investments we had made in the past are hard to reverse. In the world 
of finance, this phenomenon is commonly known as ‘stranded assets’, such as investments in 
structures for oil and gas extraction which become obsolete in the transition to renewable and 
low-carbon energy.
18 It is now becoming widely acknowledged that fragmentation of ecosystems is associated with the spread of zoonotic viruses, that 
is, viruses that cross from animals to humans. Tropical rainforests have great biodiversity. Deforestation creates fragments. Often 
the viruses come from edges of fragments, which is where humans first encounter the forest animals. It is thought that COVID-19 
crossed from bats to humans through an intermediary animal. Daily and Ehrlich (1996) is an excellent early study of the connection 
between biodiversity loss and the frequency and intensity of pandemics. 
19 See Carpenter, Ludwig, and Brock (1999). A body of water that is so rich in nutrients and animals that algae grow and are 
degraded by bacteria to the point where oxygen is severely depleted is said to be in a eutrophic state.
20 A rough analogy would be our inability to forget consciously what we have learnt, making it impossible to return to a previous 
state of mind.
21 Being ecosystems ourselves, we also harbour multiple stability regimes. The old adage about human health that ‘prevention is 
better than the cure’ is based on that same feature. 
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Figure 5 Multiple Stability Regimes 
Source: Folke et al. (2004). Permission to reproduce from Annual Reviews, Inc.
Box 3
Damming Rivers
Fragmentation can prevent migratory populations from conforming to their behaviour 
over the life cycle. That translates into species extinction. Dams are a major contributor to 
freshwater biodiversity loss. The construction of high dams is favoured by national economic 
planners because they expand irrigation, supply energy and offer protection against floods. 
One problem is that they also disrupt the hydrology of freshwater ecosystems by fragmenting 
them.22 Fragmentation obstructs migration routes, which are essential for spawning and 
feeding – it limits dispersal.
Freshwater habitats cover only 0.8% of Earth’s surface, nevertheless one-third of described 
vertebrates, including approximately 40% of fish species, are found in them. Barbarossa 
et al. (2020) have constructed a connectivity index of river water by combining species 
occurrence ranges with the hydrology and location of dams. Fragmentation can then be read 
as reduction of the index. The authors report that the approximately 40,000 high dams that 
currently exist worldwide have altered 50% of the volume of river water, by either regulation 
of water flow or fragmentation, and that the pending construction of some 3,700 more high 
dams will raise the figure to over 90%.23 Current measures of fragmentation are highest in 
22 There are other problems too, for example, that communities are displaced, often without consultation or compensation. 
23 High dams are defined as dams that are taller than 15 metres. The figure of 40,000 for the number of existing high dams 
worldwide is probably an underestimate, but it pays to work with conservative figures even when they correspond to massive 
disruptions. 
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the US, Europe, South Africa, India and China, but increases in fragmentation due to future 
dams are estimated by the authors to be especially high in the tropics, with declines in the 
connectivity index of some 20-40% in the Amazon, Niger, Congo and the Mekong Basin.
If high dams are environmentally damaging, they would appear to be uneconomic even if 
environmental concerns were set aside. Ansar et al. (2014) reported findings from a study 
of large hydropower dams for which they could find reliable data. The authors’ sample of 
245 projects initiated in the period 1934 to 2007 covered 65 countries. Construction costs 
on average were found to have been double the figures projected in their original feasibility 
studies, reducing the realised rates of return on most to below what are available from 
government bonds (4-5% annually). Smaller-scale dams, and fish ladders that allow fish to 
pass around dams, have been found to reduce risks to fisheries through fragmentation.
4 Classifying and Valuing Assets
Assets are durable. Durability, of course, does not mean everlasting, but unlike services, assets 
are not fleeting. It is tempting to call all assets capital goods, a term that has proved to be so 
attractive that it now stretches to include knowledge (‘knowledge capital’); the law, the market 
system, and financial institutions (‘institutional capital’); mutual trust, social norms, and group 
solidarity (‘social capital’); culture and personal norms (‘cultural capital’); even religion (‘religious 
capital’). Economists have been more reticent; they confine the use of the term to assets that are 
measurable.24 In the past, economists reserved the term ‘capital goods’ even more stringently 
than they do now, for they only included assets that are material (tangible) and alienable (i.e. 
whose ownership is transferable). Roads, buildings, machines and ports are ready examples. 
As patents held by a firm are part of the firm’s asset base, they appear in its balance sheet. So 
intangible and alienable assets are also included on the list of capital goods. Taken together, they 
are called produced capital.
The range of capital goods in the economist’s lexicon has broadened over the years to include 
intangible but non-alienable assets such as health, education, aptitude and skills, which, taken 
together, form human capital. Economists today include human capital as a category of capital 
goods because they have discovered ways to measure its value – not only to the individuals who 
acquire it, but also to society at large.
In the past decades, economists have developed methods for measuring the value individuals 
place on natural resources; so we now have a third category of capital goods: natural capital. 
The methods can be involved, for natural capital ranges over plants (they are tangible and 
alienable), pollinators (they are tangible and often non-alienable), the view from one’s sea-front 
home (it is intangible and alienable) and the global climate (it is intangible and non-alienable).
24 See Arrow (2000) and Solow (2000) for strong criticisms of the increasing practice of regarding social capital as capital. This does 
not make social capital unimportant: it is a central feature of effective institutions, as we discuss below.
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Figure 6 Interaction Between the Capitals
As the Review explores reasons for the growing disparity between private incentives and public 
aspirations, we pay particular attention to the wedge between market prices of capital goods, 
especially the market prices of natural capital, and what should be called their ‘social worth’, 
or alternatively, their ‘social scarcity value’. Economists call them accounting prices. A capital 
good’s accounting price is the contribution an additional unit of it would make to societal 
well-being (or more narrowly, the common good).25 Being durable, capital goods offer their 
services over their lifetime. So the accounting price of a capital good reflects the contribution its 
flow of services over its lifetime makes to social well-being. Box 4 shows that absolute values of 
ecosystems (they are a form of natural capital) have no meaning; only comparisons of values tell 
us something.
Box 4
Absolute Values Are Meaningless
Absolute values of portfolios carry no information; only portfolio comparisons do. The value 
of a marginal change to the biosphere is meaningful because it is presumed that humanity 
will survive the change to experience it, but the matter is different when it comes to valuing 
Nature as a whole. It may be because growth and development economists ignored our place 
in the natural world, environmentalists some years ago were tempted to value the whole of 
Nature, to show that it is of great economic worth. In a widely cited publication in Science, 
the authors estimated that the global flow of the biosphere’s services was, towards the end 
of the 20th century, worth US$16-54 trillion annually, with a point estimate of US$33 trillion 
(Costanza et al. 1997). As that figure was larger than global GDP in the mid-1990s, we were 
meant to appreciate the economic significance of natural capital.
25 Accounting prices are also called ‘shadow’ prices. 
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The estimate is a case of misplaced quantification. As the authors recognise, if Nature 
is destroyed, life would cease to exist. But then who would then be here to receive 
US$33 trillion of annual benefits if humanity were to exchange its very existence for them? 
Economics, when used with care, is meant to serve our ethical values. The language it 
provides helps us to choose in accordance with those values. Despite recognising this, the 
authors of the paper imply that the biosphere is valuable because it can be imputed a large 
monetary value. That is to get things backward.26
Measurement problems are also rife in estimating the stock of many kinds of natural capital 
(fisheries stocks in their national waters are generally not recorded by governments), but it 
is far better to work with rough and ready figures than to ignore whole swathes of capital 
goods by pretending they do not exist. Unfortunately, the macroeconomic theories of growth 
and development that have shaped our beliefs about economic possibilities and the progress 
and regress of nations do not recognise humanity’s dependence on Nature. The Review 
corrects that mistake.27
Accounting prices reflect an accommodation between economic futures that are both socially 
desirable and socio-ecologically possible, which means they reflect social scarcity values of 
capital goods. There are cases where market prices approximate accounting prices, but for 
reasons we explore below (Section 7), many forms of natural capital simply do not have markets 
– they are free to the user. So special methods have to be devised. There is now a wide range 
of methods for doing that, from asking people to state their willingness to pay for restoring a 
degraded beach (that is, estimating an ‘amenity value’ of Nature), to asking them to declare 
the value they attach to protecting the migratory route of snow geese (that is, estimating what 
people may regard as an ‘intrinsic value’ of Nature), to inferring the value of an ecosystem 
service from the contributions they make to the production of goods and services whose social 
scarcity values can be estimated (that is, estimating the ‘use value’ of Nature’s services), such as 
the contribution of forests as habitat for pollinators that support crop production.
Valuation methods that involve estimating the use value of Nature by determining the 
productivity of its processes involve a blend of ecological and economic reasoning: The 
accounting value of a lake fishery can be approximated by the market value of catch over time; 
the social costs of air- or water-borne pollution can be estimated at least in part by measuring 
the losses to human health attributable to it; the minimum value of restoring a watershed can 
be inferred from the cost of building a water treatment plant; and so on.28
To date, estimates of accounting values of natural capital have, for the most part, not included 
the health benefits green spaces that ecosystems confer on us. They have remained even 
further from including the mental health benefits we derive from green spaces. However, the 
importance of including health benefits in natural capital accounts is increasingly recognised, 
and there are an emerging number of studies attempting to elicit values (White et al. 2016). 
Humans cannot survive without the rich biodiversity of microbiota that exist on our skin and 
in our guts, urogenital tracts and airways. They influence our susceptibility to disease and play 
an important role in our health under changing environmental conditions. We are ecosystems 
ourselves, with exchanges taking place constantly between bacteria, viruses, fungi, archaea, and 
protozoa in the natural environment and those in our bodies. We need contact with sources of 
26 Formally we have a case where the value of an entire something has no meaning, and is therefore of no use, even though the 
value of changes to that same thing – expressed as differences – not only has meaning, but also has use. 
27 The absence of Nature is also prominent in the economic growth and development models that inform economics and finance 
ministries and central banks. 
28 Excellent accounts can be found in the treatise by Freeman (2003) and the collection of essays in Haque, Murty and Shyamsundar 
(2011). Kareiva et al. (2011) and Vincent (2011) contain clear accounts of valuation methods that estimate the productivity of 
natural capital in providing ecosystem services. 
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diverse microbiota. Loss of biodiversity can and does have an impact on our health (e.g. weaker 
resistance to disease). Studies suggest that macro-biodiversity (e.g. plants and trees) in urban 
environments is associated with microbe diversity and in turn with a healthy human microbiome, 
known to be linked to a wide range of health outcomes (Review, Chapter 11). There is evidence 
too that repeated contact with Nature contributes not only to long term hedonic well-being 
(happiness, pleasure), but to life satisfaction as well. A series of large-scale European studies 
based on data from national surveys has found that living in an area with more green space 
is associated with less mental distress than otherwise. A longitudinal study covering over 
10,000 UK residents found that living in greener urban space was associated with greater life 
satisfaction (White et al. 2013)29.
Figure 7 Market Prices and Accounting (or Shadow) Prices
What about knowledge, institutions and social capital – are they not assets as well? They are, 
but as with biodiversity, measurement problems abound (try, for example, to compare the value 
to a nation of ‘good governance’ with the real estate value of its capital city). So we call them 
enabling assets, their worth is reflected in accounting prices. Enabling assets bestow value to an 
economy’s capital goods. Even if the composition of capital goods is the same in two societies, 
the one where people trust one another with reason would be found to be wealthier than the 
one where people are distrustful of one another. Mutual trust is an enabling asset: other things 
equal, the accounting price of, say, scientific journals in a country at peace would be higher than 
in a country torn by civil strife. Likewise, other things equal, a more biodiverse ecosystem is more 
productive in terms of the regulating and maintenance services it supplies. So biodiversity is also 
an enabling asset.
The relationship runs the other way also. Knowledge in the sciences, technologies, and the 
arts and humanities (they are all enabling assets) is created and acquired, but it is created and 
29 See Review (Chapter 11), for the distinction between measures of hedonic well-being and life satisfaction. 
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acquired by people (human capital) in combination with produced capital (libraries, laboratories) 
and natural capital (raw materials and ecosystem services). Institutions are also created by 
people, as is mutual trust, which is the glue that holds communities together. Financial capital 
facilitates exchange (among people and across time), so it too is an enabling asset.
There are therefore three categories of capital goods in our classification and a wide range 
of enabling assets. Enabling assets may not be measurable, but that does not matter: they 
enable human societies to function well, and that can be measured. Accounting prices reflect 
that worth.
5 The Global Economy in the Anthropocene
World population in 1950 was around 2.5 billion and global output of final goods and 
services (i.e. global GDP) at 2011 prices was around 9 trillion international dollars (i.e. dollars 
at purchasing price parity, PPP).30 The average person’s annual income was around 3,300 
dollars PPP, a high figure by historical standards. Since then the world has prospered beyond 
recognition. Life expectancy at birth in 1950 was 46; today it is around 73. The proportion 
of the world’s population living in absolute poverty (currently 1.90 dollars per day) has fallen 
from nearly 60% in 1950 to less than 10% today (World Bank, 2019).31 In 2019, the global 
population had grown to over 7.7 billion even while global GDP per capita had risen to around 
16,000 dollars PPP (at 2011 prices). The world’s output of final goods and services was a bit 
above 120 trillion dollars PPP (at 2011 prices), meaning that globally measured economic activity 
had increased more than 13-fold in only 70 years, a rate of increase that had never remotely 
been experienced before (Figure 8).
This remarkable achievement has, however, come alongside a massive deterioration of the 
biosphere’s health. In a review of evidence from the past 11,000 years (Earth scientists call 
the period the Holocene), Waters et al. (2016) tracked the human-induced evolution of soil 
nitrogen and phosphorus inventories, and carbon dioxide and methane in sediments and ice 
cores. They report that time series of a broad class of global biogeochemical signatures display 
a flat trend over millennia until some 250 years ago, when they begin a slow rise that continues 
until the middle of the 20th century, when they show a sharp and accelerating rise. The trends in 
global economic activity over the past 70 years that we have summarised above and displayed 
in Figure 8 match these findings. The authors proposed that the mid-20th century should be 
regarded as the time we entered the Anthropocene.32 Annex 1 presents a way of defining the 
Anthropocene through the idea of ‘planetary boundaries’.
30 In constructing international dollars (i.e. dollars at purchasing price parity, PPP), the official exchange rates of various currencies 
with respect to the US dollar are converted to bring the purchasing power in the regions on par with one another. In what follows, 
‘dollars’ mean ‘international dollars’.
31 Global poverty is likely to have risen sharply in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, partially reversing some of the improvement 
over recent decades. In October 2020, the World Bank suggested that the number of people living in extreme poverty would likely 
increase from 88 million to 115 million in 2020 (World Bank, 2020a).
32 The term ‘Anthropocene’ was popularised by Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) to mark a new epoch in which humans dominate the 
biosphere. The Anthropocene Working Group has proposed that the immediate post-war years should be regarded as the start of 
the Anthropocene (Voosen, 2016).
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Figure 8 Global Real GDP Since 1750
Source: Our World in Data based on World Bank (2020a), Maddison (2018), Bolt et al. (2018) and Review calculations.
Perhaps the most visceral sign of environmental degradation is species extinction. Uncertainties 
in the rates at which species are becoming extinct mirror our lack of knowledge of the number 
of species in existence (recall the range 8-20 million, possibly more, for eukaryotes, Section 2). 
The figures presented in Box 5 reflect these uncertainties, but explain why the Holocene is the 
period when Earth began experiencing its sixth mass extinction.
Box 5
Species and Population Extinction
Largely as a result of human activities – land- and ocean-use change in all its varieties – 
species and the component populations of still-extant species are becoming extinct far more 
rapidly than in the past. Current extinction rates of species in various orders are estimated to 
have risen to 100-1,000 times the average extinction rate over the past tens of millions of 
years (the ‘background rate’) of 0.1-1 per million species per year (expressed as E/MSY), and 
are continuing to rise.33 To illustrate in absolute terms, 1,000 species would become extinct 
every year if the number of species was 10 million and 100 E/MSY was the current extinction 
rate. Despite the uncertainties, the figures put the scale of humanity’s presence in the 
biosphere in perspective. The figures also tell us why Earth scientists and ecologists say we are 
witnessing the sixth great biological extinction since life began.34
Judged by what is known about relatively well-studied groups (terrestrial vertebrates, plants), 
some 20% of species could become extinct within the next several decades, perhaps twice as 
many by the end of the century. It is estimated that 84 mammal species have become extinct 
since 1500 and 32 species of mammal have gone extinct since 1900 (IUCN, 2020; Pimm and 
Raven, 2019). 
In a survey of population data on nearly 30,000 species of terrestrial vertebrates, Ceballos, 
Ehrlich, and Raven (2020) have estimated how many are on the brink of extinction. Their 
criterion was populations with fewer than 1,000 individuals. By this measure, 515 species are 
on the brink, representing 1.7% of the vertebrates on the authors’ survey list. If extinction 
33 See De Vos et al. (2014), Pimm et al. (2014), and Ceballos, Ehrlich, and Ehrlich (2015). 
34 The Sixth Extinction has also been called the Holocene Extinction, which began at the end of the last glacial period some 11,000 
years ago, the signature being provided by the extinction of large land mammals. Kolbert (2014) is a narrative on the mass extinction 
under way.
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follows at the same rate, the population of terrestrial vertebrates will halve in about 40 
years. But the rate is likely to increase at an accelerated rate, for several reasons. First, human 
pressure on the biosphere is increasing (see below); second, the distribution of those species 
on the brink of extinction coincides with hundreds of other endangered species, surviving 
precariously in regions with high human impact; and third, close ecological interactions 
among species tend to move other species toward annihilation – extinction breeds extinction. 
Assuming all species on the brink have experienced similar trends, the authors estimate that 
more than 237,000 populations of those species have vanished since 1900.
Trends in biogeochemical signatures and species extinctions are consistent with those in the 
global stock of natural capital. Managi and Kumar (2018) tracked the accounting values of 
produced capital, human capital, and natural capital over the period 1992 to 2014 in 140 
countries.35 In their work, renewable resources include forest resources (stocks of timber and 
a selected group of non-timber resources), fisheries (stocks were estimated from past records 
of catch), agricultural land (cropland and pasture land); while non-renewable resources cover 
fossil fuels and a selected set of minerals. Figures for the social cost of carbon (a negative 
accounting price) of greenhouse gas emissions were used to address future losses from global 
climate change. 
Figure 9 displays the authors’ estimates of global accounting values per capita of the three 
classes of capital goods over the period 1992 to 2014. It shows that the value of produced 
capital per capita doubled and human capital per capita increased by around 13%, but the value 
of the stock of natural capital per capita declined by nearly 40%. 
Figure 9 Global Wealth Per Capita, 1992 to 2014
Source: Managi and Kumar (2018).
35 The value of produced capital was obtained from official national accounts. Data limitations meant that natural capital was limited 
to minerals and fossil fuels, agricultural land, forests as sources of timber, and fisheries. Market prices were used to value them. The 
accounting value of human capital was based on methods that economists have devised for valuing education and health. 
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6 Unsustainable Economic Development
As the biosphere is a regenerative entity, it pays to let our imagination roam and regard it to 
be a gigantic version of a lake fishery (forests would be an equally good metaphor)36. If the 
stock of fish is low, the lake provides ample nutrients for the fish population to grow, which 
is a way of saying that the fishery is a regenerative resource. But because the lake is of finite 
size, it is able to provide a limited flow of nutrients. Even though the fish population increases 
initially, nutrients per unit of fish population decline, so the population eventually attains a 
size determined by the lake’s carrying capacity and fluctuates around it. If fish-harvesters enter 
the scene, the fish population will decline, but so long as each period’s harvest is kept within 
bounds, the fishery can survive indefinitely. That is a sustainable fishery. But if fishers harvest 
at a rate that is consistently above the fishery’s regenerative rate, it is doomed. That is an 
unsustainable fishery.
The biosphere is finite in extent, so the flow of goods and services it provides is bounded. We 
may liken our activities to those of the fishers in our parable, but unlike them we inhabit the 
lake, we are not external to it. We take goods and services from our planet and we deposit 
our waste into it: material has to balance. What we take from our planet over a period of time 
and put back in as waste is known as our ecological footprint. And so the footprint not only 
includes the goods and services we harvest and extract from the biosphere, it also includes the 
rate at which the biosphere is able to treat our waste. The full set of provisioning, regulating, 
maintenance, and cultural services comes into play here. We may use the economist’s lexicon 
and call our ecological footprint the demand we make of the biosphere.37
In a classic paper, Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) used the term impact to refer to what we have just 
called ‘ecological footprint’ and ‘demand’. The authors decomposed humanity’s impact on the 
biosphere in terms of our activities and the efficiency with which we are able to transform the 
biosphere’s supply of goods and services into our activities. Reasonably, they took global GDP to 
be a measure of human activities and observed that it is the play of technology (and institutions, 
although the authors did not speak of the latter explicitly) that determines the efficiency with 
which we convert the biosphere’s goods and services into GDP.
But global GDP is the product of human population size and global GDP per capita. So we have 
three factors to reckon with: population size; per capita GDP, and the efficiency with which we 
convert the biosphere’s goods and services into GDP; and the extent to which the biosphere 
is transformed by global waste products. The factors are of course not independent of one 
another and are, in any case, the outcome of our choices. Fertility rates both influence and are 
influenced by our standard of living, and both influence and are influenced by the technology 
and institutions we devise and bring into play. It is nevertheless useful to work with this three-
way breakdown of our ecological footprint. It enables us to identify trade-offs. For example, it 
says that if the efficiency factor remains unchanged, the trade-off between population size and 
the living standard is of an inverse form: doubling the global population needs to be matched 
by halving global GDP per capita if humanity’s ecological footprint is to remain unchanged.
Human population has been growing, as has global GDP per capita. Efficiency has also 
increased, but not to the extent needed to counter the growth in population numbers and GDP 
per capita (Box 6). Figures 10 and 11 show that both have grown in recent centuries in much 
the way of global GDP (Figure 8): a slow rise at the start of the industrial revolution and a sharp 
increase that has itself been increasing since the mid-1950s. 
36 This and the following section are based on A. Dasgupta and Dasgupta (2017) and Barrett et al. (2020).
37 That material must balance was the insight in Kneese, Ayres and d’Arge (1970) and Māler (1974). The Review puts the material 
balance condition to work to show that economic output cannot be made to grow indefinitely. We return to this point in Section 11. 
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Figure 10 Global Population Since 1750
Source: Maddison (2010), UNPD (2019) and Review calculations.
Figure 11 Global Real GDP Per Capita Since 1750
Source: Our World in Data based on World Bank (2020a), Maddison (2018), Bolt et al. (2018) and Review calculations.
Recall Figure 8, which showed the growth in global real GDP since 1750. It can be interpreted as 
saying that, assuming the efficiency factor has not matched GDP growth, the global ecological 
footprint (i.e. human global impact) has been increasing. But we cannot tell whether the 
footprint exceeds the biosphere’s ability to regenerate itself. That question has been studied in a 
bold programme of research by the Global Footprint Network (GFN). They have estimated that 
the ratio of our demand from the biosphere to its regeneration rate increased from 1 in the late 
1960s to 1.6 in 2020 (Wackernagel and Beyers, 2019; Lin et al. 2020).38 The authors speak of 
1.6 figuratively as the number of Earths needed to satisfy our current demand on a sustainable 
38 Their estimate is that the ratio was less than 1 previously. The methods deployed by GFN to estimate the ratio can be found in 
their annual publications. Wackernagel and Beyers (2019) presents a non-technical account of the findings. It should be noted that 
the 2020 estimate (1.6) was slightly lower relative to 2019 due to the falls in economic activity due to COVID-19 induced lockdowns 
around the world. 
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basis. The exact figure is of little significance, what matters is that the evidence that now has 
been collected from a wide range of investigations (Section 5 and Annex 1) says that in recent 
decades the gap between demand and supply has been widening and will continue to widen 
unless humanity is able to reverse the trends in its demands. We borrow from Barrett et al. 
(2020) and call the gap between the global ecological footprint and the biosphere’s regenerative 
rate the Impact Inequality (Figure 12).
In a healthy biosphere, humanity could, on reasonable utilitarian grounds, choose to draw it 
down somewhat and use the goods and services Nature supplies not only for consumption 
but also for accumulating produced capital (roads, buildings, machines, ports) and human 
capital (health, education, aptitude). That is what we have been doing over millennia and is 
what economic development has come to mean among many people.39 That was a legitimate 
formulation of economic development when our ecological footprint was less than the 
biosphere’s ability to supply goods and services to meet that demand at a sustainable rate. 
Today the matter is different.
Figure 12 The Impact Inequality
There are therefore four avenues available to humanity for transforming the Impact Inequality 
into an Impact Equality. They involve finding ways to: 
(i) reduce per capita global consumption;40 
(ii) lower future global population from what it is today; 
(iii) increase the efficiency with which the biosphere’s supply of goods and services are 
converted into global output and returned to the biosphere as waste; and
(iv) invest in Nature through conservation and restoration to increase our stock of Nature 
and its regenerative rate.
Box 6 formalises this and uses empirical findings of our recent economic experiences to estimate 
how fast the efficiency with which we are able to transform the biosphere’s goods and services 
39 Barbier (2011) is an excellent historical account of that process.
40 For simplicity of exposition, we are equating global output with global consumption. 
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into GDP has to be if the SDGs are to be met by 2030.41 We find that the rate at which it must 
increase vastly exceeds the rate it has been achieved in the recent past.42 As there is enormous 
waste in our use of provisioning services (global food waste alone, from source to final 
consumption, is an astonishing 30% or thereabouts43), there is scope for efficiency gains. There 
is also waste attributable to the wide range of subsidies we pay ourselves for the use of Nature’s 
services. Many of the biosphere’s goods and services (e.g. water, fossil fuels) thus come with a 
negative price tagged to them. Globally, Nature’s subsidies amount to an annual US$4-6 trillion, 
or approximately 5-7% of global GDP (Box 9). 
There are, however, limits to the extent our global demand can be reduced by being more 
efficient in our consumption of goods and services (see Section 12 on technological advances). 
Which is why our crude estimates say we must also invest in Nature and attend to two 
problems that are rarely addressed in the economics of growth and climate change: finding 
ways to reduce global per capita consumption (the required redistribution measures would 
be enormous) and hastening the demographic transition in countries and regions where 
larger families are the norm. We study the contours of these two neglected problems first 
(Sections 7-9). 
Box 6
The Impact Inequality and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals
We denote humanity’s global impact on the biosphere by I and the biosphere’s regenerative 
rate by G. Both I and G are estimated in terms of the accounting values of the biosphere’s 
goods and services, expressed, say, in real (international) dollars per year. I does not have 
to equal G, for, continuing to use the parable of fisheries, the difference between the two 
would automatically be accommodated by a change in the biosphere’s stock. We write the 
latter as S. Declines in S are to be read as deterioration of the health of the biosphere. For 
vividness, we could imagine that every ecosystem is valued at its accounting price, and S is 
the sum of the accounting values of all the ecosystems on Earth. S is a stock, expressed in 
real (international) dollars. As with the example of fisheries, G depends on S, so we write that 
dependence as G(S). But as S is bounded, so is G bounded.
N denotes global population, y global GDP per capita, and α a numerical measure of the 
efficiency with which we are able to convert the biosphere’s goods and services into the final 
products we produce and consume. Global GDP is then N times y, which we write as Ny. 
The larger is α, the smaller is the demand we make on Nature for the same level of GDP.44 
Conversely, the larger is Ny, the larger is the demand we make on Nature for the same level 
of α. We may then express I as Ny/α and thereby write the fundamental inequality at the core 
of the economics of biodiversity as
I = Ny/α > G(S) (1) 
41 Box 6 contains the one bit of technical material in this abridged version of the Review. Readers can skip it without losing the 
thread of the argument. We have prepared it for readers who are curious to learn how mathematical arguments advance our 
quantitative understanding of socio-ecological possibilities for the future. 
42 COVID-19 can be expected to set the SDGs even further back than our computations. 
43 This is only a very rough estimate; there is a lack of information at some stages of production, See FAO (2019).
44 A simple illustration would be installing double glazing in homes. α would increase because the same warmth would be enjoyed 
at a reduced dependence on electricity or gas. 
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Expression (1) is the global Impact Inequality (Figure 12).45
Figures 10 and 11 revealed that Ny has been increasing in recent decades at an 
unprecedented rate; Figure 9 revealed that S has been declining in recent decades; and MA 
(2005) and IPBES (2019) have confirmed that G has also been declining in recent decades. 
The Global Footprint Network has found that the gap between I and G has been rising in 
recent decades to the point where the ratio of I to G in 2019 was 1.7. In recent decades, 
S has declined even as the gap between I and G has grown. The estimates of the character 
of modern economic growth that we have collated here now allow us to ask whether the 
United Nations’ SDGs for 2030 were ever realisable.
As a simple exercise, we assume that global GDP at constant prices will continue to increase 
at its average annual rate since 1970, of 3.4%. Managi and Kumar (2018) estimated that 
the value of per capita global natural capital declined by 40% between 1992 to 2014. That 
converts to an annual percentage rate of decline of 2.3%.46 But world population grew 
approximately at 1.1% in that period. It follows that the value of the stock of natural capital 
S declined at an annual rate of (2.3-1.1)% = 1.2%. Because there are no estimates of the 
form of the G-function, we assume for simplicity that G is proportional to S. So G can also be 
taken to have declined at an annual rate of 1.2%. As we have seen, the GFN has estimated 
that I/G increased from 1 in 1970 to 1.7 in 2019, which implies that it increased at an 
average annual rate of 1.1%. The estimates for the annual percentage rates of change of Ny, 
G, and [Ny/α]/G enable us to calculate that α had been increasing at an annual percentage 
rate of 3.5% in the period 1992 to 2014.
Suppose we want to equalise Ny/α and G in year 2030, that is, reduce the ratio of [Ny/α] to 
G from its current value of 1.7 to 1 in 10 years’ time. That would require that the ratio of 
Ny/α to G should decline at an average annual rate of 5.4%. Assuming Ny continues to grow 
at 3.4% annually and G continues to decline at 1.2% (i.e. business is assumed to continue as 
usual), how fast must α rise? The answer is an annual rate of 10.0%. As that is a huge hike 
from the historical rate of 3.5%, it suggests we must look at other policies if the SDGs are to 
be sustainable.
Suppose Ny was to remain constant from now to year 2030 and draconian steps were 
taken by us over our demands to limit the rate of deterioration of the biosphere to 0.1% a 
year. A simple calculation shows that the required increase in α is an annual (5.4+0.1)% = 
5.5%. Even that is almost a 60% increase of the 3.5% rate at which α has been increasing in 
recent decades. These are crude estimates, but they serve to illustrate the point that increases 
in efficiency alone are highly unlikely to be able to close the gap between I and G in the 
next decade.
The Impact Inequality also points to the error in imagining that perpetual economic growth 
is possible in the long run. It is significant that a mechanical engine that converts heat into 
work at 100% efficiency is a theoretical impossibility. The biological counterpart is that it 
would not be possible even theoretically to convert our further waste into a state that makes 
no further demands on the assimilative services of the biosphere; for if we were able to do 
that, we would be able to break free of Nature. That impossibility places a bound on α, 
meaning that no matter how ingenious we can be, global output (Ny) must also be bounded.
45 The expression for global impact Ny/α in equation (1) could be thought to be saying that, for any given value of α, N and y are 
in inverse relation to each other – for instance, that if N was to double then y would have to halve if global impact Ny/α was to 
be held constant. Arithmetically that would be correct, but the thought could be misconstrued. The reason is that N and y are not 
independent of one another: we humans have not only mouths, but hands and brains too. Thus, y is a function of N. The Review 
(Chapter 4*) presents a complete capital model from which ‘trade-offs’ between N and y can be estimated at various stages of 
economic development. Dasgupta and Dasgupta (2021) have constructed simple methods that can be deployed on the model to 
calculate trade-offs between N and y that are consistent with sustainable development.
46 The interested reader can follow the arithmetic steps in the corresponding Box in the Review should she wish to do so.
Part I: The State We Are In and Why
34 The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Abridged Version
7 Rich and Poor, Consumption and Population
How does ecological footprint vary with income?47 Figure 13 shows that although the higher 
a country’s income, the greater is its footprint, that footprint increases with income less than 
proportionately. It seems our impact on the biosphere increases with affluence, but the efficiency 
with which we transform the biosphere’s goods and services into the market value of final 
goods and services also increases with affluence. But that poses a cruel dilemma: other things 
equal, egalitarian objectives such as those enshrined in the SDGs may clash with the global need 
to reduce our ecological footprint.48
Figure 13 Ecological Footprint and Income
Source: World Bank data on GDP per capita in 2018 (thousands, constant prices in 2017 international dollars), and estimates from 
the Global Footprint Network on ecological footprint per capita (in global hectares), and Review calculations. 
The World Bank groups countries into four income categories: (i) high income, with an average 
per capita GDP of around 52,000 dollars PPP; (ii) upper-middle income (average around 17,500 
dollars PPP); (iii) lower-middle income (average around 6,800 dollars PPP); and (iv) low income 
(average around 2,500 dollars PPP). Table 1 presents the distribution of incomes, population 
sizes, and total fertility rates (TFR) across the four groups.49
47 This section is based on A. Dasgupta and Dasgupta (2017).
48 This can be confirmed from Figure 13. Suppose all countries were to enjoy the average income of the world, around 16,000 
international dollars. The global ecological footprint would be larger than the sum of the footprints of all countries at the current 
distribution of incomes. 
49 A region’s total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of births per woman over her reproductive years (taken to be 15-49). As a 
rule of thumb, 2.1 is taken to be the fertility rate at which a region’s population would remain constant in the long run. That is the 
‘replacement fertility rate’. 
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Table 1 Income and Population Shares
Countries (income; dollars 
PPP)
GDP (2019 prices; 
trillion)




High 64 47 16 1.6
Upper-middle 50 47 37 1.9
Lower-middle 20 15 38 2.8
Low 2 1 9 4.6
Source: World Bank (2020a). Figures rounded.
The figures are revealing. A little over 15% of the world’s population produces nearly 50% of 
global GDP, while just under 10% of the world’s population produces 1%. The majority of the 
world’s lowest income countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. Comprising around 14% of the 
world’s population, the region represents only a bit more than 3% of the world economy.50 
Estimates from the Global Footprint Network suggest that sub-Saharan Africa’s ecological 
footprint is a mere 6% of the global footprint. So sub-Saharan Africa cannot remotely be 
held responsible for the global environmental problems we face today; that responsibility falls 
squarely on today’s high income countries and increasingly the lower-middle income and upper-
middle income countries.
8 Addressing the Impact Inequality, 1: Global Consumption
In recent decades, there has been a significant increase in our global demand for provisioning 
services, in particular food, timber, fibres, biofuel, and water. This has affected the ability 
of ecosystems to provide the regulating and maintenance services on which our economies 
ultimately depend. For example, land used for agriculture increased by over 100 million hectares 
between 1980 and 2000 across the tropics, with half of this land directly converting the tropical 
forests that regulate climate and prevent soil erosion. In our oceans, fishery catch has more than 
quadrupled since 1950. Data on our current and predicted future use of provisioning services 
of crops, fibre, biofuels, timber, water, fish and aquaculture tell a similar story of escalating 
demands. If we are to avoid exceeding the limits of what Nature can provide on a sustainable 
basis while still meeting the needs of the human population, consumption and production 
patterns will need to be restructured fundamentally.
Food production is the most significant driver of terrestrial biodiversity loss. But humanity 
also comes with an entourage. Land is used to produce food for our pets (cats and dogs). A 
recent assessment of the demand for pet food found that its production uses 0.8-1.2% of 
global agricultural land, which is approximately twice the land area of the UK (Alexander et al. 
2020). But that is nothing in comparison with our love of meat products. Livestock in 2016 
occupied 3.28 billion hectares of global agricultural land (67%). This figure does not include 
the approximately 35% of crop production for livestock feed (Foley et al. 2011). If that were 
included, the proportion of agricultural land devoted to livestock would become 77%.51 If 
we reckon that agricultural land replaced what were once woodlands and forests, grasslands 
and shrubs, wetlands and swamps, and include in our calculation the discharge of waste 
accompanying food production and consumption, we begin to appreciate the magnitude of the 
tension between our demand for provisioning services, in particular food production, and our 
need for regulating and maintenance services.
50 The slight discrepancy between these figures and the corresponding ones in Table 1 is explained by the fact that there are a 
handful of lower- and upper-middle income countries in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. South Africa, Kenya, Namibia and Botswana).
51 See Klein Goldewijk et al. (2017), and Poore and Nemecek (2018).
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As the global population grows, the problem of producing sufficient food in a sustainable 
manner will only intensify. There is also significant waste (Box 7): as noted earlier, approximately 
one-third of food produced is lost or wasted (FAO, 2014, 2019). This is more than just ironic; 
even as more than 10% of the world’s population go to bed hungry each day, food remains 
under-priced for the wealthy.
Box 7
Food Loss and Waste
Short term macroeconomics fuels profligacy: we are encouraged to consume so as to prevent 
the employment rate from falling. There is a need to break the link between consumption 
that is damaging of the biosphere and employment, because we know employment improves 
well-being (Review Chapter 11). Three major types of footprint of food loss and waste are 
quantifiable: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, pressures on land, and pressures on water. 
They all have an impact on biodiversity. Production of food which is never consumed has 
significant environmental impact: GHG emissions from the production of lost and wasted 
food amount to 8% of total GHG emissions, making food waste the third largest carbon 
emitter in the world, behind the US and China (Hanson and Mitchell, 2017). 
The extent of food loss and waste along supply chains varies depending on global context: 
loss is substantial in handling, storage and transport stages in regions where these are 
difficult to achieve. At the global level, approximately one-third of food produced is lost or 
wasted (FAO, 2019), that is, a land area the size of India and Canada together is used to 
grow food that is never consumed. For aquatic food, post-harvest loss is a particular problem 
for small-scale fisheries. Large quantities of fish are lost in transport and storage, especially 
where access to electricity for cold storage is a difficulty. Post-harvest losses were estimated at 
10% of global capture fishery and aquaculture production in 2005 (Béné et al. 2007).
Meeting environmental objectives by reducing food loss and waste requires an understanding 
of not only where food waste occurs in the supply chain, but also the footprints of 
commodities that are wasted and the costs of interventions to reduce waste at different 
points. To reduce the land footprint, for example, policies need to aim to reduce animal 
product waste because 60% of the land footprint of food loss and waste is for livestock 
production. Some countries have achieved significant reductions in food waste. In 2015 to 
2018, the UK saw a 7% reduction in food waste (480,000 tonnes), mainly through working 
in partnership with food retailers and tackling waste at the household stage (WRAP, 2020). 
Globally, however, food waste remains gigantic.
9 Addressing the Impact Inequality, 2: Global Population
Global population grew sharply in the years following the mid-20th century, because the 
substantial reductions in death rates traceable to advances in medicine and public health 
practices were not matched by reductions in fertility rates. Table 1 shows that fertility rates are 
lower in richer groups of countries. The table also shows that low income countries, the bulk of 
which are in sub-Saharan Africa, stand out for their high fertility rates.52
In 2018, women in sub-Saharan Africa on average have around 4.7 births over the course of a 
lifetime, in contrast to a global average of 2.4. Even the latter figure is above the replacement 
fertility rate – approximately 2.1. The fertility rate in South Asia differs considerably across 
regions: the fertility rate in Bangladesh, which has welcomed voluntary participation in family 
52 The remainder of this section owes much to discussions with John Bongaarts, John Cleland, Aisha Dasgupta, Paul Ehrlich, and 
Peter Raven. 
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planning programmes, is today only a bit over 2; in India it has fallen to 2.2, whereas in Pakistan 
it is 3.5.53 In contrast, the fertility rate in China today is 1.7. 
Recall though that the global ecological footprint depends on the absolute population size. 
A population can be stable, but if large it would have a big footprint, other things equal, 
and could bring the biosphere into disrepair. That is why the replacement fertility rate is not 
as significant a notion of ‘fertility transition’ (the transition from high fertility rates to the 
replacement rate) in the economics of biodiversity as it is in demography. The economics of 
biodiversity encourages us to look for transitions that dip below the replacement fertility rate 
before tending toward it. As Table 1 shows, high income and upper-middle income countries, 
seen as groups, display that feature.
Peering into population projections by expert demographers is a necessary exercise in the 
economics of biodiversity. The United Nations’ current median projection of world population 
in year 2100 is around 10.9 billion, with a 95% certainty range 9.4-12.7 billion (UNPD, 
2019). More than three-quarters of the increase from today’s 7.7 billion is expected to be 
in sub-Saharan Africa, where population in 2100 is projected to rise from around 1.1 billion 
today to 3.8 billion with 95% certainty that it will be in the range 3.0-4.8 billion (Figure 14). 
But attempts to raise incomes there, even to the current global average income (approximately 
17,000 international dollars), in the face of a near-3 billion rise in numbers, will require an 
increase in the region’s annual output from 4.3 trillion international dollars to about 68 trillion 
international dollars at today’s prices. That rise, assuming that it is possible, is likely to have 
adverse consequences for the region’s ecology, contributing to societal conflicts there and 
greater attempted population movements both within the region and out of it (Juma, 2019).
There are alternative projections to those made by the United Nations Population Division 
(UNPD). Vollset et al. (2020) have projected global population for 2100 based on two 
assumptions that are notably different from UNPD (2019): (i) sharper declines in fertility rates 
in countries that have already undergone a fertility transition; and (ii) earlier declines in fertility 
rates in low income countries. The authors’ central projection of global population in 2100 is 
8.8 billion, with a 95% prediction interval of 6.8-11.8 billion. Their forecast for sub-Saharan 
Africa is an increase by approximately 2 billion from today’s 1.1 billion, which is fewer by 700 
million than the median projection in UNPD (2019). As a median global population of 8.8 billion 
in 2100 is lower than even the lower bound of 9.4 billion in UNPD’s 95% prediction interval, the 
publication created much media interest.
In fact, differences between the two sets of projections for global population become significant 
only after 2070. Until then, there is less than 5% difference between the two.54 And that matters 
far more than their differences for 2100. Nature responds to the demands we make of it, it does 
not calculate rates of change in demands, nor rates of change of rates of change in demands. 
When ecosystems tip over into unproductive states, the shift cannot usually be reversed (in 
exceptional circumstances it can be, but only at great cost). Globally, if a few more planetary 
boundaries (Annex 1) are breached by year 2070, differences in population projections for year 
2100 will count for little.
The SDGs are reticent about population, and yet it is difficult to imagine that they can be 
regarded to be sustainable without addressing the subject (given the role population plays in 
our demands on Nature), even if the target year was to be postponed a decade or more beyond 
2030. It has been argued that the goal to restrict the increase in mean global temperature to 
2°C from that in the pre-industrial revolution era is unlikely to be met unless population growth 
53 In 1970 (i.e. before the partition of Pakistan into two states), the total fertility rate was high in both Bangladesh and Pakistan – 6.9 
in Bangladesh and 6.6 in Pakistan – but by 2000 it had dropped to 3.2 in Bangladesh but was 5.0 in Pakistan (A. Dasgupta, 2020). 
For further discussion of the role family planning played in reducing birth rates in Bangladesh, see Review (Chapter 9). 
54 We are grateful to Patrick Gerland of the United Nations Population Division for clarifying this for us. 
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is reduced substantially (O’Neill et al. 2010), and yet even the recent 2015 Paris Agreement on 
climate change made no mention of population, nor of the lack of family planning facilities for 
many of the world’s poorest women. Today, less than 1% of international aid from the EU to 
Africa is devoted to family planning. Box 8 collates what is known of the magnitude of unmet 
need for family planning.
Figure 14 Total Population Size by Region, Estimates and Projections, 1950 to 2100
Source: UNPD (2019).
Box 8
Family Planning and Reproductive Health
Over the years, female education has been seen by development experts as the surest route 
to women’s empowerment, including choice over fertility. All governments recognise the 
importance of women’s education for empowering women, yet even today around 30% of 
females between 15 and 24 years of age in low income countries are illiterate (World Bank, 
2020a). Family planning and reproductive health programmes, in contrast, are affordable by 
governments even in low income countries. They offer an effective route for governments 
to empower women (they are what today many would call a ‘low-hanging fruit’); yet they 
remain low on the development agenda. It is a paradox.
By providing access to subsidised contraceptive commodities and services, family planning 
and reproductive health programmes were successful in accelerating fertility declines in East 
Asia and Latin America in the 1960s to 1980s. Cleland et al. (2006) estimated that their 
promotion in countries with high fertility rates had the potential to avert more than 30% of 
maternal deaths and nearly 10% of childhood deaths. The rationale for vigorously expanding 
the content and reach of such programmes today also lies in the more than 215 million 
women in developing, mainly low income, countries who have reported they want to prevent 
pregnancy but are not using modern contraception. Among them, over 150 million use no 
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method of contraception and nearly 65 million rely on traditional methods (UNPD 2020). The 
Guttmacher Institute (2020) estimated that there were some 110 million pregnancies in low 
and middle income countries annually that were unintended. The institute also estimated 
that if all unmet needs for modern contraception were satisfied in developing countries, there 
would be a nearly 70% decline in unintended pregnancies, amounting to around 35 million 
a year. Meeting unmet needs for contraception would reduce pregnancy-related deaths by 
70,000. Many unintended pregnancies end in abortion, a significant proportion of which are 
performed under unsafe conditions.
In addition to reducing unintended pregnancies, use of contraceptives among women 
enhances their own health and that of their children by spacing births and providing greater 
opportunity for education. Guttmacher Institute (2020) estimated that more than 2.5 million 
infants in low and middle income countries die each year in the first month of life. Access 
to community-based modern family planning and reproductive health programmes is a 
means for women to have greater control over their lives and for improving the chance of 
having healthy babies. If the benefits of modern family planning and reproductive health 
programmes are high, the costs are low. By one estimate (Guttmacher Institute, 2020), 
expanding and improving services to meet women’s needs for modern contraception 
in developing countries would cost under US$2 a year per person. As routes to fertility 
transitions, investment in community-based family planning and reproductive health 
programmes should now be regarded as essential.55
10 Environmental Externalities
Why and how have we come to over-extend our demands on the biosphere to such an extent? 
One set of explanations, much studied in recent years by environmental economists, focuses 
on human short-sightedness and our inability to choose actions that are in our own personal 
interests. Behavioural psychology has studied and confirmed systematic biases in our reading 
of the world and in the personal choices we make – the goods we consume and the risks we 
take (Box 11).
The findings are illuminating, but they do not help to explain why our overshoot has increased 
so rapidly in recent decades, to the point where some parts of the biosphere have tipped 
over into unproductive ecosystems and some parts are probably not far from tipping points 
(Annex 1). In order to have an uncluttered problem to examine, we therefore imagine that 
people are capable of reasoning judiciously. The problem then is to explain why reasoned 
choices at the individual level can nevertheless result in a massive failure of collective reasoning. 
For that, we look into features of the biosphere that create the dissonance.
As noted earlier, mobility, invisibility, and silence are pervasive features of regulating and 
maintenance services. That makes it difficult for others to observe or verify the use someone 
makes of them or what that someone does, perhaps inadvertently, to weaken them. Property 
rights to Nature’s processes are thus difficult to define and difficult to enforce even when they 
have been instituted. By property rights we do not only mean private rights, we include collective 
rights (e.g. community rights and state rights). The inability of societies to honour property 
rights even when they can be defined gives rise to externalities, which are the unaccounted-for 
consequences for others, including future people, of actions taken by one or more persons. 
The qualifier ‘unaccounted-for’ means that the consequences in question follow without prior 
engagement with those who are affected, or without due consideration for future people. 
Environmental externalities, for that is what we are focusing on here, are prevalent because we 
do not have to pay for many of our biosphere’s services. Being free, we demand too much; that 
55 Of the many publications that have reported the benefits that family planning services provide to poor households, see especially 
Cleland et al. (2006), Bongaarts (2011, 2016), Miller and Babiarz (2016), and Guttmacher Institute (2020). 
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is, we demand more than is in our collective interest. In Box 9, we confirm, moreover, that some 
ecosystem goods and services come not at zero price but at a negative price. Put simply, it pays 
to exploit the biosphere, and government subsidies play a part in that. 
Box 9
Nature Subsidies
Governments almost everywhere amplify adverse environmental externalities by paying people 
more to exploit the biosphere than they do to protect it. These payments have been called 
perverse subsidies. Examples include subsidies to agriculture, water, fossil fuels, fisheries, 
energy and fertilisers. These subsidies encourage over-extraction and harvesting of the 
biosphere. Government subsidies for exploiting Nature are extensive in size. Recent estimates 
suggest that direct subsidies that are harmful to biodiversity total around US$500 billion per 
year, and when taking into account environmental externalities, the conservative estimate of 
the total cost of subsidies is much larger, at around US$4 to US$6 trillion globally per year 
for the sectors mentioned above (OECD, 2017b; Andres et al. 2019; Coady et al. 2019). 
The figures dwarf the size of public finance devoted to conservation and restoration and 
sustainable use of the biosphere. For example, domestic public finance associated with the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity totals around US$68 billion per year globally 
(OECD, 2020). Estimates of aggregate finance flows toward biodiversity (including those from 
both public and private sources) range from around US$78 billion to US$143 billion per year 
(equivalent to around 0.1% of global nominal GDP in 2019)56 (Review, Chapters 8 and 20).
Two types of externalities may be contrasted: unidirectional and reciprocal. We introduce 
them, and then review various types of institutions that societies have created to reduce them 
(Sections 11-13).
Figure 15 Reciprocal and Unidirectional Externalities
56 See Deutz et al. (2020) and OECD (2020). 
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10.1 Unidirectional Externalities 
An externality is unidirectional when an agent (or a group of agents) inflicts an unaccounted-
for damage or confers an unaccounted-for benefit on another (or others). An example of 
unidirectional harm is a company discharging toxic chemicals into waterways; an example of 
a unidirectional benefit is the protection enjoyed by downstream dwellers against landslides 
afforded by the wooded property of the landowner upstream.
Unidirectional externalities find their greatest expression in our engagements with our 
descendants. To explain, consider that our consumption levels affect what we are able to leave 
behind for them. It is customary to argue that people have a right to judge for themselves how 
much to save for their children, that parents are in any case best placed to reach answers to that 
question.57 The argument runs as follows: people care about their children, and know that their 
children in turn will care about their grandchildren, that their grandchildren in turn will care 
about their great-grandchildren, and so on. By recursive reasoning, thoughtful parents would 
care about all their descendants. So, when parents reflect on how much they should bequeath 
to their children, they are guided by all their descendants’ well-being. Voluntary participation in 
free and fair markets would enable parents to express that extended care, while relying on their 
own resources.
One problem with the argument (there are other problems as well) is that even if parents are 
able to internalise the well-being of their own descendants, they would not take into account 
the positive externalities they confer on, nor the negative externalities they inflict on, other 
parents and their descendants. As so many of our biosphere’s regulating and maintenance 
services are free, each one of us experiences (even if at an unconscious level) an urge to exploit 
them at rates that, from the perspective of our collective good, are too high.58 And that 
amounts to each one of us discounting the benefits and burdens of our descendants at rates 
we would not countenance were we able to choose them collectively. Rates of discount in the 
market are therefore too high; accounting rates of interest – they are often called social rates 
of discount – would be lower. Economists point to an absence of adequate property rights to 
natural capital as the source of the problem.
10.2 Reciprocal Externalities
Under reciprocal externalities, each party inflicts an unaccounted-for harm or confers an 
unaccounted-for benefit on all others in a population. The population could be as small as a 
village community or as large as the world. One example of mutual harm is the carbon emissions 
of every household today; another is the biodiversity loss caused by our activities. An example 
of a mutual benefit would be the flip side, which would take place if nations undertook to fulfil 
their commitments to reduce carbon emissions or biodiversity loss. Gordon (1954) famously 
wrote that an asset that belongs to everyone belongs to no one. Hardin (1968) even more 
famously spoke of the “tragedy of the commons” to describe what can happen to a resource 
to which access is free. Because users are not charged nor required to limit their use, everyone 
uses it excessively.59 This is not simply market failure, it is institutional failure writ large. When 
governments are unable to agree on ways to ensure that commitments they have made on 
reducing carbon emissions are complied with, it is a sign of failure in international governance; 
it is not market failure.
57 There are exceptions to this argument of course, investment in education being one.
58 Anthropologists have observed that children consume meals at a faster rate when eating from a common plate than when eating 
from individual plates.
59 What prevents us from depleting free resources immediately are the personal costs of extraction. On this, see Dasgupta, Mitra, and 
Sorger (2019). 
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Reduction in the prospective damage from climate change and biodiversity loss is akin to the 
production of public goods, which are neither rivalrous (access to a public good by any one 
group of people has no effect on the quantity available to others) nor excludable (no one can 
be excluded from access to the good). Markets would be expected to offer very little in the way 
of incentives for individuals in their private capacity to supply public goods: the benefit from 
supplying them would be shared with everyone, while the entire cost of production would be 
borne by the supplier. The term ‘free riding’ expresses the phenomenon exactly. That is why 
governments are urged by economists to reduce harmful externalities using pollution taxes, 
resource extraction fees, even prohibitions (e.g. establishing Protected Areas; issuing a fixed 
number of tradeable permits to pollute; and so on).
Globally, public goods appear in the form of such regulating and maintenance services as are 
embodied, for example, in the climate system. The ecosystems supplying those public goods 
differ from one another, which means different remedies are required if their supply is to 
improve. Consider that the world’s rainforests are a seat of global public goods but fall within 
national jurisdictions. They thereby give rise to unidirectional externalities. If we are to preserve 
the world’s rainforests, the global community should be prepared to pay the nations harbouring 
them to do that. In contrast, the world’s oceans beyond the 200-mile exclusive economic zones 
are global public goods but are open access resources, giving rise to reciprocal externalities. 
Protection of the oceans should therefore be subject to international control (e.g. global taxation 
on ocean fisheries and transportation; extensions of Protected Areas, and so on). The public 
finances in the two cases would be different, but they could be made to relate to one another. 
The revenue collected from global fisheries and marine transportation could, for example, be 
used to cover, if only partially, the international payment for the protection of rainforests. In Part 
II, we explore the idea of a Global Marshall Plan for protecting the biosphere and, by extension, 
our prosperity and well-being also.
Box 10
Externalities and Rights
Although the failure to establish and protect property rights has traditionally been at the 
heart of the economics of externalities, the language of rights sits awkwardly there.60 We 
are speaking of fundamental rights, not rights assigned to people or organisations because 
they are instrumental in advancing human well-being. But even fundamental rights need to 
be justified. As elsewhere in the economics of biodiversity, trade-offs have to be weighed if 
actions are to be judged. Rights short-circuit those complexities.
Perhaps the most striking, as well as the most sensitive, sphere where rights would seem to 
clash is reproduction. The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development 
reaffirmed the language of rights in the sphere of family planning and reproductive health. 
The Conference’s conclusions read:
“Reproductive rights … rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and 
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children, 
and to have information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standards of 
sexual and reproductive health.” (UNFPA, 1995: Chapter 7, Section 3)61
The qualifier ‘responsibly’ could be read as requiring couples to take into account the 
adverse environmental externalities their reproductive decisions may give rise to; but that 
60 The material in this Box has been taken from A. Dasgupta and Dasgupta (2017).
61 Moral philosophers would argue that the evaluation of family planning programmes should include the quality of lives that will 
not be lived on account of the programmes. We avoid those difficult problems by assuming that thoughtful parents reach their 
fertility desires by taking into account the potential well-being of their offspring and, by recursion, the well-being of their dynasty. 
On this and related matters in population ethics, see Dasgupta (2019). 
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probably would be a stretched reading. Certainly, writings affirming the UN declaration have 
interpreted the passage and its intent more narrowly. For example, the fundamental right of 
individuals “to decide freely and for themselves whether, when, and how many children to 
have” is central to the vision and goals of Family Planning 2020 (FP2020). It is also pivotal in 
the reproductive health indicators of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. In this vision, 
information and other services pertaining to family planning and reproductive health are 
rights, as is choosing one’s family size. But it is not clear that the two sets of rights have the 
same force.
Rights are peremptory, which is why they are problematic. One way to overcome the problem 
is to place them in a hierarchy. That was the conclusion Rawls (1971) famously reached when 
framing his principles of justice.62 But if note is taken of adverse externalities accompanying 
a person’s actions, it is by no means clear whose rights are to trump. Which is why the 
language of rights sits awkwardly in the economics of biodiversity. In a world where the 
Impact Inequality holds, and holds strongly, it may seem reasonable to insist on the rights of 
future generations when an appeal is made to curb our impact on the biosphere. Sen (1982: 
346), for example, has likened persistent pollutants to instruments of oppression: “Lasting 
pollution is a kind of calculable oppression of the future generation.” But if additional births 
can be expected to contribute further to the discharge of persistent pollutants, why do a 
couple’s reproductive rights trump the rights of future people not to be oppressed? That is 
the kind of ethical dilemma the language of reproductive rights misses.63
11 Socially Embedded Preferences
The previous section described externalities that travel in the material world. In fact, externalities 
are embedded in a larger space. The social world can be as powerful a carrier of externalities 
as the material environment. A common form in which they appear in the social world is in the 
way our relationships influence our preferences and wants. This is cause for hope that transitions 
to sustainable development are possible and with lower human costs than may be feared.
Conceptions of human behaviour that inform the economic models in use by government 
ministries view human agency as egoistic. In some aspects of behaviour we are surely that, 
but in other aspects we are socially embedded: we look to others when acting. Even in the 
latter, our motivation is not uniform. In some spheres of life we are competitive, in others 
we are conformists. The economics of biodiversity remains seriously incomplete when our 
innate sociability is not acknowledged; nor is policy well informed when we neglect our social 
embeddedness.64 That consumption is the activity around which human relationships are built 
and maintained has been found time and again by historians and anthropologists in their 
studies of traditional societies. Feasts to mark occasions of significance (birth, puberty, marriage, 
death, harvests, and the annual renewal that is spring) are a recurrent theme in their writings. 
The epic poems of Homer and Vyasa are full of it. There is hardly a book in the Odyssey that 
does not have a line-after-line description of the roasting, carving, and communal eating of 
meat and drinking of wine. And no opportunity is lost in the Mahabharata for describing the 
extravagance with which the king entertains his kinsmen and guests to mark a sacrifice to the 
gods or to celebrate the establishment of a capital for his kingdom.
62 In contrast, the 30 Articles in the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights are not placed in a hierarchy. Blackburn (2001) uses 
the UN Declaration to demonstrate the weaknesses inherent in rights-based ethics. 
63 In recognisably exceptional circumstances, governments resolve the dilemma by creating a hierarchy of rights. In the current 
COVID-19 pandemic, many governments have insisted that the right not to be infected by others trumps the individual right to do as 
we please when it comes to wearing masks and keeping safe distance from our friends. 
64 A modern classic on the way others influence us and we influence others is Cialdini (1984). 
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Historians of consumption are aware that the act of eating food communally has been a 
salient feature of societies everywhere, and that feasts have bound societies together since time 
immemorial. What contemporary historians have sought to understand are the societal changes 
that led to the democratisation of eating meals together beyond the household unit. The 
feasts described in epic poetry are enjoyed only by the aristocrats; we are told nothing of how 
common people celebrated special occasions. The modern historian, in contrast, is at pains to 
understand the growth of inns, cafes and restaurants in the general development of societies in 
the West since the late Middle Ages and Early-Modern times.
To date, socially embedded preferences have been uncovered mainly by historians, sociologists, 
and social and behavioural psychologists. What we have from social historians are narratives 
on the formation of tastes and changes in consumption practices over time (Trentmann, 2012, 
2016); and what we have from large-scale surveys on stated happiness and life satisfaction is 
confirmation that our place relative to others matters to us (Review, Chapter 11).
The classic study of competitive preferences was Veblen (1925), who wrote of ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ to understand the Gilded Age among America’s 19th century economic barons. 
That competitive preferences over consumption patterns leads to socially excessive consumption 
is well known, as evidenced by the term ‘consumerism’, which carries with it a pejorative note. 
People acknowledge the force of the ‘rat races’ they join in search of consumption experiences. 
Getting ahead of ‘the Jones’s’ is a familiar expression. Competition can also drive consumption 
that is less degrading of the biosphere, for example in demand for more energy efficient 
appliances or electric cars.
Conformist preferences are different. They reflect the desire on our part to be like others, 
neither above nor below them. Conformism can direct us to be profligate, but we would be 
profligate only because others are profligate. So it may be difficult empirically to distinguish the 
two explanations for profligacy – competitiveness and conformism. Nevertheless, conformism 
is distinct from competitiveness. One reason is that if we were conformists we would be frugal 
in our consumption practices if others were frugal. Each practice – profligacy, frugality – could 
be held together by its own bootstraps, so to speak. So there is indeterminacy in the emergent 
behaviour in a society of conformists. That indeterminacy gives substance to a common 
observation that consumption patterns in the affluent West are wasteful, and worse, that they 
damage biodiversity and thereby our own wealth and well-being – the thought being that our 
practices have evolved in a socially damaging way. But the indeterminacy also offers hope that 
reductions in those forms of consumption that are damaging of the biosphere may cost far 
less in psychological terms than they would were the human person an egoist in all manners 
of consumption. 
Fertility practices also are not influenced solely by private desires and wants, they are also shaped 
by societal mores. Reproductive behaviour is conformist when the family size a household 
desires conforms to the average family size in the community or, more broadly, in the world that 
households come into contact with. So long as all others aim at large families, no household will 
wish to deviate from the practice; if, however, all other households were to restrict their fertility, 
every household would wish to restrict its fertility. A society can thus get embedded in a self-
sustaining mode of behaviour characterised by high fertility and stagnant living standards, even 
when there is another potentially self-sustaining mode of behaviour that is characterised by low 
fertility and rising living standards and which is preferred by all (Dasgupta and Dasgupta, 2017).
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Figure 16 Socially Embedded Preferences 
A study of contraceptive use in rural Kenya found that in communities with dense social 
networks and a poorly developed market economy, a woman would be unlikely to use 
contraceptive methods if contraception use in her network was low, whereas she would be 
likely to use such methods if contraception use in her network was high (Kohler, Behrman, 
and Watkins, 2001). Further support has been provided in a recent analysis of contraceptive 
uptake in Bangladesh (Munshi and Myaux, 2006). The study concerned women living in the 
same community but belonging to different religious groups. After controlling for individual 
differences in education, age, wealth, and the like, the study found that a woman’s choice to 
use contraception depended strongly on the predominant choice made by other women in her 
religious group and was unaffected by the predominant choice made by women belonging 
to the other group. Family planning programmes that encourage community discussions 




Over the years behavioural psychologists have uncovered a number of systematic biases our 
choices are prone to. The biases on their own do not reflect socially embedded preferences 
– they are simply biases in the way we absorb information and respond to them. For 
example, the way choices are framed influences what we choose, so default options can have 
a powerful effect in shifting behaviour – referred to as ‘nudging’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Researchers have found that even when people say they would like to use a green energy 
supplier, few do (Reisch and Sunstein, 2016). However, when a green energy supply was 
made the default, 69% of people in a trial of approximately 40,000 households ended up 
with one, compared to only 7% when it was not the default option (Ebeling and Lotz, 2015). 
To cite another example, hotels today routinely offer customers the default option of not 
requiring their bathroom towels to be changed each day. 
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Nudging people to do one thing rather than another can also be achieved through changing 
the environment in which people make their decisions. This includes cues in the physical 
environment, such as size, availability and position of objects or stimuli. For example, 
researchers have found when higher proportions of healthy and vegetarian cafeteria meals 
were made available, calorie intake and meat consumption were both reduced (Pechey 
et al. 2019).65
12 Technology and Institutions
Technology and institutions together influence the efficiency with which we are able to convert 
the biosphere’s supply of goods and services into final products. They also influence the 
biosphere’s ability to supply goods and services on a sustainable basis (e.g. bioengineering).
12.1 Synergies and Disharmonies
That institutions and technology influence one another is a commonplace observation. 
Institutions define the incentives that people have to do one thing rather than another, and 
incentives shape the production, dissemination and use of knowledge. A state that invests 
vigorously in life-saving technology and then applies it is able to transform society for the better. 
Likewise, technological possibilities shape institutions. Advances in mapping the geographical 
spread of natural capital and in methods to monitor its use can help enforce property 
rights. History is rife with examples where institutions and technology have influenced one 
another beneficially.
That each can be made at least partially to mitigate the other’s failure has also been widely 
noted. Although degradation of the biosphere is frequently traced to institutional failure, people 
often express hope that progress in science and technology can put things right. The economics 
of climate change has encouraged that thought by focusing on the development of cheap 
renewable energy sources as substitutes for fossil fuels. Nature-saving technology – for example, 
substituting degradable waste for persistent pollutants and decarbonising the energy sector – 
are one class of ways in which technology can raise the efficiency with which the biosphere’s 
goods and services are converted into final products. Institutional changes, such as improving 
the character and enforcement of property rights to natural resources points to another class of 
ways in which that efficiency can be raised. Establishing Protected Areas to conserve ecosystems; 
imposing pollution taxes or outright prohibitions; and removal of subsidies on resource 
extraction and agricultural production; are another class of institutional changes that can be 
brought about by public policy. Changes in behavioural norms, such as those that lead to a 
reduction in food waste, are yet another avenue (Section 19).
But there are problems. The incentives entrepreneurs have for developing technology are shaped 
by the systems of property rights in place. Entrepreneurs understandably innovate with a view 
to lessening the need for expensive factors of production, not cheap ones. We should then not 
be surprised that modern technologies are rapacious in their use of the biosphere’s goods and 
services, many of which have a zero or even negative price. Remarkable post-war developments 
in sonar technology and advances in the technology for harvesting fish came about in large 
measure because ocean fisheries beyond national jurisdiction are free. Unbridled application 
of modern technology (e.g. the chainsaw) in clearing tropical rainforests has been made 
possible because governments have permitted it at a small price. Both forms of environmental 
destruction would have been avoided had institutions not failed. There is nothing good or bad 
65 It may be that what appears as irrational behaviour today has its roots in rational responses to problems our distant ancestors 
faced; that is, our behavioural biases may be relics of survival strategies in the distant past. For an exploration of this line of thinking 
for understanding the time-varying discount rates we humans have been found to deploy in our saving behaviour, see Dasgupta and 
Maskin (2005). 
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about technology per se. It is the use to which it is put that affects the efficiency with which we 
are able to convert the biosphere’s goods and services into final products.
Box 12
Genetically Modified Crops
Changing the biological capabilities of crops offers the possibility of using marginal land 
for production, improving crop resistance to pathogens, obtaining higher yield on existing 
farmland, and enhancing nutritional quality. Genetically modified crops remain controversial, 
even though prominent scientific bodies such as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(NCB, 2003) continue to affirm their salience in a world with growing food needs.66 
There are numerous examples of how classic genetic modification and the newer, faster, and 
more precise technique of gene editing with CRISPR/Cas9 have conferred desirable traits on 
crops. One important example of transformational crop change through genetic engineering 
relates to rice: changing its primary metabolism to increase yield dramatically (C4 rice). As rice 
makes up some 20% of global calorie intake, improvements to its growth efficiency have 
far-reaching consequences (Elert, 2014). Plants can carry out photosynthesis using a basic 
C3 or C4 molecule; the C4 route is much more efficient. Yields of species currently using C3 
photosynthesis would be considerably higher if they could be re-engineered to use C4. Rice 
is currently a C3 plant, but a global research consortium has been working since 2009 to 
introduce genes from maize and change its photosynthetic pathway to C4. The researchers 
estimate that rice yields could be improved by up to 50%, and that water use efficiency could 
be doubled (Rizal et al. 2012; Ermakova et al. 2019).
12.2 Our Bounded Economy
Contemporary conceptions of economic possibilities acknowledge that the biosphere is of finite 
size, capable of producing only a limited flow of goods and services. But they encourage the 
thought that if institutions are designed so as to create the right incentives, human ingenuity 
can overcome the bounds of a finite Earth. Formal models of macroeconomic growth assume 
that substitution possibilities between produced capital goods and technological advances can 
enable us to pursue economic growth indefinitely.
The economics of climate change and international negotiations over carbon emissions would 
seem to have gone further. There is an implicit suggestion there that GDP growth is the only 
viable route for (i) reducing carbon emissions, (ii) eliminating global poverty, and (iii) ensuring 
that development is sustainable.67 That stance has given rise to a paradox: growth in global 
output is seen as necessary for providing the funds that will be needed for reducing our 
ecological footprint, even though the ways growth in global output have been achieved are 
known to increase the footprint.68
Our footprint is not only of the material we take from the biosphere but also the transformed 
material we deposit into it. What is requisitioned for human use has to be returned. The 
macroeconomic models of growth and development in use in economic and finance ministries 
and Planning Commissions, however, do not acknowledge that material must balance – from 
source to sink. Persistent pollutants such as plastics (bags and containers), nylon (fishing nets 
66 Zilberman, Holland, and Trilnick (2018) is an excellent summary statement.
67 That would also appear to be the implicit assumption underlying the UN’s SDGs (Box 1).
68 Visions of a prosperous world in which Nature plays no part continue to thrive. Criticising the young climate activist Greta 
Thunberg for her speech at the United Nations in September 2019, the economics editor of Sky News wrote in The Times 
(27 September 2019: p. 30): “Eternal economic growth is not a phrase one spits out in derision; it’s precisely what we should be 
aiming for.”
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and synthetic textiles), toxic chemicals (insecticides and pesticides), and metals and minerals 
(iron sulphide, mercury compounds) provide examples of waste that have adverse consequences 
for the soils and water bodies. Even (perhaps, especially!) biodegradable waste has to be 
accounted for. It does not do to imagine that if waste is biodegradable it leaves no footprint. 
If we overload Nature with such waste, the process of decomposition alters the biota, and that 
compromises other ecosystem services. Pharmaceuticals such as antibiotics and fashion products 
such as cosmetics contaminate the soils and water bodies. They have an adverse effect on the 
food we eat, the water we drink, and the air we breathe. Chemical fertilisers and waste from 
livestock emerge at the other end of farm production as waste, causing nutrient overload in 
streams and water bodies, disrupting the nitrogen cycle. Even the carbon dioxide emitted by our 
economies is a biodegradable waste: it is absorbed by primary producers for photosynthesis. 
But an overload compromises the ability of the biosphere to regulate climate. Global climate 
change will increasingly be a major cause of biodiversity loss (Lovejoy and Hannah, 2019). 
That will compromise the functional integrity of ecosystems. Rising concentration of carbon in 
the atmosphere is thus expected to bring about a chain of events that will radically alter the 
biosphere’s workings. Regulating and maintenance services will move out of the bounds within 
which our economies and physiologies have evolved.69
Technological advances are taken in contemporary conceptions of economic growth to serve 
as the engine of economic growth. But those advances require investment in research and 
development. The conceptions carry with them the belief that even when GDP growth propels 
economies to higher and higher standards of living, further technological advances will require 
vanishing quantities of Nature’s goods and services. The underlying assumption is that humanity 
will in the long run be able to break free of the biosphere. It is imagined that we are external to 
Nature. The Review develops the economics of biodiversity on an understanding that humanity 
is embedded in Nature. That viewpoint can be shown to imply that the human economy is 
bounded. The Review (Chapters 4 and 4*) appeals to ecological principles to argue that the 
efficiency with which the biosphere’s goods and services can be transformed into our final 
goods and services will prove to be bounded no matter how ingenious we happen to be. We 
have to acknowledge that, if we are to reverse the Impact Inequality.
Models are now urgently needed that follow the ecological principles outlined in the global 
economic model in the Review (Chapter 4*), including data on natural capital. Empirical 
estimations of such models are needed to address the question of whether, and for how long, 
the redirection of consumption and investment that is now required is compatible with global 
GDP growth in the immediate future. The evidence presented in Section 5 implies that the 
possibility of global GDP growth generated by activities that cause depreciation of natural assets 
for an indefinite period into the future is highly unlikely. As does evidence that we have left the 
safety zones defining two of the nine planetary boundaries identified by scientists (Rockström et 
al. 2009) and are perilously close to leaving the safety zone of two further boundaries (Annex 1). 
Protection and restoration of the biosphere should now be a priority; otherwise the global 
footprint will continue to increase. 
Making forecasts of technological progress involves peering into an uncertain future. In order to 
identify desirable reforms to contemporary institutions, it pays to look instead for pointers within 
our experience. In the following two sections we study the character of local institutions that 
have been found to reduce externalities.
69 On an example of the latter – the effect of climate change on our sporting abilities – see Smith et al. (2016).
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Figure 17 The Economy is Embedded in the Biosphere
13 Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)
For unidirectional externalities, payments by beneficiaries to those holding property rights to 
ecosystems is an arrangement resembling market operations. Named ‘Payments for Ecosystem 
Services’ (PES), the underlying idea is simple enough. The Amazon rainforest is recognised as 
Earth’s lungs. If the government in Brazil is convinced that razing the Amazon is necessary for 
economic development in the country, should the rest of the world not pay an annual fee to 
Brazil to protect the forest? If a wetland on a landowner’s range is a sanctuary for migratory 
birds, shouldn’t bird lovers pay the landowner not to drain it for other uses? The cases 
here involve ecosystems that produce a public good but are located in private jurisdictions. 
PES involves negotiations, so it is not like customers accepting prices in the supermarket.
PES is based on the principle that beneficiaries of ecosystem services should pay to preserve and 
restore them. The systems have been much influenced by the fact that landowners manage 
their property in ways that are not necessarily (perhaps not even usually) compatible with the 
provision of ecosystem services. Modern agricultural practices are a notable example (Section 2). 
Designers of PES systems therefore grapple with finding ways in which landowners and land 
managers are to be compensated for providing those services.
As the tropics are rich in biodiversity and many of the world’s poorest countries are in 
the tropics, it has been a natural thought to build PES programmes among low income 
communities. A PES system in which the state plays a positive role is attractive for wildlife 
conservation and habitat preservation. Property rights to grasslands, tropical forests, coastal 
wetlands, mangroves, and coral reefs are often ambiguous in low income countries. The state 
may lay claim to the assets (‘public property’ being the customary euphemism), but if the terrain 
is difficult to monitor, inhabitants who continue to reside there can be expected to live off its 
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products. Inhabitants are therefore key players. Without their engagement, the ecosystems 
could not be protected. Meanwhile flocks of tourists visit the sites on a regular basis. An obvious 
thing for the state to do is to tax tourists and use the revenue to pay local inhabitants to protect 
their landscape from poaching and free-riding. Local inhabitants would then have an incentive 
to develop rules and regulations to protect the site. An alternative would be to hand over the 
right to charge tourists to the local inhabitants themselves.
There are two aspects of especial interest in PES systems in low income countries. One is its 
contribution to poverty reduction, the other to biodiversity conservation. Unfortunately, the 
findings are mixed on both counts (Zilberman, Lipper, and McCarthy, 2008; Pattanayak, Wunder, 
and Ferraro, 2010). There are situations where the system would be bad for poverty reduction 
and distributive justice. Many of the rural poor in low income countries enjoy Nature’s services 
from assets they do not own. Even though they may be willing to participate in a system of 
property rights in which they are required to pay for ecosystem services provided by landowners 
(as Pagiola, Rios, and Arcenas (2008) reported in their careful study of a silvo-pastoral project 
in Nicaragua), it could be that the economically weaker among them are made to pay a 
disproportionate amount. Some may even become worse off than they were previously. One 
could argue that in those situations the state should pay the resource owner instead, using 
funds obtained from general taxation. Who should pay depends on the context.
Box 13
Experience With PES Programmes
PES programmes differ in the types and scale of the demand for ecosystem services, the 
payment source (i.e. who makes the payment), the type of activity for which payment is 
made, the measure used to judge the quality of the service for which payment is made, and 
of course the size of the payment. The effectiveness of a PES programme depends crucially on 
its design.
In one variant, as in the case of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, the state awards inhabitants of an 
ecosystem (e.g. an open range in the savannah) the right to charge for the services it provides 
those who are interested (safari for eco-tourists). In another variant, the state pays restoration 
costs for the benefit of citizens. The now-revived Ganga Action Plan of the Government of 
India to restore the river Ganges is an example. The Colombian government’s policy to pay 
for the conservation of biodiverse forest to maintain natural capital and enhance livelihoods 
post-conflict is yet another example.
Then there are variants at smaller scales. The Trumpington Meadows development, involving 
a local chapter of the Wildlife Trust (an NGO), local farmers, and property developers on 
the southern fringe of Cambridge (UK), has established 1,200 new homes while creating 
a Nature reserve that spans 60 hectares – 80% of which constitutes wildflower meadows. 
New species have already colonised the Nature reserve, while some of the species present 
prior to development can still be found in the new meadows. In still another variant, a 
concerned citizen initiates a Trust to which individuals and government contribute to restore 
an ecosystem of value to local people. Just two kilometres from New Zealand’s Houses of 
Parliament, Zealandia – a conservation project covering 225 hectares – has reintroduced 
over 20 species of native wildlife, some of which have been absent from mainland New 
Zealand for more than 100 years. In addition to providing a space in which city-dwellers can 
easily experience their surrounding natural environment, Zealandia’s example has spawned 
numerous community conservation initiatives (Lynch, 2019).
And then there are examples where a farmer unilaterally ‘wilds’ their land so as to provide 
ecosystem services (carbon capture and wildlife experiences), financed in part by government 
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subsidy and in part by tourists.70 In each of these examples, it is the beneficiary who pays 
for the ecosystem service. That could seem a trite observation, but the law could in principle 
have been so designed that suppliers of ecosystem services are required to pay potential 
beneficiaries if the services are not provided!
Today, there are literally hundreds of PES schemes around the globe. China, Costa Rica, and 
Mexico, for example, have initiated large-scale programmes in which landowners receive 
payment for furthering biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, landscape amenities, 
and hydrological services. These are multiple objectives, and in practice a PES system may 
have to be designed to target more than one. That creates problems. A system could be 
aimed at reducing fragmentation of an ecosystem but has to check that it does not lead 
to an increase in disease transmission among populations; it could be aimed to improve a 
habitat for birds even while increasing the watershed’s supply of other ecosystem services; its 
purpose could be to increase both carbon sequestration and hydrological services; it could be 
designed to reduce local poverty while promoting Nature conservation; and so on. Multiple 
goals add to design challenges.71
14 Common Pool Resources (CPRs)
Ecosystem size matters. The atmosphere as a sink for pollution embraces all humanity; it is a 
global common. In contrast, a grazing field is typically contained within the perimeters of a 
village’s jurisdiction. The economics of climate change has explored institutional arrangements 
that are potentially available for curbing carbon emissions. They all involve nations as 
players.72 In contrast, it is possible, even desirable, for the inhabitants themselves to manage 
geographically confined ecosystems. One reason is that it is a lot easier to institute community 
fines (even social sanctions) for overusing village grazing fields or rainforest patches than it 
is for governments to set a tax on them. Fewer jurisdictions are involved in negotiations and 
monitoring people’s activities is much easier when it is undertaken by community members 
themselves than when it is undertaken by a government official sent from outside. Moreover, 
knowledge of the local ecology is held by those who work on, and live in and around, the 
commons. Local participatory democracy offers a mechanism by which that knowledge can 
inform the way resources are used. Taken together, they suggest that as the basis of cooperation 
over the use of a geographically confined ecosystem, mutual enforcement would be more 
reliable than enforcement by external agencies such as governments.
Confirming this is not easy. In an exceptional study on the quality of forest management in the 
central Himalayas, Somanathan, Prabhakar, and Mehta (2005, 2009) used satellite images and 
field surveys on what was a natural experiment in governance to find that crown cover was no 
less in places that were governed by village councils than it was in areas managed by the state, 
but expenditure on governance was an order of magnitude higher in the latter. The authors also 
reported that relative to unmanaged commons, crown cover in broad-leaved forests was higher 
in village-managed commons, but was not appreciably different in pine forests. It did not go 
un-noted by the authors that under the user rules, broad-leaved forests provided more benefits 
to community members than pine forests. As in any management problem, individual incentives 
and monitoring costs matter.73
70 In her book, Wilding, Isabella Tree provides a vivid account of the way she transformed her agricultural farm into a Nature reserve 
(Tree, 2018). 
71 Perrings (2014) provides a fine, extended discussion of differences among PES systems. 
72 Barrett (2003, 2012) are key publications on why climate negotiations have so far failed.
73 Baragwanath and Bayi (2020) report a similar finding on a site in the Brazilian rainforest. Deforestation was significantly less in 
land inside a territory where inhabitants had been given collective property rights than in land outside the border.
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We are talking here of the role social norms play in sustaining cooperation among resource 
users. Anthropologists and political scientists observed a different world from the one Hardin 
(1968) had considered when describing the tragedy of the commons. He had alluded to grazing 
fields from a distance, whereas those scholars studied grazing fields in the village economies 
they had visited. They discovered that spatially confined ecosystems such as woodlands, water 
sources, grazing fields, mangrove forests, and coastal fisheries are often common property, 
but are regarded as property of the community. Access to them by outsiders is not permitted 
without the community’s consent. To contrast spatially confined common-property resources 
from the open access resources Hardin had in mind, scholars have named the former, common-
pool resources (CPRs). A rich, striking literature has found that communities restrict their use of 
CPRs using a wide range of measures (see below), held together by social norms of conduct. 
The norms are effective because community members have an incentive to impose them on 
one another. Hardin had not appreciated that there are common property resources which are 
not open to all, so his analysis came under criticism (Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom, 1990). That 
local ecosystems in low income countries are communally held is not a happenstance. Annex 2 
discusses the reasons.
Because CPRs are seats of non-market relationships, transactions involving them are not 
mediated by market prices, which is why their fate usually goes unreported in national economic 
accounts. An extensive empirical literature identifies community practices over the use of CPRs 
that differ in their complexity, depending on both geography and history. Because mutual 
enforcement, not external enforcement (e.g. by the state), is the way rules and regulations are 
imposed on the use of CPRs, it pays to read examples.
In an early study of communitarian allocation rules over the use of standing timber in the 
Swiss Alps, Netting (1981) found that village councils marked equivalent shares for community 
members, who in turn drew lots for the shares. Sanctions were imposed on those who took 
more firewood than their entitlements. In summer months, cattle owners were entitled to graze 
as many animals on the communal alps as they were able to feed from their private supply 
of hay during the preceding winter. That way the total number of animals was kept roughly 
in line with the fodder potential of the village meadows. Netting traced the origins of such 
communitarian arrangements on the Alps to the 15th century.
From his study of communitarian allocation rules over water and grazing land in South Indian 
villages, Wade (1988) reported that villages downstream had an elaborate set of rules for 
regulating the use of water from irrigation canals. Fines were imposed on those who violated 
the rules. Most villages had similar arrangements for the use of grazing land.
In a study of the Kuna tribe in Panama, Howe (1986) described an intricate set of sanctions 
imposed on those who violate norms of behaviour designed to protect a common source of 
fresh water. In a study of sea tenure in northern Brazil, Cordell and McKean (1985) uncovered a 
system of codes that served to protect the fishery. Violations of the codes were met with a range 
of sanctions that included both shunning and the sabotaging of fishing equipment. And so on.
Are CPRs important to rural people? In a pioneering study on the significance of CPRs, Jodha 
(1986) found in a sample of semi-arid districts in Central India that the proportion of income 
among rural families that is based directly on CPRs is 15-25%. Cavendish (2000) arrived at even 
larger estimates than Jodha from a study of villages in Zimbabwe: the proportion of income 
based directly on CPRs was found to be 35%, the figure for the poorest quintile being 40%.
CPRs not only supply households with a regular flow of ecosystem services and tangible 
goods (water, fuelwood, fibres, building material, fruit, medicines, honey, fish), they also offer 
protection against agricultural risks. CPRs are sometimes the only assets to which the otherwise 
disenfranchised have access. In a study of households on the margin of the Tapajos National 
Forest in the Brazilian Amazon, Pattanayak and Sills (2001) found that households made more 
trips into the forest for non-timber products when times are hard. In an early study, Hecht, 
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Anderson, and May (1988) described the importance of babassu products among the landless 
in Maranho, Brazil. Extraction from the plants offers support to the poorest of the poor, most 
especially women. The authors reported that babassu products are an important source of 
cash income in the period between agricultural-crop harvests. Falconer (1990) offered a similar 
picture in the West African forest zone.
The downside of communitarian institutions is that, like so many other institutions, they suffer 
from inequities. That women may be excluded from CPRs has been recorded in the study of 
communal forestry in India (Agarwal, 2001). Entitlements from CPRs have also been known 
to be based on private holdings, that is, richer households have been found to enjoy a greater 
proportion of benefits. Beteille (1983), for example, drew on examples from India to show that 
access to CPRs is often restricted to the elite (e.g. caste Hindus). Cavendish (2000) reported that 
in absolute terms richer households in his sample of villages in Zimbabwe took more from CPRs 
than poor households. In an early review, McKean (1992) noted that benefits from CPRs are 
frequently captured by the elite.74 Agarwal and Narain (1999) exposed the same phenomenon 
in their study of water management practices in the Gangetic plain. The state can play a 
powerful role here. It can engage with communities so as to eliminate social inequities. Well-
functioning states do that in other contexts (e.g. ensuring fair elections). We argue below that 
it has an important, albeit indirect, role in the management of CPRs. But to do that it pays to 
study conditions that are necessary for people to trust one another and have confidence in their 
institutions to protect that trust. As would be expected, these issues are vital to the economics 
of biodiversity.
15 The State, Communities and Civil Society
Institutions are overarching entities. People engage with one another in institutions. Collective 
action would prove to be impossible in an institutional vacuum. It is then natural to ask: under 
what contexts would a group of people wishing to engage with one another enjoy the mutual 
trust they need in order to fulfil the obligations they undertake?
Outside the family, three contexts suggest themselves: (i) the people are trustworthy; (ii) the 
group is able to appeal to an external agency to enforce agreements; and (iii) group members 
are able to converge on norms of behaviour that mutually enforce agreements.75
Economic models of the marketplace are built mostly on (ii), where the external enforcer is 
usually taken to be the state, its coercive weapon being the law and the force required to 
enforce the law. Although the models rely on (i) only minimally, it is not as rare in the world as 
we may suspect. Evolutionary psychologists have found that communal living, role modelling, 
education, and receiving rewards and punishments (be it here or in the afterlife) help us to 
acquire a general favouring of pro-social behaviour. People are trustworthy in varying degrees. 
When we resist the temptation to go take a closer look at an exotic plant in the woods it is not 
necessarily because others will rebuke us for trampling over fragile Nature, it can be because we 
do not want to disfigure it. The problem is that although pro-social disposition is not foreign to 
human nature, no society could rely exclusively on it. How is one to know the extent to which 
someone is trustworthy? If the personal benefits from betraying one’s conscience are large 
enough, almost all of us would betray it. Most people have a price, but it is hard to tell who 
comes at what price.
People everywhere have tried to establish institutions in which they have an incentive to 
cooperate. The incentives differ in their details, but they have one thing in common: those who 
74 See also Bromley (1992) and McKean (1992) for wide-ranging reviews of CPR management schemes.
75 Daily routines within the family are usually carried out without thought because of mutual affection among members. 
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break agreements without cause suffer punishment.76 In contrast to (i), where the punishment is 
meted out by self-censorship, in (ii) it is meted out by a source external to the person (the state, 
tribal chieftain, village head), and in (iii) it is meted out in the community by mutual censorship, 
requiring as it does social norms of behaviour. The evidence of people’s doings that are required 
if (ii) is in play is based on verification (e.g. judgments in law courts). In contrast, (iii) requires 
that people are able to observe one another’s behaviour, otherwise social norms would have 
nothing to work on.
Trust in others and confidence in the institutions of government and markets that enable people 
to engage with one another for mutual advantage is called social capital.77 It is, however, 
common to regard society as comprising three classes of institutions: households, markets 
and state. The economics of climate change was initially framed explicitly with that three-way 
classification. The idea of social capital illuminates a fourth class of institutions, comprising 
communities and civil society. They both play an essential role in enabling people to engage with 
one another without the direct involvement of either markets or the state.
Social capital is the seat where individuals and organisations can be held to account by the 
public. Reputation is a form of enabling asset that private firms are eager to acquire. Firms 
today try with varying success to purchase reputation (Bakan, 2020), but in previous times it 
was acquired by behaving in ways that build their reputation. For that to be a viable route, 
consumers have to coordinate on norms of doing business with firms. Word of mouth used 
to be a common method of coordination. Today social media is a powerful platform. In Part II, 
we will suggest that the public and private financial institutions both have large roles to play 
in directing private investment toward projects that protect and restore Nature and their 
sustainable use.
Communities and civil society – the ‘third estate’, as they are sometimes called – carry somewhat 
different connotations. It is not a travesty to think of ‘communities’ as institutions that work 
outside the state (they mostly evolved in traditional societies when there was no state, at least 
not in the contemporary sense) to manage, for example, their local ecosystem.78 That can be 
contrasted with ‘civil society’, which we may think of as comprising institutions that engage 
actively with the state, for example, to create a place for services that the state is either unwilling 
or unable to provide and, more generally, to make the state function better (that can be a cause 
of friction between the two of course). 
Nor are communities and civil society without their own deficiencies. As noted in the previous 
section, communities can harbour large inequities (e.g. between men and women; between 
castes, ethnic groups, and so on) and civil society can degenerate into mere special interest 
groups; worse, street gangs. For simplicity, we amalgamate the pair and regard social 
arrangements overseen by communities and civil society as communitarian institutions.
The state has the enormous advantage over communitarian institutions in the ability to 
mobilise resources. It can finance projects that these institutions on their own would not be 
able to, and it can coordinate their activities for their mutual benefit. The biosphere is spatially 
76 Offering rewards for good behaviour is the flip side, but for obvious reasons the rewards are more in the form of prestige, 
not money. 
77 The literature is enormous. Contributions that have direct bearing on the issues studied here include Coleman (1988), Putnam 
(1993), Fukuyama (1995), and Granato, Ingelhart, and Leblang (1996). Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) is a collection of both 
theoretical and empirical essays on the subject. The way the notion of social capital has been framed here and in the Review is not 
quite the same as it has been proposed in the above works, nor is it framed the same way even among them, but ambiguity is not a 
hindrance in so complex a notion; it is instead a help, as it enables us to avoid a protracted discussion on what social capital means. 
78 That depends, of course, on how far back one looks back. In an essay on the world in Homer’s songs, Finley (2002: 89) wrote: 
“The world of Odysseus was split into many communities like Ithaca. Among them, between each community and every other one, 
the normal relationship was one of hostility, at times passive, in a kind of armed truce, and at times active and bellicose.” Finley 
would seem here to be using ‘community’ to refer to the social fabric of an entire island kingdom.
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so heterogeneous that knowledge of its ecosystems’ particular traits are held only by their 
inhabitants. On the other hand, the inhabitants’ knowledge of the circumstances of the outside 
world may be very limited, which is yet another reason the state has a vital role. The illustrations 
in Box 14, however, point to extensive government failure to aid communities to protect and 
preserve their local ecosystems.
Effective institutional structures are therefore polycentric.79 We explain the idea below, but 
it is a commonplace in the notion of a mixed economy, in which competitive markets supply 
private goods and services, and a central authority supplies public goods and services (including 
application of the law and measures that brings about a fair distribution of assets among 
people). The price system is the hallmark of markets. It serves not only to coordinate the choices 
people make, it simultaneously aggregates diffused information across the economy.80 That 
system, however, cannot serve to protect and preserve biodiversity because Nature’s processes 
do not satisfy a number of technical conditions that are required for markets to function well. 
Two conditions are especially important: (i) Nature is mobile, meaning that it is impossible to 
establish private property rights to many of its processes (silence and invisibility reinforce the 
problems); and (ii) production and consumption possibilities involving the biosphere (in other 
words, all production and consumption possibilities!) are characterised by non-linearities. 
Communitarian institutions fill the hole created by the inability of markets to function well.
Figure 18 Effective and Ineffective Institutions 
79 Ostrom (2010) popularised the term. 
80 For a fine exposition of the place of the price system in a well-functioning economy, see Stiglitz (1989). 
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Polycentric structures that are best placed to protect and promote biodiversity are thus layered 
institutions: global, regional, national, and community based. Each layer requires an authority 
at the apex to achieve coordination below and with other layers laterally. In the contemporary 
world, there is thus an enormous role for government and non-government organisations 
(NGOs) to help build or rebuild local institutions through which communities could get to 
realise the advantages of informed collective management under changing times. Such help 
would involve, among other things, devising clearly defined rules concerning the allocation 
of burdens and benefits, rules whose compliance can be observed (hopefully verified also) 
by the others who are involved. Figure 19 adds communitarian institutions to the customary 
triad of households, markets and the state for classifying institutions within a nation. States 
on their own are not capable of curbing transnational externalities. The management of 
global public goods, such as the benefits we all enjoy from tropical rainforests and the oceans, 
and the harms we all suffer from wildlife trafficking and pandemics, requires transnational 
institutions. Part II highlights humanity’s collective need today for an enhanced version of 
supra-national institutions.
Figure 19 Society’s Institutions
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Box 14
The Fragility of Trust 
Collective undertakings are of necessity built on trust and confidence in others. The law 
is able to function only when citizens trust one another to abide by the law and have 
confidence in government to enforce the law. In turn, those responsible for law enforcement 
have to believe that not to discharge their responsibility will prove costly for them, say, come 
the next election. Communitarian management of CPRs is also built directly on trust. The 
mechanism that provides incentives to members to abide by their agreement and so enjoy the 
benefits of cooperation involves the use of social norms. But social norms can prove effective 
only when individuals trust one another to act in accordance with the norms. Mutual trust is 
self-confirming.
The problem is, mutual distrust is also self-confirming. If everyone believes that no one 
else will behave in accordance with the collective undertaking, they will all act in ways that 
confirm their beliefs. The move from one set of beliefs to the other tips a society from order 
into disorder. Even though the deep cause of the societal rupture is a flip in beliefs, proximate 
causes could be extraneous events. Even a rumour that a small group of people in one small 
part of the country has mistreated another equally small group of people can start a riot that 
spreads. The benefits of cooperation can only be enjoyed if society has in place corrective 
mechanisms to quell and repair collective dysfunctions that may be caused by any one of a 
multitude of external events. Polycentric institutions create the necessary separation among 
jurisdictions to enable society to correct local failures to cooperate.81
Both MA (2005a-d) and IPBES (2019) found that CPRs have deteriorated in recent years 
in many parts of the poor world. Why should that have happened in those places where 
previously they had been managed in a sustainable manner? 
Several classes of reasons suggest themselves: one stems from deteriorating external 
circumstances, under which both the private and communal profitability of investment in the 
resource base decline. Political instability is a general cause. It is, of course, a visible cause of 
resource degradation, as civil disturbance all too frequently expresses itself by a destruction 
not only of produced and human capital, but of natural capital too. But increased uncertainty 
in communal property rights is a frequent, often hidden cause. People could worry that the 
state or warlords will assume authority over the CPRs. If the security of a CPR is uncertain, the 
returns expected from collective action are low. The influence would run the other way too, 
with growing resource scarcity contributing to political instability, as rival groups battle over 
resources. The feedback could be positive, exacerbating the problem for a time, reducing 
expected returns yet further.
A second class of reasons involves the unintended consequences of even well-intentioned 
public policy. They can happen in curious ways. Mukhopadhyay (2008) is a historical study of 
the transformation of agrarian land in Goa, India, that was earlier owned and regulated by a 
communitarian institution called the communidades. When Goa became a part of India, the 
government introduced land reforms that gave tenants the right to purchase the land they 
had worked. The author does not question the underlying motivation behind land reforms, 
but notes one unfortunate consequence, which is the breakdown of cooperation among 
households in maintaining the embankments that had earlier prevented the land from 
flooding by tidal waters. Over the years, deterioration of the embankments has led to an 
increase in soil salinity.
81 See Dasgupta (2007) for the place of trust in understanding economics, not merely the economics of biodiversity. 
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A third class of reasons CPRs have deteriorated in many places has to do with rapid 
population growth, which triggers environmental degradation if institutional practices are 
unable to adapt to the increased pressure on resources. In Cote d’Ivoire, for example, growth 
in rural population was accompanied by increased deforestation and reduced fallows in the 
1990s. Biomass production declined, as did agricultural productivity (López, 1998).82
A fourth class of reasons appears when community rights are overturned by central fiat. In 
order to establish its political authority, a number of states in the Sahel, for example, imposed 
rules that destroyed communitarian management practices in the forests. Villages ceased to 
have authority to enforce sanctions on those who broke community rules. But state officials 
did not have the expertise to manage the commons, often they were corrupt. Thomson, 
Feeny, and Oakerson (1986), Somanathan (1991) and Baland and Platteau (1996), among 
others, have identified the ways by which the exercise of state authority can damage local 
institutions and turn CPRs into what are in effect open-access resources.
Management of the global commons involves an even more complicated environment for 
trust to emerge. Cooperation among nations over such activities as tele-communication, 
use of air space, and time keeping has been remarkably successful in comparison with the 
outcomes so far of negotiations over climate and biodiversity. In a far-reaching body of work 
that uncovers reasons that climate negotiations have so far failed to achieve agreed goals, 
Barrett (2003, 2012, 2015) has shown that the agreements made were never enforceable. 
What passed as commitments were thus not credible. In these works, Barrett has also 
explored ways in which agreements could be so framed that they would be enforceable.
16 Arbitraging Assets
We began by observing that we are all asset managers and that asset management involves 
comparisons of portfolios – across time or at a point in time. That means asset management 
involves making comparisons of alternative investment opportunities. That said, none of us 
views the world from a single perspective. We each play a private role but on occasion we also 
view the world as a citizen. This distinction lies at the heart of the Review. It explains why people 
lament our collective behaviour that leads to the Impact Inequality, even while contributing to 
that behaviour.
Let us then imagine for concreteness that in their role as private asset managers people desire 
to maximise their personal wealth and value stocks at their market prices, but that as citizens 
they commend, even vote for, economic programmes that protect and promote societal well-
being. The latter means that as citizen investors people value investment opportunities in terms 
of accounting prices. Because markets place little value on Nature, the private investor’s portfolio 
does not contain many investments that protect and promote Nature (that is, ‘green’ projects), 
while citizen investors favour portfolios that include green projects. Nevertheless, whether 
people act as private investors or commend investment projects as citizen investors, their goal 
is to maximise portfolio values – the big difference between the two types of investors lies in 
the portfolios they believe maximise wealth. In the former case, the wealth in question is private 
wealth; in the latter, the wealth in question is what we have previously called inclusive wealth. 
The difference between them lies in the prices used to value capital goods. To have a sharp 
distinction between the ‘private’ and ‘public’ roles we all play, let us imagine the citizen investor 
is concerned with the global portfolio of assets.83 In either case, to say that an investor’s goal is 
to maximise wealth is to say that her goal is to maximise the value of the portfolio from among 
the portfolios available to her for consideration.
82 Diamond (2005) offers an account of past societies that collapsed as their local ecosystems collapsed. In a number of cases, the 
collapse was triggered by pressures of population growth that had led to unsustainable uses of land. 
83 The comparisons we make in the text can also be undertaken if the citizen investor is interested only in the nation’s portfolio. 
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16.1 Arbitraging Assets at a Point in Time
Maximising the value of portfolios is a goal, but that does not on its own tell the investor what 
rule she should follow when choosing or commending a portfolio. Suppose, to take an example, 
a private investor has an amount of money to invest, say £X. Value maximisation would direct 
her to choose a portfolio that earns as large as possible a risk-adjusted return on her investment 
at the end of, say, a year. For simplicity, we assume she intends to spread her £X only on 
financial assets and a one-year government bond that offers a fixed rate of interest. The investor 
is interested in the real return, of course, but that is uncertain if only because she cannot 
forecast changes in the consumer price index. That uncertainty will make itself felt equally 
for all assets. So we may ignore it in the account that follows and suppose that the return on 
government bonds is certain.
In order to choose her portfolio, the private investor assesses the income she is likely to receive 
from each of the stocks that are available for purchase. Income from a stock (i.e. the dividend 
she would receive) is the stock’s yield. But the price of the stock relative to the government bond 
could go up or down during the year.84 We call that capital gains, recognising that the ‘gains’ 
could be a loss. At the end of a year the investor’s wealth as capitalised in the stock would be 
its yield plus the value of that stock. The latter will contain the capital gains term. Therefore, the 
rate return on investment in a stock is the yield on a unit of that stock plus the capital gains on it 
over the year. 
In contrast, the interest on £1 on the government bond would be the bond’s yield. At the end 
of the year, the investor’s wealth as capitalised in the bond would be the amount she receives 
when she cashes in the bond. In other words, the rate of return on investment in the bond is the 
interest on the bond over the year. Her wealth at the end of a year is her initial investment in the 
portfolio of her choice plus the return she earns on it. It is then obvious that value maximisation 
leads the private investor to choose a portfolio in which, adjusting for risk, the assets offer the 
same rate of return. This rule is known as the arbitrage condition.85 And she holds a portfolio 
rather than a single asset so as to reduce uncertainty in her wealth in a year’s time (as in the 
saying that one should not put all of one’s eggs in the same basket).
No two private investors are likely to hold the same portfolio, if for no other reason than that 
their assessment of risks would typically differ as would their attitude to risk. But the basic idea 
remains: asset management involves comparison of rates of return on investment.
For the small private asset manager, prices would be unaffected by her portfolio choice, but for 
the citizen who is trying to reach an opinion on the portfolio humanity ought to hold, the prices 
she uses to estimate rates of return will not be independent of the portfolio she favours. She 
will, for example, notice that the oceans and the atmosphere have neither markets nor social 
institutions to mediate their use, meaning that their prices are zero. Fishing companies no doubt 
incur harvesting cost, but that only amounts to the cost of transporting fish from the oceans 
to the marketplace; the cost does not include the rent they ought to pay the global community 
for the fish they catch, nor for the wasted bycatch they throw back into the waters. Similarly, 
there is no global tax on carbon emissions; mostly we are free to emit as much as we like.86 
The citizen investor will know also that communities who may have been inhabiting a region 
rich in biodiversity have no deeds to their assets and are vulnerable to eviction by governments 
in aid of companies eager to mine, ranch and establish plantations. Because she recognises the 
84 Government bond serves as the numeraire in this account. There is no loss in generality in doing this.
85 If, adjusting for risk, the expected rate of return on one asset was greater than that on another, the latter would not be included in 
her portfolio of choice. That is the essence of ‘arbitrage’, which is the practice of taking advantage of price differences between two 
or more asset markets. 
86 In fact, the rents are not zero in the market place; they are negative because of the plethora of subsidies governments offer people 
to exploit Nature (Box 9). 
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significance of human rights and the ecosystems where the inhabitants reside (the biodiversity 
in that unique region is a global public good), she will place a positive value on them – the 
accounting prices she estimates would be positive – but then she would proceed to apply the 
reasoning we have just reviewed. The reasoning in this particular example could lead her to 
place a non-negotiably high value to the region, which would mean to her that the region 
should never be converted through development. She will agitate for an international agreement 
to maintain the region in the global portfolio of assets, an agreement that presumably would 
include financial payments to governments in the region for disallowing its conversion into 
capital goods that are only useful for producing provisioning services.
If forecasting rates of return in the marketplace is hard, projecting rates of return on investment 
in assets that have no markets is harder still. Which is why our citizen investor’s work is harder 
than that of the private investor. Measuring an ecosystem’s yield when it is for free in the 
marketplace requires an understanding of ecology. If the capital good the citizen investor is 
considering is a fishery in the oceans, yield would be the additional biomass of fish that would 
be available in a year’s time if a unit less was harvested today.87 Because fisheries are expected 
to decline in relation to stocks of produced capital under business as usual, our citizen investor 
would expect the accounting price of ocean fisheries relative to government bonds to increase 
over time. So the rate of return – and as she is imagining the investment as a citizen, it would be 
the social rate of return – on the fishery would be its yield plus the (accounting) capital gains it 
would enjoy. If the asset she is considering is the atmosphere as a sink for our carbon emissions, 
its social rate of return would be the reduction in damages over the year that humanity would 
enjoy if emissions were reduced by a unit today.88 Box 15 presents an estimate of the yield of 
the biosphere’s stock of primary producers (Section 2). The exercise brings together the macro 
statistics of the state of the biosphere (Sections 5-7) and the application of micro reasoning to 
global statistics that we as investors engage in.
Box 15
Global Yield of Primary Producers
Applying remote sensing data covering several years to models that trace the yield (expressed 
in net biomass production per year) of various seats of biomass to such factors as sunlight, 
climate and terrain, the yield of the planet’s primary producers was estimated at the end of 
the 20th century to be about 105 trillion Kg per year (Field et al. 1998). Primary producers’ 
yield is called, understandably ‘primary production’. Similar techniques have been used 
to estimate the global stock of biomass, which has been found to be about 550 trillion 
Kg (Bar-On, Phillips, and Milo, 2018). The latter figure exceeds the planetary biomass of 
primary producers, because it includes the biomass of bacteria, not all of which are primary 
producers; as well as the near-negligible biomass of animals. Viewing the biosphere from the 
perspective of humanity as a whole, the biosphere-wide average yield on the stock (105/550 
a year), when units of biomass are awarded equal weights, is approximately 19% a year. 
That is of course not the primary producers’ yield which, because of its spatial heterogeneity, 
should be understood to be the highest yield on a marginal unit of primary producer biomass 
across the biosphere. Moreover, the 19% is an underestimate because the stock is an 
overestimate of primary producer biomass.89
Jordà et al. (2019) have estimated that the long-run global yield (rent or dividend) on 
housing and equities has averaged around 5% a year. If we take that figure to be a proxy for 
87 Biomass in an ecosystem is the mass of living material in it, measured by weight, say, kilograms.
88 The social cost of carbon, made familiar in the economics of climate change, is calculated by summing the damages humanity 
would be expected to suffer from over time if a unit more carbon was emitted today.
89 There are further biases that point in the same direction. For details, see Review, Chapter 2.
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the yield on produced capital and assume that the global economy has been managing its 
portfolio of assets in an efficient manner, then the capital gains on produced capital relative 
to natural capital would as a minimum have equalled the difference between the two figures 
(i.e. 14% a year). That is an application of the arbitrage condition. In short, under ideal 
circumstances we would have expected the accounting price of primary producers relative to 
produced capital to be declining by 14% a year.
Patently, the latter has not been happening in recent decades, nor is it happening today. 
Destruction of the world’s rainforests and degradation of the soils, when taken together 
with global accumulation of produced capital (approximately 3% a year) points to rainforests 
above ground and the soils underground, which are important seats of primary producers, 
becoming scarcer relative to produced capital, not more abundant. Simple and crude as this 
calculation is, it demonstrates how far off we are from an efficient allocation of global assets. 
It points especially to the enormous imbalance we have created between produced and 
human capital on the one hand, and natural capital on the other.
16.2 Arbitraging Assets Across Time
In standard economic accounts, investment is interpreted as foregone consumption. That 
means investment in a capital good is the increase in its quantity or improvement in its quality 
that will be realised tomorrow if resources are diverted to it from consumption today.90 We are 
talking of net investment, that is, investment net of depreciation. In the contrasting case of 
pollution, depreciation is the decline in societal well-being caused by an increase in pollution 
(e.g. depreciation of the atmosphere in its role as a sink for carbon emissions is the net increase 
in carbon concentration).91
Common-sense notions of investment, however, carry a sense of robust activism. When the 
government invests in roads, the picture drawn is of bulldozers levelling the ground and 
macadam being laid by workers in hard hats. But the notion of capital goods being adopted 
here extends beyond produced capital to include human capital and natural capital. That 
training people to be teachers is investing in human capital is simple enough. To leave a forest 
unmolested may not sound much like investment, but it is an investment. It enables the forest to 
grow; its growth is its yield. To allow a fishery to re-stock is to invest in the fishery, the growth in 
biomass is its yield; and so on. Investment in Nature can mean simply waiting.
We began the account of asset management by assuming that our private investor has £X to 
invest. As she has to keep funds aside for consumption purposes, her present wealth would be 
greater than that. So then how did she arrive at the figure X?
Suppose government bonds have a yield of 4%. To the investor that means time has an arrow, as 
a unit of consumption foregone today will yield 1.04 units of additional income in a year’s time 
which she could consume. So she will not be indifferent between a unit of consumption today 
and a unit of consumption in a year’s time, she will want more in a year’s time as compensation 
for foregoing a unit of consumption today.
How much more? Presumably 4% more, because that is the rate on offer in government bonds. 
In short, she would adjust her allocation between consumption and investment to the point 
where the trade-off she is willing to make between an additional unit of consumption today and 
an additional unit of consumption in a year’s time is in the ratio 1 to 1.04. From that figure, we 
can conclude that the percentage rate at which she is willing to swap a marginal unit today for 
90 Investment in the atmosphere when viewed as a sink for carbon compounds means a reduction in carbon emissions (a by-product 
of production and consumption).
91 The oceans absorb atmospheric carbon as well, but because it becomes increasingly acidic, that depreciation should be included in 
estimates of the depreciation of the atmosphere as a sink. 
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an addition to her consumption at the end of a year is 0.04, or 4%. We say 4% is her private 
consumption discount rate over the year.
Being a reasoning person, she so chooses her mix of consumption and investment that her 
consumption discount rate equals the yield on government bonds. She reckons she will want to, 
and be able to, consume more next year and still have funds left to invest in government bonds 
that will make her wealthier still. And she wants to continue becoming wealthier because she 
plans to have children and would like her children to be wealthier than she, and so on, down 
the generations. In short, she wants her dynasty to enjoy sustainable development.
For the global citizen investor, the reasoning is altogether more complex. She is reasoning on 
behalf of humanity.92 As she is trying to identify the mix of consumption and investment she 
can commend to the world (and remember, by ‘investment’ we mean investment in all three 
categories of capital goods), she will not regard future yields of the various capital goods 
to be independent of the mix she commends. Even the yield in government bonds would 
be influenced by her choice. But a reasoning similar in character to the one she used in her 
role as a private investor tells her that what she is after is the ideal point of contact between 
socially desirable and socio-ecologically possible futures; for that point of contact is the mix she 
would commend. And the mix she will commend is one in which the social discount rate on 
consumption in each period equals the social rates of return on capital goods.
Including the term ‘social’ in defining the two sets of rates is meant to signal that the citizen 
investor is basing them on the common good, not her personal good.93 She will be using 
accounting prices to value capital goods, not market prices. Adverse environmental externalities 
associated with investment in produced and human capital mean that social rates on return on 
these two broad categories of capital goods are lower than market rates of return. Similarly, 
because people do not internalise the well-being of others’ descendants, the social discount rate 
on consumption would be lower than the corresponding private rate. Taken together, as a social 
investor she will urge governments to design policies that coax private investors to invest more in 
natural capital than they do now. The call would be to tilt portfolios in favour of natural capital.
Box 16
Discounting Future Consumption
Discussions on social discount rates on consumption have been prominent in cost benefit 
analysis and the economics of climate change. The rates in use in policy assessment have 
almost always been positive in sign. Why?
Three reasons suggest themselves: (i) the citizen investor may desire to award a lower weight 
to a marginal unit of consumption in the future simply because it will be in the future; (ii) 
there is a risk that humanity will cease to exist in the future; and (iii) the citizen investor 
expects the average level of consumption to be higher in the future, meaning that a marginal 
addition to consumption in the future will have less value to a future person than it has to 
someone today. Reason (i) reflects myopia, (ii) reflects discounting for risk of extinction, and 
(iii) reflects a desire to discount to compensate for intergenerational inequity. Notice though 
that reason (iii) says that if the expectation is that people will be poorer in the future, then 
the consumption discount rate could be negative.
There is a fourth, more subtle reason the citizen investor may choose to place a lower weight 
to a unit of consumption of future generations relative to that of the present generation. 
92 Her reasoning will be based on more restricted considerations if she adopts the role of citizen of her country, but even that would 
be a lot wider than her role as a private investor. 
93 The term common good is no longer in much use among economists, who instead prefer ‘social well-being’ because it 
encompasses a wider range of ethical considerations. 
Part I: The State We Are In and Why
63The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review – Abridged Version
It has to do with countering a bias that the productivity of capital displays toward the 
future. Because well-chosen investment has a positive yield, time has a direction in economic 
reasoning. A unit of investment gives rise to more than a unit of additional consumption in 
the future. The Review (Chapter 10) shows that unless the temporal asymmetry is countered, 
reasons (i)-(iii) may not be sufficient to ensure a reasonably egalitarian distribution of well-
being across the generations.
The above reasoning shows that consumption discount rates reflect a combination of the 
citizen investor’s ethical values and her reading of socio-ecological possibilities. The Review 
shows that the discount rate (the rate could vary over time) she will want to deploy on future 
consumption is the percentage rate at which the accounting price of consumption declines 
over the year in question. The citizen investor’s choice of consumption discount rates has 
powerful implications for her portfolio selection. Here is an illustration using numbers taken 
from studies in the economics of climate change:
Suppose the investor expects consumption per capita to grow at the rate 1.3% over an 
indefinite number of years. In their work, the values chosen by Nordhaus (1994) and Stern 
(2006, 2015) for the required ethical parameters give rise to two very different consumption 
discount rates: Nordhaus: 4.3% a year; Stern: 1.4% a year.94
Simple computation shows that a marginal unit of consumption is awarded half the 
weight if it is to appear 51 years in the future for Stern and 17 years in the future for 
Nordhaus. Differences in their choice of consumption discount rates explain to an extent the 
disagreements among the authors on the urgency over global climate change. Nordhaus’ 
4.3% a year may not seem very different from Stern’s 1.4% a year, but is in fact a lot 
higher when it is put to work on the economics of the long run. Just how much higher 
can be seen from the fact that the present-value of a small loss in consumption 100 years 
from now if discounted at 4.3% a year is 17 times smaller than the present-value of that 
same consumption loss if the discount rate used is 1.4% a year. The moral is banal: if the 
time horizon is long, even small differences in consumption discount rates can mean large 
differences in the message cost-benefit analysis gives us.
Drupp et al. (2018) reported findings of a survey in which economists were asked to say what 
rates they thought would be appropriate for discounting investment projects. While 30% of 
respondents recommended Stern’s 1.4% or lower, only 9% recommended Nordhaus’ 4.5% 
or higher, with 61% forming the middle ground between the two. The authors also reported 
that there is much less disagreement among economists than we are led to believe from the 
literature on discounting. 90% of economists find a discount rate between 1-3% acceptable 
for long-run public projects.
17 Inclusive Wealth and Social Well-Being
We have now studied the way our citizen investor would reason so as to arrive, in only 
broad terms no doubt, at the mix of consumption and various forms of investment she 
would commend. The reasoning moved from considerations of consumption-investment 
mixes at the micro level (for that is what portfolio analysis amounts to) toward a picture 
of the macroeconomy moving through time (the mix of consumption and investments in 
the aggregate).
But there is an enquiry that runs the other way, from the evaluation of the macroeconomy to 
rules that should govern decisions at the microeconomic level (i.e. at the level of households 
and firms). Our citizen investor would no doubt be astonished if the two routes did not lead 
94 The figures are taken from Dasgupta (2008), who also offers their justification. 
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her eventually to commend the same policies. In this section we confirm that. For simplicity, we 
continue to imagine the citizen investor to be interested in evaluating the global economy.
There are two types of economic evaluation that we all conduct as citizens. One is policy 
analysis, the other is sustainability assessment. To see what they involve, consider the list of six 
questions we all ask frequently:
(1) How is the economy doing?
(2) How has it been doing in recent years?
(3) What would be our projection of the economy in the future if policies and institutions 
evolve in the way we expect them to evolve?
(4) How is the economy likely to perform under alternative policies?
(5) Which policies should we support?
(6) What would be an ideal set of policies?
The questions prompt the citizen investor to make two types of comparisons:
Questions (1)-(3) require that she assesses whether an economy is on a path of sustainable 
development; that is, she evaluates a change that has been or is likely to be experienced by an 
economy as it moves through time. That is sustainability assessment. An example of the kind of 
question she asks is: “Are the prospects of improvements in people’s lives and the lives of their 
descendants better now than they were a decade ago?”
Questions (4)-(6) on the other hand prompt the citizen investor to engage in policy analysis. 
There she evaluates the economic change that would be brought about by a proposed shift in 
policy at a point in time. An example of the kind of question she asks in policy analysis is: “Is 
the wetland preservation project being proposed likely to improve people’s lives and the lives of 
their descendants?”
Question (3) is the projection of the socio-ecological world around which both sustainability 
assessment and policy analysis are conducted.
It transpires that sustainability assessment and policy analysis, though seemingly different, 
amount to the same exercise.95 It transpires also that the measure our citizen investor should 
use to conduct the exercise is an inclusive measure of wealth, that is, adjusted for demographic 
changes, the sum of the accounting values of produced capital, human capital and natural 
capital. So we call the measure inclusive wealth (Figure 20).
Adjustments for demographic changes over time could be taken to mean inclusive wealth per 
capita, rather than inclusive wealth itself. Figure 9, which presented the Managi-Kumar (2018) 
estimates of movements in the three components of global inclusive wealth per capita in the 
period 1992 to 2014, signalled just that.
Inclusive wealth is the measure of an economy’s productive capacity. If the inclusive wealth 
per capita we bequeath to our descendants is greater than the inclusive wealth per capita 
we ourselves inherited, we would be leaving behind a larger productive base for each of our 
descendants. Being an aggregate figure, inclusive wealth does not reflect its distribution across 
people. An enormous literature on distributive justice can be brought to bear to sharpen 
95 The Review (Chapter 13) contains the formal arguments that show their equivalence.
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sustainability assessment and policy analysis. In doing that though, the citizen investor would be 
reading the distribution of inclusive wealth, not the distribution of GDP.96 
Presenting economic accounts in terms of balance sheets (for that is what wealth accounts 
amount to) rather than incomes and expenditures tells us that we will have to revise received 
economic wisdom in many areas. Box 17 presents an argument based on environmental 
externalities that shows how misleading the argument for free trade can be.
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Box 17
Trade, Consumption, and Wealth Transfers
The presence of adverse environmental externalities tells us to question our enthusiasm for 
free trade.97 To illustrate why, imagine that timber concessions have been awarded in an 
upstream forest of a low income country by its government so as to raise export revenue. 
As forests stabilise both soil and water flow and are the habitat for birds and insects, 
deforestation erodes soil, increases water run-off, and reduces pollination and pest-control 
downstream. If the law recognises the rights of those who suffer damage from deforestation, 
the timber company would be required to compensate downstream farmers.
But compensation is unlikely when the cause of damage is many miles away, the victims are 
scattered groups of farmers, and the damage cannot be restricted to farmers who have not 
bargained with the company. Problems are compounded because damages are not uniform 
across farms – their geography matters. Moreover, downstream farmers may not even realise 
that the decline in their farms’ productivity is traceable to logging upstream. The timber 
96 That social well-being and what we have defined here as inclusive wealth are equivalent for the purposes of sustainability 
assessment and policy analysis was shown in a general setting by Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) and Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler 
(2003a-b). Dasgupta (2004) is a book-length treatment of the equivalence. Arrow et al. (2012, 2013) applied the theorem by 
estimating movements in inclusive wealth in five countries (Brazil, China, India, USA, and Venezuela) over the period 1995 to 2000. 
Managi and Kumar (2018) is the third of a series of publications that began with UNU-IHDP/UNEP (2012, 2014) in which the idea 
has been to estimate movements over time in the inclusive wealth of more than 120 countries, akin to estimates the World Bank 
provides annually of movements in the GDP of nations.
97 The analysis here is based on Dasgupta (1990) and Chichilnisky (1994). 
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company’s operating cost would in those circumstances be less than the social cost of 
deforestation (the latter, at least as a first approximation, would be the firm’s logging costs 
and the damage suffered by all who are adversely affected). So, the export would contain an 
implicit subsidy (the externality), paid for by people downstream. And we have not included 
forest inhabitants, who now live under even more straightened circumstances. The subsidy is 
hidden from public scrutiny, but it amounts to a transfer of wealth from the exporting to the 
importing country. Ironically, some of the poorest people in the exporting country would be 
subsidising the incomes of the average importer in what could well be a rich country. That 
cannot be right.
Aside from the economic waste associated with externalities, the example has a noteworthy 
feature that is rarely noted in celebrations of free trade. As low income countries depend 
greatly on the export of primary products (coffee, tea, sugar, timber, fibres, palm oil, 
minerals), there is a hidden transfer of wealth from them to importing countries. If the 
importing country is rich (which has tended to be the case), then this wealth transfer only 
exacerbates such a disparity. The transfer of wealth remains hidden from the national 
accounts of both countries because national accounts do not record externalities. 
The example also has a general message. Modern consumption patterns, relying as they 
do on imported primary goods from distant parts of the world, are prone to being under-
priced. And they are under-priced at source for reasons similar to the present example. 
That the final products are under-priced provides people with an incentive to consume 
not only too much, but also consume the ecologically wrong sorts of goods. Moreover, 
research and development expenditure is directed toward producing new products and new 
technologies that are profligate in the use of primary products. That puts further pressure on 
the biosphere.
Why should our citizen investor want economic accounts to include inclusive wealth? The reason 
is, movements in inclusive wealth track well-being across the generations exactly. If a change 
increases well-being across the generations, it records a rise in inclusive wealth. Conversely, if 
a change has an adverse effect on well-being across the generations, it records a decline in 
inclusive wealth. Inclusive wealth and well-being across the generations are not the same object, 
but they move in the exactly the same way.98 
How can a measure that is designed to reflect an economy’s productive capacity also reflect 
well-being across the generations? The answer is that in estimating inclusive wealth, accounting 
prices are used to value capital goods. If we were now to return to the definition of accounting 
prices (Section 5), we would recognise that they provide the link between wealth and well-
being. Though it may seem materialistic to speak of wealth, in talking about inclusive wealth 
rather than wealth without the qualification, we do not create any dissonance between our 
ethical concerns and our concerns about the means to use for enabling lives to flourish. Which 
is why it should cause no surprise that appraising investment projects amounts to examining 
whether the projects contribute to inclusive wealth.
Economists have long advocated that the criterion for project appraisal should be the net 
present value (NPV) of the flow of social benefits. The idea is to measure the flow of benefits, 
net of costs, in terms of the accounting values of the flow of goods and services. The procedure 
then involves summing the flow of net benefits, discounted at social discount rates. But 
summing a project’s benefits over time amounts to the change in inclusive wealth that would be 
brought about by the project. It is entirely satisfying that a criterion long in use in social cost-
benefit analysis matches the requirement that policy analysis should be conducted in terms of 
the effect of policies on inclusive wealth. Notice though, there is no connection between GDP 
98 The equivalence is stated formally and proved in the Review (Chapter 13).
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and the NPV of investment projects. To advocate the use of GDP to measure economic progress 
while advancing NPV as the criterion for project appraisal is bad economics. We have no 
explanation for why the two have managed to survive simultaneously.
We have now come full circle to where we began, for our citizen investor now recognises 
that maximising the value of portfolios amounts to wealth maximisation, but as citizen she 
interprets wealth to be inclusive wealth. Accounting wages and salaries in this reckoning are 
the social returns on human capital; continued protection afforded by mangrove forests against 
storms is the return on keeping shrimp farmers at bay; planting and tending trees helps to raise 
biodiversity and at the same time reduces carbon in the atmosphere; creating Protected Areas 
on land and the seas prevents loss of biodiversity; and so on. 
The citizen investor now understands that she has been misled all these years in being told that 
GDP growth amounts to economic progress, that her concerns over biodiversity loss run against 
what she is told is sound economic reasoning. She realises that the change from one period to 
the next in inclusive wealth amounts to inclusive investment, that is, the accounting value of net 
changes over the period in the quantities or qualities of all three classes of capital goods. 
She now puts pen to paper to confirm that inclusive wealth increases from one period to the 
next if (and only if) consumption in that period is less than net domestic product (NDP), that 
is, GDP minus the accounting value of depreciation of all capital goods. She realises that it is 
possible for GDP to increase over a period of time even as inclusive wealth increases. But she also 
realises that because the Impact Inequality globally is so large today, the possibility of global GDP 
growth generated by activities that cause depreciation of natural assets for an indefinite period 
into the future, even while inclusive global wealth increases, is highly unlikely. She realises that 
only formal economic models that include natural capital can, once they have been estimated 
from data, provide an answer. 
She may also feel that for equity reasons, raising material standards of living in low income 
countries and regions ought to take precedence. And because she is persuaded that individual 
preferences are socially embedded, she is sanguine that citizens of wealthy countries would 
not be sacrificing anything of substance in changing their patterns of consumption to be 
less damaging.
Our citizen investor realises as well that economics, when practised correctly, reflects her ethics 
and provides her with a grammar for expressing her concerns – opposite to what she has been 
told over the years. Once she has understood all that, she will complain to her government that 
it is relying on a misleading index of economic success and is correspondingly mismanaging the 
economy’s assets. She will ask her economic and finance ministry to explain, for example, why 
its economists do not include the accounting value of natural capital in the investment projects 
they appraise or in the public policies they advocate. She will ask her government to explain 
to her why it is not doing more to repair a global financial system that permitted the world’s 
50 largest banks last year to provide more than US$2.6 trillion in loans and other credit to 
sectors that have an adverse impact on biodiversity (forestry and agriculture).99 
She will then bring her complaints to the attention of her community. Her hope is that if citizens 
act together, not only will her government listen, but the world will listen too. She will insist that 
eternal vigilance may be the price we have to pay for freedom, but that that freedom will prove 
to be meaningless if we are unable to prevent Nature from utter exhaustion.
99 See Portfolio Earth (2020).
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Part II 
The Road Ahead
18 Options for Change
At their core, the problems we face today are no different from those our ancestors faced: how 
to find a balance between what we take from the biosphere and what we leave behind for 
our descendants. Whereas though our distant ancestors were incapable of affecting the Earth 
System as a whole, we are not only able to do that, we are doing it. Humanity now faces a 
choice: we can continue down a path where our demands on Nature far exceed its capacity to 
meet them on a sustainable basis; or we can take a different path, one where our engagements 
with Nature are not only sustainable but also enhance our collective well-being and that of 
our descendants.
The Review constructs a unified framework for the economics of biodiversity (Review, Chapters 
0-13), which we have presented in a brief form in Part I here. The framework has enabled us 
to show that the reasons we are on our current path can be traced to institutional failure writ 
large – it is not merely a case of market failure – and the failure of contemporary conceptions 
of economic possibilities to acknowledge that we are embedded within Nature, we are not 
external to it.100
The Review has also applied the framework to explore institutions that can help us to better 
engage with the natural world (Chapters 14-20). Because biodiversity varies geographically, 
success will look different from one region, ecosystem or country to the next. Part I showed why. 
Different environmental problems also require action that is sensitive to local socio-ecological 
conditions. There are countries that are so badly governed that the prime recommendation 
of concerned citizens there would be to let their communities manage their local ecosystems 
without state interference. There are countries where well-meaning governance has weakened 
the place of local knowledge in people’s lives. Then there are countries where with every good 
intention the state has embraced policies that may have worked elsewhere but are unsuitable 
there. And, of course, societies differ also in their conception of what enables lives to flourish.
The Review has addressed the currently near-universal conception of economic progress and 
shown it to be wildly misleading. The Review has also constructed the necessary grammar if 
economics is to help shape our values and serve them, not direct them. That is why we do not 
even attempt to produce a blueprint of policies appropriate in different locations. What follows 
instead guides the reader through options humanity has for achieving the necessary change.
The options for change are geared towards three broad, interconnected transitions, requiring 
humanity to (i) ensure that our demands on Nature do not exceed its supply, and that we 
increase Nature’s supply relative to its current level; (ii) change our measures of economic 
success to help guide us on a more sustainable path; and (iii) transform our institutions and 
systems – in particular our finance and education systems – to enable these changes and 
sustain them for future generations (Figure 21). The changes needed in our institutions and our 
100 The failure writ large includes especially our failure to create appropriate institutions. We are genetically and culturally a 
small-group animal that in an evolutionary eyeblink has gone from tens of hundreds to groups of millions to billions. We have 
developed technologies in a few generations that enable us to alter the biosphere dramatically, potentially exterminate ourselves, but 
we have not developed the supra-national institutions that are increasingly necessary if we are to achieve a sustainable pattern of 
activities. We are most grateful to Paul Ehrlich for framing this problem for us. 
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customary behaviour will involve hard choices. In what follows we present some of the ideas 
that, hopefully, will prove to be useful and on which others will build.101
Figure 21 Summary of Options for Change
The success stories from around the world brought together below not only show what is 
possible, they also encourage the thought that the same ingenuity – some would say the 
innate capability – that has led us to make demands on the biosphere so large, so damaging 
and so quickly relative to the history of the biosphere, can also be redeployed to bring about 
transformative change, perhaps even in just as short a time. Although time is not on our side, it 
is not too late for us, both individually and collectively, to make the conscious decision to change 
paths. Our descendants deserve nothing less.
19 Nature’s Supply and Our Demands
In the wake of the Second World War, what became known as the Marshall Plan was launched 
to rebuild Western Europe. While most historians agree that the recovery experienced in Europe 
cannot be attributed to the Marshall Plan alone, there can be no doubt that it sped that 
astonishing recovery: industrial production in recipient countries leapt by 55% in just four years; 
by the effective end of the Marshall Plan in 1951, national per capita incomes in Britain, France 
and West Germany were more than 10% above pre-war levels; and the resumption of growth 
was sustained over the decades that followed (Eichengreen and De Long, 1991; Eichengreen, 
2010). If we are to enhance the biosphere’s health and reduce our demands, large-scale 
changes will be required, underpinned by levels of ambition, coordination and political will akin 
to (or even greater than) those of the Marshall Plan.102 We elaborate on why below.
101 What follows has been adapted from Chapter 21 of the Review. 
102 Such a plea has been made by others, including in Al Gore’s Earth in Balance, first published in 1992, and more recently in a 
speech by HRH The Prince of Wales to mark the start of Climate Week NYC, 2020. 
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19.1 Conservation and Restoration of Ecosystems
In Part I we identified reasons it is less costly to conserve Nature than it is to restore it, other 
things equal. It was noted that markets alone are inadequate for protecting ecosystems 
from overuse. Uncertainty in our knowledge of ecosystem tipping points, the irreversibility 
of ecosystem processes, and imperfections in verifying one another’s activities, when taken 
together, mean that quantity restrictions (e.g. on extraction or pollution) may be a better 
instrument than taxation. In the context of conservation, it follows that quantity restrictions, 
informed by science and supported by legislation, will help to correct the externalities pervasive 
in our engagements with Nature.
Protected Areas have an essential role in conserving and restoring our natural capital, but it has 
been estimated that only 20% of Protected Areas are being managed well.103 Improvements can 
be made by ensuring that Protected Areas (i) are extended and integrated into the surrounding 
land and sea; (ii) involve indigenous people and local communities; and (iii) receive sufficient 
resources for their effective management (Review, Chapter 18). The Review points to successes 
from around the world to demonstrate what is possible and what works. Examples include the 
co-management of the Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve and Haida Heritage Site in Canada, 
the community-led management of Cabo Pulmo National Park in Mexico, and the increase in the 
global designation of Marine Protected Areas, from 3.2 million km2 in 2000 to 26.9 million km2 
today (Duarte et al. 2018; Duarte et al. 2020a, 2020b).
More investment in Protected Areas is needed. The funds required are small. It has been 
estimated that to protect 30% of the world’s land and ocean and managing the areas effectively 
by 2030 would require an average investment of US$140 billion annually, equivalent to only 
0.16% of global GDP and less than one-third of the global government subsidies currently 
supporting activities that destroy Nature (Waldron et al. 2020). The benefits, even when 
confined to financial benefits, of such levels of protection are estimated to exceed the costs 
significantly (Waldron et al. 2020). But there are wider benefits, including lowering the risks 
of societal catastrophes in relation to human health – not least the risks of the emergence and 
spread of infectious diseases. Dobson et al. (2020) have estimated that the associated costs 
over a 10-year period of efforts to monitor and prevent disease spillover (which is driven by 
wildlife trade and by loss and fragmentation of tropical forests) would represent just 2% of the 
estimated costs of COVID-19.
There is the fear though that biodiversity conservation afforded by marine and terrestrial 
protected areas would be neutralised by disruptions caused by climate change. And that 
should remind us that Nature’s regulating and maintenance services are complementary to one 
another. Neither climate change nor biodiversity loss can be tempered on its own and the efforts 
designed to temper them should recognise that.
While avoiding degradation of Nature should be the priority, restoration – habitat management, 
rewilding, allowing natural regeneration and creating sustainably productive lands and seas 
– also plays an essential role in improving the health of the biosphere (Review, Chapter 19). 
Restoration can also help us to address the imbalance between our demands for the biosphere’s 
provisioning services on the one hand and for its regulating, maintenance and cultural services 
on the other.
Much of global biodiversity and many of our ecosystems lie outside Protected Areas. Modern 
agriculture has driven a great deal of environmental decline. Even though monoculture 
systems have raised food production, they have diminished biodiversity. Restoration can shift 
monocultures and degraded lands and seas to a landscape that provides multiple ecosystem 
services, balancing provisioning services with regulating services. Shifting cultivation and crop 
103 See UNEP-WCMC, IUCN and NGS (2018).
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rotations (they increase soil fertility and reduce pests) have been standard practice in sustainable 
land management. Today that should be supplemented by the offer of greater incentives to 
farmers to adopt practices that support biodiversity and ecosystem services. Agri-environment 
schemes and Payments for Ecosystems Services (PES) are obvious candidates for further 
development. As noted in Part I, the effectiveness of PES schemes has proved to be mixed in low 
income countries. But even where such schemes hold great potential, their success depends on 
their design and scale of funding. 
Better planning for the use of land and marine ecosystems, in the form of legally binding 
instruments, can help to provide a framework for balancing the competing demands we make 
of our ecosystems. By requiring that more space be given over to Nature, the planning process 
can also help to maintain, and even increase, stocks of natural capital. Lessons can be drawn 
from successes, from sustainable infrastructure development in the Bahamas, to coastal zone 
management in Belize (Review, Chapter 19). 
Ecological solutions (often referred to as Nature-based solutions) have the potential to provide 
multiple benefits. Restoring ecosystems by ecological means can not only address biodiversity 
loss and climate change, they also deliver wider economic benefits. They have frequently been 
found to be more cost-effective than engineered solutions and have far fewer unexpected 
consequences. They also create employment. As part of fiscal stimulus packages and public 
expenditure, investment in natural capital has high social value and the potential for quick 
returns. Recent research suggests that ecological investments such as afforestation, parkland 
expansion, and restoration of rural ecosystems should have high priority as part of COVID-19 
recovery stimuli (UNEP, 2020). Hepburn et al. (2020) have pointed to three reasons for investing 
in such activities. First, training requirements are minimal for many ‘green’ projects, implying 
that they can be implemented quickly. Second, the work meets social distancing norms. Third, 
many countries have blueprints of projects in existing mandates, for example, in programmes 
designed to meet international agreements on climate change.
A deeper case can be made for why we should expect a positive link between employment and 
‘green investment’. If natural capital were valued at accounting prices, we would expect green 
investment to increase substantially, possibly compensating for declines in produced or human 
capital accumulation (Section 2). Moving toward a Nature-based economic development will 
lead to greater returns to human capital. That in turn would lead to a greater demand for 
investment in human capital and for employment.
19.2 A Sustainable Ecological Footprint
If we are to avoid exceeding the limits to what Nature can provide on a sustainable basis, 
consumption and production patterns will need to be fundamentally restructured. By 
quantifying the resources required for meeting basic human needs, and comparing the 
estimates to planetary boundaries (Annex 2) for over 150 countries, a recent study found that 
while nutrition, sanitation and the elimination of extreme poverty could be met for all people 
without transgressing planetary boundaries, the universal achievement of contemporary lifestyles 
in high income countries would require resources several times the sustainable level (O’Neill et 
al. 2018). The authors’ figures are very much in line with the crude estimates we reported in 
Section 7 of our ecological footprint.
19.2.1 Changing Consumption and Production Patterns
Estimates of our current and predicted future use of provisioning services including food, 
fibre, biofuels, timber, water and fishery and aquaculture output tell a clear story of escalating 
demands, and corresponding declines in regulating and maintenance services (Review, 
Chapter 16). 
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Several approaches can help us to meet rising demands for provisioning services while 
safeguarding regulating and maintenance services. In addition to changing the balance of crops 
intended for human food and animal feed, closing gaps in agricultural yield could go some way 
without expanding agricultural land further (Foley et al. 2011). Establishing clear boundaries for 
conservation and agriculture (known as ‘land-use zoning’); making payments to avoid habitat 
conversion and reducing food waste; strategically deploying technology, infrastructure or 
knowledge; and introducing standards and certification schemes are examples of schemes that 
can help (Phalan et al. 2016). As well as strategies for avoiding habitat conversion, sustainable 
production systems can effectively deliver multiple ecosystem services. Regenerative agriculture, 
organic agriculture, agroforestry and low-trophic level aquaculture are capable of enhancing 
regulating services (such as pollination and air quality regulation) even while providing food. 
Our ecological footprint is not only made up of the material we take from the biosphere, but 
also the transformed material we deposit into it as waste (Review, Chapter 4 and 4*). Enforcing 
standards for re-use, recycling and sharing also has an important role to play, and is likely to 
have a positive economic impact, including the creation of jobs. 
Technological innovations can contribute enormously to reducing our footprint. Genetically 
modified crops can increase yields even while reducing the contribution food production 
makes to climate change and to biodiversity loss (Zilberman, Holland, and Trilnick, 2018). 
Vertical farming and meat analogues can increase yields, while reducing the contribution 
food production makes to climate change and biodiversity loss. In addition, there are ways to 
reduce environmentally damaging inputs, through such methods as precision agriculture and 
integrated pest management. Technological innovations can also help to reduce bycatch in 
fisheries. Each has potential, but they will only emerge if incentives are provided for developing 
and then establishing them on a large scale. Historically the private sector has relied on the state 
to provide the investments in research and development (R&D) that raise the productivity of 
its own investment in R&D. That there are synergies to be exploited between the two has been 
much discussed among historians of science. The state has an enormous role here for helping 
to finance and coordinate the investment that will prove to be necessary to help shift to a 
sustainable future.
We cannot however rely on technology and human ingenuity alone, we need also to change our 
production and consumption patterns. The human economy is bounded, so it would be entirely 
counterproductive to seek economic growth that damages Nature for providing the necessary 
finance for investment in R&D. If ‘business’ continues as before, consumption in high income 
countries and in the emerging high-middle and low-middle income countries is projected to 
remain the main factor driving the world’s ecological footprint. An important factor in our 
ecological footprint is our diet. Diets rich in animal products have much higher footprints than 
those based on plant products. If pastureland and land used for livestock feed are combined, 
animal agriculture uses nearly 80% of global agricultural land. Moreover, greenhouse gas 
emissions from plant-based food are 10 to 50 times less than those from animal products (Poore 
and Nemecek, 2018). Regions differ substantially in their relative footprints. Estimates suggest 
that if diets shifted away from animal products, it would be possible to feed the world’s present 
population with as little as 50% of current agricultural land. Estimates also suggest that it would 
not be possible to supply the world with environmentally intensive diets even if the Earth’s entire 
land surface was converted to agriculture (Alexander et al. 2016). 
19.2.2 Supply Chains and Trade
The expansion in global trade over the decades has run parallel with GDP. That has increased our 
ecological footprint greatly; it has also given rise to transfers of wealth from primary producers 
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to importing countries (Box 17). It is therefore useful to study the effect of trade on the 
biosphere by tracking entire supply chains.104
A shift to sustainable patterns of consumption and production will require us to embed 
environmental considerations along entire supply chains. Transparency and the sharing of 
information across supply chains is needed, and such information should be verifiable and 
support the enforcement of standards (Review, Chapter 8). Novel technologies can help. 
Improvements in geospatial data and implementation of ‘blockchains’ along entire supply chains 
can help to raise transparency, for they display the impact of commodity production on local 
ecosystems and individual species. Geospatial data combined with machine learning have been 
used to estimate a global figure for the potential threat posed by extractive activities to natural 
World Heritage Sites (WWF and Swiss Re Institute, 2020). They have also been used to monitor 
Nature-related risks in sovereign debt investments (WWF and Investec, 2019). Certification 
schemes can make a difference, but existing schemes differ in their effectiveness. WWF, for 
example, compared various voluntary certification schemes in 2013 and concluded that their 
socio-ecological performance varied substantially between schemes.105
Changes in broader trade practices and policies can support a shift to sustainability (Review, 
Chapter 15). While there are limits to what market-correcting measures, such as taxes, are able 
to achieve for reducing our ecological footprint, they can make a difference if they are applied 
widely and designed well. Border Adjustment Taxes are an important example, but face both 
technical and political problems. Sustainability provisions in regional trade agreements also 
have potential, and there are encouraging signs that the number of regional trade agreements 
featuring environmental provisions has increased over time. Similarly, financial commitments 
to environmental objectives as part of aid expenditure directed at supporting trade have also 
increased; today they account for approximately one-third of total aid (UNEP and WTO, 2018). 
19.2.3 Pricing
The accounting price of an asset or service is the sum of its market price and the tax that ought 
to be imposed on it.106 The gap between accounting prices and market prices is therefore a 
measure of inefficiency in the allocation of goods and services: the gap reflects waste in our use 
of resources. But unlike food waste (Box 7), the gap is not visible. The Review discusses various 
ways available for estimating accounting prices. Open access resources such as ground water 
and ocean fisheries are free, so their accounting prices are the taxes that ought to be imposed 
on their use (Review, Chapter 7). 
When reliable estimates of accounting prices are available, taxes can be a useful instrument for 
reducing environmentally damaging behaviour. At present, no OECD or G20 country collects 
more than 1% of its GDP in environmental taxes beyond those related to energy or motor 
vehicles (OECD, 2019). There is scope, therefore, to raise further revenue through environmental 
taxation. Such taxes need to be designed carefully, to avoid potential shifts to other activities 
that damage Nature (leakage), to avoid the risk of crossing tipping points (if behaviour is 
insufficiently influenced by the tax), and to ensure the environmental harm being taxed is 
measured to a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
There is also an urgent need to tackle perverse subsidies, which in total are equivalent to some 
5-7% of global GDP (Box 9), implying that the accounting value of Nature must be greater 
still. All prevailing subsidies have a historical rationale – distributional justice, national food 
sufficiency, political pressure from powerful lobbies and so on – which is why they prove 
104 Green et al. (2019), for example, have traced the habitat loss caused by consumption of soy to the product’s final destination.
105 Perhaps not surprisingly, in countries with weak governance there has been rapid growth of ineffective certification schemes 
(WWF, 2013).
106 In a case where the ideal policy would be to subsidise the good, the accounting price would be the market price less the subsidy.
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difficult to dislodge. But the resources that would become available to governments if they were 
removed could be used to finance programmes that benefit not only populations at large, but 
in particular the most vulnerable in society. Correcting inefficient economic distortions to resolve 
institutional failures can serve the common good.
19.2.4 Future Population
Expanding human numbers have been a significant factor in the growth of our global footprint. 
Global population is expected to continue to rise over this century (UNPD, 2019). In Part I, we 
explained how individual fertility choices are influenced by the choices made by others. We 
explored ways in which a society can become embedded in a self-sustaining mode of behaviour 
characterised by high fertility and stagnant living standards, even when there are potentially self-
sustaining modes of behaviour that are characterised by low fertility and rising living standards. 
As well as improving women’s access to finance, information and education, greater access to 
community-based modern family planning and reproductive health programmes is a means 
for women to have greater control over their lives, shift behaviours, and improve the chance of 
having healthy babies. 
The benefits of modern family planning and reproductive health programmes are high (Box 8). 
But there has been significant under-investment in family planning to date. OECD estimates 
suggest that less than 1% of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the EU to Africa is 
directed towards family planning. It has even been suggested that a dollar spent on family 
planning and reproductive health is more beneficial than a dollar spent on agricultural research, 
rotavirus vaccination, preschool education, trade facilitation, even mosquito nets (Kohler 
and Behrman, 2018). As a route to accelerating the demographic transitions, investment 
in community-based family planning and reproductive health programmes should now be 
regarded as essential. 
20 Measuring Economic Progress
Standard economic measures such as GDP can mislead. If the goal is to protect and promote 
well-being across the generations (i.e. social well-being), governments should measure inclusive 
wealth (a measure of societal means). Inclusive wealth is the sum of the accounting values 
of produced capital, human capital, and natural capital. The measure corresponds directly to 
well-being across the generations (Review, Section 17): if a change enhances social well-being, 
it raises inclusive wealth; if the change diminishes social well-being, it reduces inclusive wealth. 
Social well-being and inclusive wealth are not the same object, but they move in tandem. There 
lies the value of inclusive wealth in economic accounts.
Natural capital accounting is a necessary step towards the creation of inclusive wealth accounts. 
It enables us to understand and appreciate the place of Nature’s services in our economies, 
including the services that are usually overlooked; it enables us to track the movement of natural 
capital over time (a prerequisite for sustainability assessment); and it offers us a way to estimate 
the impact of policies on natural capital (a prerequisite for policy analysis). 
Frameworks for natural capital accounting and assessment are being developed, in many cases 
through the UN’s System of Environmental and Economic Accounts. Countries are beginning 
to incorporate natural capital and ecosystem services into national economic metrics of success. 
China’s Gross Ecosystem Product, and New Zealand’s Living Standards Framework are examples 
(Review, Chapters 12 and 13).
These are early days for natural capital accounts. Increased investment in physical accounts and 
in ecosystem valuation would improve them. International cooperation in the construction of 
national accounts and the sharing of data would improve decision-making around the world. 
Harmonisation of national accounts should be coupled with technical assistance. Incorporating 
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natural capital accounts in macroeconomic surveillance undertaken by international financial 
institutions – for example, the International Monetary Fund’s Article IV surveillance activities 
(IMF, 2020) – would also send a strong signal, inspiring governments’ reform agendas to reflect 
the scale and urgency of the problems societies face.
Whether we account for Nature in economic measures is key for how we interpret 
productivity.107 Contemporary models of economic growth and development tend only to 
consider produced and human capital as primary factors of production, not explicitly natural 
capital (Review, Chapter 13). Typically, Total Factor Productivity estimates are biased upward 
and should be treated with scepticism. Improving and using measures of productivity that 
account for the use of, and impact on, Nature are crucial if we are to understand what improved 
productivity means. There are several initiatives, such as the OECD’s greening productivity 
measurement workstream (OECD, 2017a), that have made a start.
21 Transforming Our Institutions and Systems
Our global collective failure to achieve sustainability has its roots in our institutions. Many of the 
institutions we have built have proved to be wholly unfit to curb our excesses; worse, they have 
helped to enlarge the gap between what we are led to believe is possible and Nature’s bounded 
capacity to respond to our demands. Effective institutions are the foundations on which to 
rebuild our engagement with Nature and manage our assets. Beyond ensuring our institutions 
are fit for purpose, including in relation to managing public goods, changes in two other 
systems are particularly important: the global financial system and our education system. 
In Section 17 we presented a general finding: neither top-down nor bottom-up institutional 
structures work well. What the inhabitant of an ecosystem knows and can observe differs from 
what an agent from the national government knows and can observe. Moreover, institutions 
that work well are neither entirely rigid nor entirely flexible, they are both ‘polycentric’ and 
‘layered’, meaning that knowledge and perspectives at all levels from different organisations, 
communities and individuals are pooled and spread.
It is a commonplace assertion that we live in a highly interconnected world today. That has 
been applauded over the years because the fruits of labour at one place have been transmitted 
to other places in short order. Ideas and practices in one location are transmitted rapidly to 
other locations through movements of people and goods. But adverse disturbances are also 
transmitted rapidly. That has become cruelly evident in the rapid spread of COVID-19.
What makes for effective institutions has particular salience for the management of global public 
goods. Beyond exclusive economic zones the oceans are a public good. They are also an open-
access common property of all nations.108 As they are a global public good (in the 1970s they 
were called a Common Heritage of Mankind), the accounting rents from the issue of fishing 
rights and charges levied on the use of the oceans for cruises and the transportation of goods 
could be collected and shared among nations. A lively discussion took place in the 1970s of 
the amount of global rents that could be collected in the form of a tax on ocean resources (e.g. 
manganese nodules on the sea bed), the idea being that the tax could be used as development 
aid. The proposed Global Ocean Treaty, currently under negotiation among UN members, 
presents an opportunity to fill gaps in governance within existing supra-national arrangements 
to address biodiversity monitoring and conservation.
Some ecosystems have the features of a global public good but are not a global common 
because they are located within national boundaries. Tropical rainforests are an example. 
107 The technical term for productivity of aggregate capital is Total Factor Productivity (Chapter 13).
108 By creating exclusive economic zones of up to 200 miles, the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea sought to eliminate 
the incentives nations have to deplete ocean resources, but technological and geographical advantages mean that adverse 
incentives remain.
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Management of river basins that cover many countries are a regional example. It is right to 
ask whether the fate of our economies, livelihoods and well-being should rest on national 
sovereignty. A fairer approach would be to pay those countries for the protection of the 
ecosystems on whose services we all rely. The 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity will agree on global goals post-2020. Nature is also an important 
theme for the 26th Conference of the Parties of the UN Convention on Climate Change. These 
conferences provide powerful opportunities to set a new direction for the coming decade.
22 The Global Financial System
Finance plays a crucial role. A significant portion of the responsibility for helping us to shift 
course will fall on the global financial system. Governments, central banks, international financial 
institutions (such as Multilateral Development Banks) and private financial institutions all have a 
role to play in making the shift. 
The problem is to encourage private financial institutions to take note of accounting prices, if 
only implicitly. The qualification is required because market prices of natural capital are far from 
their accounting prices. So indirect means are required. One such means is for governments and 
international financial institutions to invest in Nature, which may involve directing investment 
away from projects that degrade Nature and their unsustainable use. Projects that are 
complementary to public investment would then be attractive to private financial institutions. 
The financial system would be made to move its lending and credit activities also if consumers 
signal their distaste for investments that are rapacious in the use of Nature’s goods and services. 
Citizens can insist that firms disclose conditions along their supply chains (product labelling is 
a partial method for doing that). Consumers could also boycott such products as those that do 
not meet standards. Reputation matters to firms, and that can be exploited by citizens.
To leave Nature alone so that it is able to thrive is to invest in it. Governments have tools at their 
disposal to make that happen, even if through indirect means. They range from taxes, subsidies, 
regulations and prohibitions to Nature-specific mechanisms, such as payments for ecosystem 
services (Box 13) and biodiversity offsetting schemes. While the relative share of biodiversity 
funding within the overall budget for Official Development Assistance has increased in recent 
years, existing flows are insufficient to meet conservation needs in developing countries. 
Increasing those financial flows could take the form of debt forgiveness, direct grants or 
technical assistance. The creation of binding targets on public investments in natural capital to 
ensure that globally agreed objectives are met would go an important step further.
The risks associated with biodiversity loss – reductions in the productivity and resilience of 
ecosystems along supply chains – have significant macroeconomic and financial implications. 
Far more global support is needed for initiatives directed at enhancing the understanding and 
awareness among financial institutions of Nature-related financial risks, learning and building 
on the advances on climate-related financial risks. Central banks and financial supervisors can 
support this by assessing the systemic extent of Nature-related financial risks. A set of global 
standards is required. They should be underpinned by data that are both credible and useful for 
decision-making. Businesses and financial institutions could then be obliged to integrate Nature-
related considerations with their other objectives. The idea ultimately is to have them assess 
and disclose their use of natural capital. The Task Force on Nature-related Financial Disclosures, 
established in 2020, is a step in that direction. 
There is growing evidence that individual investors want investment providers to consider 
sustainability and Nature in their investment decisions (UNEP and PRI, 2019). Integrating the 
protection of biodiversity with the fiduciary duties of institutional investors and asset managers 
would be a way to ensure their investment policies account for natural capital. One barrier to 
this is myopia. Impacts of Nature’s diminution can be felt over long time-horizons. Fisheries 
practices in the oceans will leave an imprint that will be felt by generations of future people. 
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Destruction of tropical rainforests is to all intents and purposes irreversible. The time horizon 
within which financial actors plan and act is, unhappily, not more than a few years. Financial 
regulators and supervisors can play a key role in the necessary shift by changing their own 
assessment horizons and using their regulatory powers.
Many of the risks to life and property associated with ecological degradation are positively 
correlated among those who are affected. If the loss of mangrove forests makes someone more 
vulnerable to cyclones, it makes their neighbours more vulnerable also. Which is why there is 
need for global, regional and national insurance funds. Although there are examples of regional 
insurance schemes for environmental disasters (e.g. the African Risk Capacity and the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility), there is currently no global insurance scheme. In principle, a 
global risk pool – with contributions from all countries – could help protect vulnerable countries 
against such shocks following extreme events. Emergency relief is not uncommon even at the 
global level, but its volume is always uncertain. And it that comes after a disaster strikes a 
community. Insurance, in contrast, is a security against disaster. Investing in Nature is a reliable 
form of insurance.
23 Empowered Citizenship
Ultimately though, it is we citizens who can bring about such changes. As citizens, we need to 
demand and shape the change we seek. We can do this, for example, by insisting that financiers 
invest our money sustainably, that firms disclose environmental conditions along their supply 
chains (product labelling is a partial method for doing that), even boycotting products that do 
not meet standards. Reputation matters, and that can be exploited by citizens. If we are not 
acting now, it is because we have grown distant from Nature. Such detachment is in part a 
symptom of societal change, including growing urbanisation, the profusion of technology, and 
reduced access to green spaces. Detachment from Nature has meant a loss in our physical and 
emotional state.
In their admirable survey of a growing literature on the role played by our direct experiences 
of biodiversity with personal well-being, Capaldi et al. (2015) distinguish two aspects of those 
experiences: contact with Nature and connectedness with Nature. The former could even 
involve interaction with the natural world via indoor plants or from virtual representations of 
Nature such as photographs or paintings of natural landscapes. The latter refers to a person’s 
sense of connectedness with the natural world, it reflects the extent to which she internalises 
the experiences she has with Nature. If contact with the natural world is a means to furthering 
personal well-being, connectedness with Nature is an aspect of well-being itself.
Access to green spaces (they are local public goods) can also reduce socio-economic inequalities 
in health. Interventions to increase people’s contact and connectedness with Nature would not 
only improve our health and well-being, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that 
those interventions would also motivate us to make informed choices and demand change 
(Review, Chapter 11).
There are glimmers of hope. Examples of Nature renewal in urban environments are one 
(Box 13). That our desires and wants are to a significant extent socially embedded is also a 
cause for hope that economising on the use of Nature’s provisioning services among the many 
throughout the world who enjoy high material standards of living would prove to be personally 
less costly than they fear, provided of course the economy is shared. Contemporary conceptions 
of the human person cuts against the grains of our sociability; we are encouraged to imagine 
that the thriftiness we may feel should be practised by all will fall on us unilaterally. That 
probably explains why most of us do not act with our neighbours to practise it.
So, there are grounds for hope. The grounds no doubt have involved small initiatives so far, but 
the economics of biodiversity is not the preserve of the large. The conception we would all wish 
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to adopt is grand, but it is ultimately we citizens who will determine whether we are able live in 
peace with Nature.
24 Education
Our increasing detachment from Nature would seem to accompany the increasing detachment 
of Nature from economic reasoning. Many view Nature almost entirely through an 
anthropocentric lens, even while our physical interaction with and emotional attachment to 
Nature declines. It would seem then that if we are to appreciate our place in Nature, we have to 
educate ourselves.109 We would only then begin to appreciate the infinitely beautiful tapestry of 
Nature’s processes and forms.
Every child in every country is owed the teaching of natural history, to be introduced to the awe 
and wonder of the natural world, to appreciate how it contributes to our lives. Establishing the 
natural world within educational policy would contribute to countering the shifting baseline, 
whereby we progressively redefine ourselves as inhabitants of an emptying world and believe 
that what we see is how it is and how it will continue to be. This shifting baseline has been 
termed the ‘extinction of experience’ (Pyle, 2003).
Achieving tangible effects, however, is not straightforward. The development and design of 
environmental education programmes can be directed to overcome the problems. Bawa et al. 
(2020) have used agricultural colleges in India as examples to propose that their curricula should 
now include ‘biodiversity science’. In their wide-ranging survey of documenting direct impacts of 
environmental education, Ardoin, Bowers, and Gaillard (2020) have suggested that focusing on 
local issues or locally relevant dimensions of broader issues, such as collaborating with scientists, 
resource managers and community organisations, are of enormous help. The Review’s emphasis 
on the role of communities and civil societies in the economics of biodiversity is consonant with 
that line of thinking. 110
But even that would not be enough. Connecting with Nature needs to be woven throughout 
our lives. The connection has been found to decline from childhood to an overall low in the 
mid-teens, followed by a steady rise that reaches a plateau lasting the rest of one’s life (Hughes 
et al. 2019). It is a cruel irony that we surround children with pictures and toys of animals and 
plants, only to focus subsequently on more conceptual knowledge, marginalising environmental 
education relative to the wider curriculum. Even if we had studied Nature in primary school, 
we may not have encountered the subject subsequently.111 In US universities it was common 
practice to require first-year students to complete a course on a broad-brush history of 
civilisation. There is every reason universities should require new students to attend a course on 
basic ecology. Field studies that would accompany such a course would be a way to connect 
students with Nature, in particular those that may have grown up in an urban environment. 
Understanding even the simplest of the biosphere’s processes may well be the first step toward 
developing a love of Nature.
There is a further reason for connecting people with Nature at an early age. The three pervasive 
features of Nature – mobility, silence and invisibility – mean that the consequences of actions 
which desecrate Nature are often untraceable to those who are responsible. Neither the rule of 
law nor the dictates of social norms are sufficient to make us account for Nature in our daily 
practices. Institutional rules, no matter how well designed, would be insufficient for eliminating 
109 We are grateful to Mary Colwell for preparing a note for us on the place of education in the economics of biodiversity. 
This section is adapted from her piece.
110 In a study of institutions of higher education in India, Bawa et al. (2020) have advocated that agricultural colleges should now 
include biodiversity science in their curricula. 
111 There are signs of change. The charity iAfrica is experimenting with a digital education programme on Nature conservation in 
schools in sub-Saharan Africa. In the UK, a GCSE in Natural History is expected to be introduced in England in 2022
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environmental externalities. We will have to rely also on self-enforcement, that is, be our own 
judge and jury. And that cannot happen without creating an environment in which, from an 
early age, we are able to connect with Nature.
25 Nature’s Intrinsic Worth: Sacredness
The Review has developed the economics of biodiversity by viewing Nature in anthropocentric 
terms. That is an altogether narrow viewpoint, but it has a justification. If, as we have shown in 
Part I, Nature should be protected and promoted even when valued solely for its uses to us, we 
would have even stronger reasons to protect and promote it if we were to acknowledge that it 
has intrinsic value.112
Many people, perhaps in all societies, locate the sacred in Nature. And the sacred is not 
negotiable, unless we are able to rationalise by imagining it to be incorruptible. The Ganges is 
sacred to Hindus – she is known as Ma Ganga. And yet it is one of the most polluted rivers in 
the world, being the sink into which industrial chemicals, household waste, agricultural runoff, 
and cremation remains are fed. Many say there is no dissonance between the river’s sacredness 
and its role as a carrier of human waste because being celestial, Ma Ganga is incorruptible. 
It is common practice everywhere to rationalise when we are faced with contending needs 
and wants.
We are able to avoid rationalising incompatible demands only when protecting the sacred is not 
too costly. It is only then that we regard the sacred to be non-negotiable. In Benin, legislation 
has enshrined the sanctity of sacred groves into law. Many social practices of communities there 
rely on materials and resources drawn directly from forests: leaves, animals, water and stones. 
Those areas are considered sacred because they have traditionally been seen to be inhabited 
by deities or spirits. The sites also serve as spaces for rituals. Hunting is prohibited there, as is 
setting fires to the groves. Traditionally, custody of sacred forests was entrusted to members of 
a certain lineage. Logging and gathering plants for food and medicine were regulated by local 
communities (Houngbo, 2019). Benin has nearly 3,000 sacred groves – covering an area of over 
18,000 hectares, which accounts for 0.16% of the national territory. The groves themselves are 
mostly small – only around 10% are larger than 5 hectares (Soury, 2007). Forests are, however, 
disappearing in Benin: in 1990 they covered 50% of land, but today the figure is less than 40%.
Many today would regard an awareness of the sacred to encompass a sense of awe and wonder, 
of a way to become aware of the transcendent. That is how we all try to locate ourselves from 
time to time within the landscape around us, imagining what lies beyond. That sense is not 
confined to what cosmopolitans might call ‘traditional cultures’. Some of the most sublime 
songs of the poet Rabindranath Tagore have roots in the Vedanta, but they are detached from 
the rituals that had been given expression in Vedic times. They invoke the transcendent, but they 
are not tied to religion.
That sense of spirituality is often experienced today not only in isolation but also communally, 
such as among ramblers, birdwatchers, mountain hikers, cyclists, surfers and divers (Grove-
White, 1992). The historian Simon Schama (1995) has argued that it is a mistake to think that 
Western cultures have abandoned the spiritual aspects of the natural world, or that they have 
abandoned the myths that were created around Nature. He showed that the transcendent has 
been expressed repeatedly in art and architecture. Nature’s transcendence gives it a value that is 
independent of us.
Although the sense of transcendence that Nature invokes may still exist everywhere, it has taken 
a severe beating in modern times. Contending needs and wants have displaced our feeling that 
112 We have benefited greatly from discussions on the intrinsic value of Nature with Simon Beard of the Centre for the Study of 
Existential Risk at Cambridge, including on ways to conceptualise the moral value of Nature, with a view to showing us how to think 
about these difficult matters, not what to think. The Review (Chapter 11) contains a sketch of his ideas. 
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by protecting the landscape we protect ourselves. The ability of richer societies to desecrate the 
landscape elsewhere has helped to accommodate those conflicting feelings, and the discipline 
of economics has increasingly aided that accommodation. Economic justification in high income 
countries is all too often a euphemism for commercial justification; and in low income countries 
the term ‘economic development’ is routinely used to justify blatantly unworthy investments.
That need not have been. Correct economic reasoning is entangled with our values. Biodiversity 
does not only have instrumental value, it also has intrinsic worth – perhaps even moral worth. 
Each of these senses is enriched when we recognise that we are embedded in Nature. To detach 
Nature from economic reasoning is to imply that we consider ourselves to be external to Nature. 
The fault is not in economics; it lies in the way we have chosen to practise it.
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Annex 1 Safe Operating Distance From 
Planetary Boundaries
Further evidence of the biosphere’s degradation is adduced from a study of Earth System 
processes. The idea has been to identify processes of the biosphere that are critical for 
maintaining the stable state we experienced in the past 11,000 years or so (the Holocene). 
Rockstrom et al. (2009) identified nine biophysical processes that are critical for Earth System 
functioning. The authors’ proposal was to set quantitative boundaries for each, beyond which 
the Earth’s Holocene state would be put at further risk, making the move to the Anthropocene 
firmer. The authors named the markers that may be used to check whether the processes are 
undergoing rapid change, planetary boundaries. A planetary boundary is not equivalent to a 
global threshold or tipping point. In any case, not all nine key processes are known to possess 
single definable thresholds, and for those where a threshold is known to exist, there are 
uncertainties about where they might lie. Boundaries are placed upstream of these thresholds at 
the safe end of the zone of uncertainty.
Although not all the nine processes have single identifiable markers, crossing the boundaries 
increases the risk of large-scale, potentially irreversible, environmental changes. Four of the 
nine processes have taken the planet into regions the authors regard as outside safe operating 
space, meaning that there are now increasing risk of a significant change from the biosphere’s 
conditions in the Holocene. Biosphere integrity (for which one may read ‘biodiversity’) and 
nitrogen and phosphorus cycles have exceeded their boundaries farthest. But land-use change 
and climate change are also outside their safe operating space (Figure 22).
Unravelling the notion of biosphere integrity has proved problematic. As Figure 22 shows, 
Rockstrom et al. (2009) had identified it with the extinction rate of species per million per 
year (E/MSY). One problem with the use of this metric is that extinction rates are estimated 
most often for vertebrate species (only amounting to <2% of described species). Mace et al. 
(2014) have argued moreover that extinction rates do not reflect the genetic library of life, 
nor the functional diversity of ecosystems, nor the conditions and coverage of Earth’s biomes. 
The authors’ observations speak to the markers of biodiversity we explored in Chapters 2 
and 3. We see below that those markers reflect ominous features of the Anthropocene. A new 
boundary based on the Biodiversity Intactness Index (BII) is under development, but has yet to be 
quantified (Steffen et al. 2015).
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Figure 22 Critical Earth System Processes and Their Boundaries
Source: J. Lokrantz/Azote based on Steffen, W. et al. (2015) ‘Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing 
planet’, Science, 347(6223:1–10). Note: P = phosphorus; N = nitrogen; BII = Biodiversity Intactness Index and E/MSY = extinctions 
per million species per year.
A further respect in which the idea of planetary boundary has been extended is to study sub-
global boundaries. This is important because, as was noted in Chapter 2, crossing a boundary 
at a regional level (e.g. destruction of the Amazon rainforest) can have implications for the 
whole Earth System. Regional level boundaries have now been developed for biosphere integrity, 
biogeochemical flows, land-use systems and freshwater use.
The idea of planetary boundaries has powerful heuristic appeal and has excited the 
public’s imagination of the processes that govern the Earth System. It may have proved 
to be a problematic concept, but it is a most useful classification of the Earth System’s 
biogeochemical processes.
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Annex 2 Why Common Pool Resources?
Why did communities not permit themselves to divide their local ecosystem and turn them 
into private properties? One reason would have been the need to pool risks. Woodlands, for 
example, are spatially heterogeneous ecosystems. Microclimate matters, as does variation in 
soil quality. In some years one group of plants bears fruit in one part of a woodland, in other 
years some other group of plants, in some other part, are fecund. Relative to average output, 
fluctuations could be presumed to be larger in arid regions, mountain regions and unirrigated 
areas. If a woodland was to be divided into private parcels, each household would face greater 
risks than it would under communal ownership and mutual-regulation. The reduction in 
individual household risks may be small, but as average incomes are very low in Indian villages, 
household benefits from communal ownership and mutual enforcement of agreements could be 
expected to be large. Communal ownership helps to pool risks.
An immediate corollary is that income inequality is smaller in those locations where CPRs 
are more prominent. Aggregate incomes is a different matter, though, and it is the arid and 
mountain regions and unirrigated landscapes that are the poorest. However, the dependence 
on CPRs even within dry regions declines with increasing incomes across households. Theory 
predicts it and case studies confirm it (Jodha, 1986, 2001; Cavendish, 2000).
Where users are symmetrically placed, distributions would be expected to be symmetric – a 
subtle matter to devise if the resource is heterogeneous. Rotation of access to the best site is an 
example of how that can be achieved. It is often practised in coastal fisheries, fuel reserves in 
forest land, and fodder sites in the grasslands and mountain slopes (Netting, 1981; Baland and 
Platteau, 1996). Rotation enables users to get a fair share.
It would be possible in principle for the community to parcel out the resource as private 
property and let households establish a mutual insurance scheme. But that move would 
jeopardise cooperation in other activities. For at least two reasons. First, cooperation appears 
to be habit forming, which means dispensing with cooperation in any one activity could lead 
to a weakening of cooperation in other activities. Secondly, cooperation is more robust when 
sanctions for opportunism in any one venture include exclusions not only from that venture, 
but also from other collective ventures. Abandoning cooperation in one field of activity thus 
reduces the robustness of cooperation in other fields of activity. This fact is an implication of the 
theory of games. It explains why economic relationships are so frequently tied to one another 
(Dasgupta, 2007).
Local ecosystems are frequently CPRs also because animals, birds and insects are mobile. 
Mobility integrates an ecosystem’s components. A coastal ecosystem can hardly be split into 
bits: fish swim. In Section 2 it was also noted that the productivity of ecosystems is greater than 
the sum of the productivities of their spatial parts. Ecosystems therefore have an element of 
indivisibility to them. But even if it was decreed that no portion could be converted for another 
use, parcelling ecosystems into private bits would be inefficient because of the externalities that 
would be created by mobile components. Communal ownership internalises those externalities. 
Admittedly, private monopoly would avoid the externalities, but it would grant far too much 
power to one person in the community.
Agricultural land, especially in densely populated areas, is a different matter. Both labour and 
capital are critical inputs in production. Investment can increase land’s productivity enormously. 
Agricultural land as CPRs would be subject to serious management problems, including those 
due to the temptations to free ride on investment costs. The lack of incentives to invest and 
innovate would lead to stagnation, even decay. The experience with collective farms in what was 
previously the Soviet Union testifies to that. Those regions of sub-Saharan Africa where land is, 
or was until recently, held by the kinship were exceptions, but only because land was plentiful 
Annex 2 Why Common Pool Resources?
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in the past and because poor soil quality meant that land had to be kept fallow for extended 
periods. Of course, it may be that agricultural productivity remained low there because land was 
held by the kinship, not by individuals. As elsewhere in the social sciences, causation typically 
works in both directions.
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